Reprinted with permission from Trita Parsi‘s Substack:
Michelle Brohard, head of policy and geopolitical risk at Kpler, speculated in a recent interview with energy analyst Rory Johnston (@commoditycontext) that the reason why more crude is getting through the Strait of Hormuz may be because some countries are paying Iran a toll, possibly up to 20% of the value of each cargo.
I cannot verify whether this is true or not, but I have heard directly from the Iranian side that certain countries in the GCC have struck deals with Iran to allow for their oil to get out, and that this is the main reason why more traffic is flowing rather than the Trump administration’s military efforts. “Whatever flows through the Strait, it’s because we are allowing it to flow,” I have been told.
One can dismiss the Iranian account as a desperate effort to claim control over a situation that on the surface is moving against Iranian interest.
But there may also be a logic that explains why Iran would not only allow more oil to flow, but also a narrative in the West that claims Tehran has lost the battle over the Strait.
As Brohard attests in her interview, the current situation in the Strait is unsustainable. As a U.S. serviceperson in the region told me, the cost of U.S. escorts is enormous and simply cannot be sustained. Whatever the cost the U.S. shouldered for keeping Persian Gulf oil secure before the war, it is dramatically higher now – even though the U.S. itself doesn’t buy any of that oil. China does.
Thus, not only was the U.S. subsidizing Chinese oil imports before the war, but those subsidies have increased several-fold as a result of the war.
It is also unsustainable for these GCC countries to continue to buy Iran off. They are doing so because the region expects a third round of the war to begin in the next few weeks and as a result, they need to move as much oil as possible out of the Persian Gulf before hostilities resume.
So yes, Iran certainly would benefit from allowing more oil to get through if it can collect a hefty fee, particularly mindful of how Trump’s blockade has squeezed the Iranian economy.
But that is likely not the full story. Tehran is likely – either directly or through one of its partner organizations – to preempt Trump and initiate the third round of the war itself. Tehran has already deprived Trump of the ability to control the geography of the war. It may also seek to deprive it of its timing.
The initial attack will likely seek to shock the energy markets, potentially with the intent of dispelling any notion in the White House that Iran’s escalation dominance can be challenged.
To achieve that shock and shoot up oil prices dramatically, a narrative that the Strait is already open and that Tehran has lost the battle over the waterway is actually helpful to the Iranians. The more the idea of an opened Strait becomes normalized, the more of a shock Tehran will achieve if it dramatically closes it.
Unfortunately, in my assessment, all gravitational forces are currently pushing matters toward escalation and a third round of the war. As Tom Pickering and I wrote earlier today, a diplomatic de-escalation that helps evade this war may only be achieved if Beijing decides to step in.
Trita Parsi is the Executive VP of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and an award-winning author. Washingtonian Magazine has named him one of the 25 most influential voices on foreign policy. Noam Chomsky calls him “one of the most distinguished scholars on Iran”
