Strengthening Proliferation-Prevention

According to the Commission On The Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism [.pdf], their mandate was "to examine the threats posed to the United States." But their principal conclusion was that "unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013."

Terrorist attack?

Somewhere in the world?

Great Zot!

What are we "world community" citizens to do?

Well, apparently, support the "next" American President to –

  • Use "soft power" to "communicate" to the rest of world American "intentions."
  • Build "grassroots social and economic institutions" (throughout the world, but "especially in Pakistan") "that will discourage radicalism."

For example, explain to the Iranians why they must give up their "inalienable" rights to the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Rights guaranteed them – "without discrimination" – by the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Why must they?

Well, according to the Commission, "terrorist organizations are intent on acquiring nuclear weapons or the material and expertise needed to build them."

Therefore, the Commission has concluded that;

"The United States should work internationally toward strengthening the nonproliferation regime, reaffirming the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons by

"(1) imposing a range of penalties for NPT violations and withdrawal from the NPT that shift the burden of proof to the state under review for noncompliance;

"(2) ensuring access to nuclear fuel, at market prices to the extent possible, for non-nuclear states that agree not to develop sensitive fuel cycle capabilities and are in full compliance with international obligations;

"(3) strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency, to include identifying the limitations to its safeguarding capabilities, and providing the agency with the resources and authorities needed to meet its current and expanding mandate;

"(4) promoting the further development and effective implementation of counterproliferation initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism;

"(5) orchestrating consensus that there will be no new states, including Iran and North Korea, possessing uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing capability;

"(6) working in concert with others to do everything possible to promote and maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing;

"(7) working toward a global agreement on the definition of ‘appropriate’ and ‘effective’ nuclear security and accounting systems as legally obligated under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; and

"(8) discouraging, to the extent possible, the use of financial incentives in the promotion of civil nuclear power."

"We" need to take all these steps because, as the Commission noted, "the nonproliferation regime embodied in the NPT has been eroded." But the Commission didn’t note the extent to which the United States – particularly the Bush-Cheney administrations – deliberately set out to discredit, even destroy, that regime.

At this point, recall that the NPT – in and of itself – contains no enforcement mechanism, whatsoever.

So, the NPT took advantage of the existing Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency, requiring that each no-nuke NPT signatory enter into a bilateral “safeguards” agreement with the IAEA “with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons.”

Whenever the IAEA’s inspectors detect possible “diversion,” the Director-General reports that to the Board of Governors.

The Board can then decide – by a two-thirds majority – whether or not the “diversion” furthers “any military purpose” and should be reported to the UN Security Council for possible action.

Now, in his first State of the Union Address, President Bush the Younger essentially accused North Korea, Iran and Iraq of having clandestine nuclear weapons programs.

But – at that time – North Korea, Iran and Iraq were NPT signatories and had their “declared” nuclear facilities subject to IAEA periodic inspection. Furthermore, both Iraq and North Korea were subject to additional stringent IAEA surveillance.

Obviously, if Bush was to advance the American Hegemony, to impose regime change on Iraq, Iran and North Korea, on the false pretext they had nukes, the IAEA nuke proliferation-prevention regime had to be discredited or superseded.

So, in October 2002, months after we now know Bush had already decided to launch a war with Iraq, Bush falsely charged that North Korea had a secret enriched-uranium nuclear-weapons program.

Then, Bush announced in late 2002 the aforementioned (by the Commission) National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. And developed from it the aforementioned Proliferation Security Initiative of 2003, whose stated objective was to create a web of international “counter-proliferation partnerships” to prevent “proliferators” from “carrying out their trade in WMD and missile-related technology.”

According to Bonkers Bolton – then Undersecretary of State for Non-Proliferation – the PSI was necessary because “proliferators and those facilitating the procurement of deadly capabilities are circumventing existing laws, treaties and controls against WMD proliferation.”

Then, having had his wars of aggression “ratified” by his 2004 reelection, Bush made Condi Rice Secretary of State and Bonkers Bolton our temporary UN Ambassador, whereupon they attempted to get Director-General ElBaradei fired and to corrupt the IAEA Board of Governors.

Now, in 2000, in Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s opening statement to the Sixth NPT Review Conference, she encouraged conferees to focus on three key issues: how the NPT is working to (a) prevent nuclear proliferation, (b) advance nuclear disarmament, and (c) enhance cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

However, in 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice didn’t address or even attend the Seventh NPT Review Conference.

Worse, Condi’s munchkins refused to allow the findings of the 2000 NPT RevCon to even be discussed at the 2005 NPT RevCon, much less be affirmed.

Worse still, they attempted to get the NPT, itself, revised, eliminating all that pesky language requiring us (a) to disarm and (b) to facilitate the acquisition by NPT Parties (like Iran) of nuclear energy and prohibiting us from attacking NPT Parties (like Iran).

Condi also sent Stephen Rademaker to instruct the conferees about the need to replace the NPT – if not so “revised” – with President Bush’s Proliferation Security Initiative.

After becoming a paid lobbyist, Rademaker publicly “admitted” in India that the U.S.-India nuclear deal he and Condi negotiated was really all about coercing India into signing on to the PSI (they didn’t) and voting “our way” on the thoroughly corrupted IAEA Board (they did).

Now comes the Commission to essentially re-endorse the Bush-Cheney-Rice-Bolton program to "strengthen the non-proliferation regime," apparently not realizing that it was that very program which effectively emasculated it.

So, if someone does nuke you and yours in your jammies sometime before 2013, blame Bush-Cheney-Rice-Bolton.

Author: Gordon Prather

Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy implementing official for national security-related technical matters in the Federal Energy Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Department of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant for national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. -- ranking member of the Senate Budget Committee and member of the Senate Energy Committee and Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather had earlier worked as a nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California and Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico.