Iran’s Rights Compromised

According to the United Nations statute establishing the International Atomic Energy Agency:

"The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health, and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.

"The Agency is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members, and all members – in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership – shall fulfill in good faith the obligation assumed by them in accordance with this Statute."

Hence, the IAEA Secretariat, the IAEA Board of Governors, and all members are to – “in good faith” – assist in the development and practical application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes in all member states.

In order to ensure that “special fissionable or other materials, equipment, services, equipment, facilities, and information” are not used “in such a way as to further any military purpose,” the IAEA Secretariat administers a Safeguards system.

Iran entered into a Safeguards Agreement [.pdf] with the IAEA in 1974.

Under that agreement (contrary to what the neo-crazy sycophantic media has told you) Iran is not required to inform the IAEA about the existence of facilities – such as the uncompleted nuclear power plant at Bushehr, for example – until 180 days before “special fissionable or other materials” are actually introduced into the facility.

Iran notified the IAEA about Bushehr, the uranium-conversion facility at Isfahan, and the uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz – and subjected them to IAEA Safeguards – years before being required to do so.

Hence, for years, the principal responsibility of the IAEA’s director-general, Mohamed ElBaradei, in Iran has been to assist the Iranians get those “safeguarded” facilities at Bushehr, Isfahan, and Natanz up and operating, safely and peacefully.

As well as to counter the “bad faith” efforts of the Cheney Cabal to prevent the Iranians from getting those facilities up and operating.

So ElBaradei’s report to the IAEA Board’s quarterly meeting last week was mostly an update of what he has done to assist the Iranians at Bushehr, Isfahan, and Natanz. Right?


ElBaradei’s report is mostly an update of what he has not done.

You see, at their last quarterly meeting, the Board directed ElBaradei to report to the UN Security Council their determination that to satisfy some Board members as to the exclusively peaceful intent of Iran’s nuclear program, the Board “deemed it necessary” for Iran to, inter alia:

"implement transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, including in GOV/2005/67, which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development as the Agency may require in support of its ongoing investigations."

Beyond the requirements of a potential Additional Protocol.

Far beyond the requirements of Iran’s existing Safeguards Agreement.

Iran promptly informed ElBaradei that – in the future – it would comply only with their Safeguards Agreement. After three years of voluntary cooperation that went beyond even an Additional Protocol not yet in force, Iran declared [.pdf]:

"It should also be recalled that Iran has fully cooperated in provision of voluminous information; granting many accesses to different locations [even military sites]; arranging interviews with individuals; submission of non-Safeguards related information; [granting] permission for taking large number of environmental samples from nuclear and non-nuclear sites and even from military sites; [arranging] over thousands of hours of meetings with experts in understanding the detail of every subject [which amounted to more than 1,700 man-days of inspection]; therefore, the Agency has full understanding on every part of the program and has achieved progress on the matters."

So does ElBaradei acknowledge in his latest report [.pdf] that previous cooperation by Iranians had – in fact – gone far, far beyond what was required under their existing Safeguards Agreement?


He just complains about how hard it is, now, “to follow up” on “information” obtained from a mysterious “walk-in” laptop, provided him by the Cheney Cabal.

First, there is “Operation Green Salt,” an inexplicable – therefore, highly suspect – military uranium-conversion program.

Then, there is the “design of a missile reentry vehicle,” which – if authentic – is highly classified Iranian national security information and, under the IAEA Statute, absolutely none of ElBaradei’s business.

Author: Gordon Prather

Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy implementing official for national security-related technical matters in the Federal Energy Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Department of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant for national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. -- ranking member of the Senate Budget Committee and member of the Senate Energy Committee and Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather had earlier worked as a nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California and Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico.