The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy

Endnotes              back to page main page one

115 Steven Kull (Principal Investigator), Americans on the Middle East Road Map (Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, May 30, 2003), pp. 9-11, 18-19. Also see Steven Kull et al., Americans on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, May 6, 2002). A 2005 Anti- Defamation League public opinion survey found that 78 percent of Americans believe that their government should favor neither Israel nor the Palestinians. "American Attitudes toward Israel and the Middle East," Survey conducted on March 18-25, 2005, and June 19-23, 2005, by the Marttila Communications Group for the Anti-Defamation League.

116 Robert G. Kaiser, "Bush and Sharon Nearly Identical on Mideast Policy," Washington Post, February 9, 2003.

117 Lee Hockstader and Daniel Williams, "Israel Says It Won’t ‘Pay Price’ of Coalition," Washington Post, September 18, 2001; Jonathan Karp, "Sharon Cancels Peace Talks in Rebuff to U.S. Concerns," Wall Street Journal, September 24, 2001; Thomas Oliphant, "A Delicate Balance," Boston Globe, September 18, 2001: "Israel’s Opportunity," Los Angeles Times editorial, September 18, 2001.

118 Kurt Eichenwald, "U.S. Jews Split on Washington’s Shift on Palestinian State," New York Times, October 5, 2001. At the same time, Prime Minister Tony Blair made "Britain’s strongest endorsement yet of Palestinian statehood." Michael Dobbs, "Blair Backs Creation of Palestinian State," Washington Post, October 16, 2001.

119 James Bennet, "Sharon Invokes Munich in Warning U.S. on ‘Appeasement’," New York Times, October 5, 2001; Jane Perlez and and Katharine Q. Seelye. "U.S. Stongly Rebukes Sharon for Criticism of Bush, Calling it ‘Unacceptable’." New York Times October 6, 2001; Shlomo Shamir, "U.S. Jews: Sharon is ‘Worried’ by Terrorism Distinction," Ha’aretz, September 18, 2001; Alan Sipress and Lee Hockstader, "Sharon Speech Riles U.S.," Washington Post, October 6, 2001. For evidence that other Israelis shared Sharon’s fears, see Israel Harel, "Lessons from the Next War," Ha’aretz, October 6, 2001.

120 Jack Donnelly, "Nation Set to Push Sharon on Agreement," Boston Globe, October 10, 2001; Hockstader and Sipress, "Sharon Speech Riles U.S."; Perlez and Seelye. "U.S. Strongly Rebukes Sharon."

121 Lee Hockstader, "Sharon Apologetic over Row with U.S.," Washington Post, October 7, 2001; Serge Schmemann, "Raising Munich, Sharon Reveals Israeli Qualms," New York Times, October 6, 2001.

122 Aluf Benn, "Analysis: Clutching at Straws," Ha’aretz, September 18, 2001; "Excerpts from Talk by Sharon," New York Times, December 4, 2001; William Safire, "‘Israel or Arafat’," New York Times, December 3, 2001.

123 Elaine Sciolino, "Senators Urge Bush Not to Hamper Israel," New York Times, November 17, 2001.

124 Dana Milbank, "Bush Spokesman Gentle on Israeli Assault," Washington Post, December 3, 2001; Safire, "Israel or Arafat"; David Sanger, "U.S. Walks a Tightrope on Terrorism in Israel," New York Times, December 4, 2001.

125 Keith B. Richburg and Molly Moore, "Israel Rejects Demands to Withdraw Troops," Washington Post, April 11, 2002. All quotes in this paragraph are from Fareed Zakaria, "Colin Powell’s Humiliation: Bush Should Clearly Support His Secretary of State – Otherwise He Should Get a New One," Newsweek, April 29, 2002. Also see Mike Allen and John Lancaster, "Defiant Sharon Losing Support in White House," Washington Post, April 11, 2002, which describes the Bush Administration’s anger with Sharon.

126 It is worth noting that the American people were generally supportive of Bush’s efforts to put pressure on Israel in the spring of 2002. A Time/CNN poll taken on April 10-11 found that 60 percent of Americans felt that U.S. aid to Israel should be cut off or reduced if Sharon refused to withdraw from the Palestinian areas he had recently occupied. "Poll: Americans Support Cutting Aid to Israel," Reuters News Release, April 12, 2002; AFP News Release, April 13, 2002. Also see Israel and the Palestinians (Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, last updated on August 15, 2002). Moreover, 75 percent of those surveyed thought that Powell should meet with Arafat when he visited Israel. Regarding Sharon, only 35 percent found him trustworthy, while 35 percent thought he was a warmonger, 20 percent saw him as a terrorist, and 25 percent considered him an enemy of the United States.

127 William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "‘Senior White House Aides:’ Speak Up!" Weekly Standard, April 11, 2002. For a graphic description of the heat that the Lobby put on Powell when he was in the Middle East, see Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), pp. 323-326. Also see John Simpson, "Israeli Leader Has More Power in Washington than Powell," Sunday Telegraph (London), April 14, 2002, which describes a joint press conference Powell and Sharon conducted by noting that: "the Secretary of State’s language, body and verbal, certainly were not that of the paymaster coming to call a client to account. Far from it. Mr. Powell seemed ingratiating, deferential; no doubt he realizes how much support Mr. Sharon has back in Washington and how much influence his friends have there with the President." It is also worth noting that former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who was making Israel’s case in the United States at the time, said even before Powell arrived in Israel that his trip "won’t amount to anything." Elaine Sciolino, "Netanyahu Says Powell Mission ‘Won’t Amount to Anything’ and Urges Arafat’s Exile," New York Times, April 11, 2002.

128 James D. Besser, "No Tennessee Waltz," Jewish Week, December 27, 2002. Also see Mike Allen and Juliet Eilperin, "White House and DeLay at Odds," Washington Post, April 26, 2002; Judith Eilperin and Helen Dewar, "Lawmakers Endorse Israel’s Offensive," Washington Post, May 3, 2002. Bush was feeling intense pressure not just from lawmakers, but from Jewish leaders and Christian Evangelicals. See Mike Allen and John Lancaster, "Defiant Sharon Losing Support in White House," Washington Post, April 11, 2002; Dan Balz, "Bush Statement on Mideast Reflects Tension in GOP," Washington Post, April 7, 2003; Elisabeth Bumiller, "Bush Sends Aide to Speak at Rally to Quell a Growing Furor," New York Times, April 16, 2002; Bradley Burston, "Background: Can Bush Afford to Press Sharon for Peace?" Ha’aretz, May 6, 2002; Akiva Eldar, "Bush and Israel, 1991 and 2002," Ha’aretz, May 6, 2002; Alison Mitchell, "U.S. Political Leaders Seek Unity on Mideast, for Now," Washington Post, April 12, 2002; William Safire, "On Being an Ally," New York Times, April 11, 2002; Alan Sipress, "Policy Divide Thwarts Powell in Mideast Effort," Washington Post, April 26, 2002; and Alan Sipress and Karen DeYoung, "U.S. Presses Ahead with Peace Efforts," Washington Post, May 9, 2002.

129 Randall Mikkelsen, "White House Calls Sharon ‘Man of Peace’," Reuters, April 11, 2002; Bill Sammon, "White House Softens Tone with Israel," Washington Times, April 12, 2002.

130 Peter Slevin and Mike Allen, "Bush: Sharon A ‘Man of Peace’," Washington Post, April 19, 2002; David Sanger, "President Praises Effort by Powell in the Middle East," New York Times, April 19, 2002. For a transcript of the press conference, see "President Bush, Secretary Powell Discuss Middle East," White House, Office of the Press Secretary, April 18, 2002.

131 Eilperin and Dewar, "Lawmakers Endorse Israel’s Offensive"; Juliet Eilperin and Mike Allen, "Hill Leaders Plan Votes on Pro-Israel Relations," Washington Post, May 2, 2002; Alison Mitchell, "House and Senate Support Israel in Strong Resolutions," New York Times, May 3, 2002. For copies of the two resolutions, see "2 Resolutions ‘Expressing Solidarity with Israel’," New York Times, May 3, 2002. Also see Matthew E. Berger, "Bills in Congress Boost Israel, Treat Arafat as Terrorist," Jewish Bulletin, April 26, 2002.

132 Arieh O’Sullivan, "Visiting Congressmen Advise Israel to Resist Administration Pressure to Deal with Arafat," Jerusalem PostΒΈ May 6, 2002.

133 Eli Lake, "Israeli Lobby Wins $200 Million Fight," United Press International, May 11, 2002.

134 Quoted in Jefferson Morley, "Who’s in Charge?" Washington Post, April 26, 2002. As Akiva Eldar noted just before Sharon steamrolled Bush, "Sharon has a lot of experience sticking it to the Americans …. Ultimately, whether it was Palestinian terror, Arafat’s mistakes, or domestic politics, the Americans were sent to the peanut gallery." See his "Words Are Not Enough," Ha’aretz, April 8, 2002. Nor was Bush’s humiliation lost on commentators around the world. Spain’s leading daily, El Pais, expressed the views of many outside observers when it commented, "If a country’s weight is measured by its degree of influence on events, the superpower is not the USA but Israel." Quoted in Morley, "Who’s in Charge?"

135 Bradley Burston, "Hamas ‘R’ Us," Ha’aretz, January 18, 2006; Akiva Eldar, "Kadima to A New Middle East," Ha’aretz, December 19, 2005; Idem, "Who Needs Abu Mazen?" Ha’aretz, November 7, 2005; Ran HaCohen, "Hamas and Israel: Rival Twins,", February 6, 2006; M.J. Rosenberg, "No Partner – As Always," IPF Friday, Issue No. 260, February 3, 2006; Danny Rubenstein, "All We Did Was Switch the Non-Partner," Ha’aretz, February 5, 2006; "Disarray Among the Palestinians," New York Times editorial, January 17, 2006.

136 Regarding the views of previous Presidents, see Clyde R. Mark, "Israeli-United States Relations," Issue Brief for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 29, 2002), p. 7. On April 14, 2004, Bush broke with his predecessors and proclaimed that Israel would not have to return all of the territories that it occupied in 1967, and that Palestinian refugees would not be allowed to return to their former homes in Israel, but would have to settle in a new Palestinian state. See "Statement by the President Regarding Israel-Arab Peace Process," April 14, 2004; and "President Bush’s Letter to Prime Minister Sharon," April 14, 2004.

137 "US Scowcroft Criticizes Bush Admin’s Foreign Policy," Financial Times, October 13, 2004. Also see Glenn Kessler, "Scowcroft is Critical of Bush," Washington Post, October 16, 2004.

138 On Kerry, see Gadi Dechter, "Analysis: President Kerry on Israel," United Press International press release, July 9, 2004; Nathan Guttman, "Kerry Position Paper Outlines Support for Israel," Ha’aretz, July 2, 2004: Nathan Guttman, "Kerry Jumps on Sharon Bandwagon in Favoring Gaza Disengagement Plan," Ha’aretz, April 25, 2004. On Clinton, see Adam Dickter, "Hillary: ‘I Had A Lot to Prove’," Jewish Week, November 18, 2005; Kristen Lombardi, "Hillary Calls Israel a ‘Beacon’ of Democracy," Village Voice, December 11, 2005; Sonia Verma, "Clinton Stressed U.S.-Israel Coalition," Newsday, November 15, 2005; Rachel Zabarkes Friedman, "Senator Israel," National Review Online, May 25, 2005.

139 Emad Mekay, "Iraq Was Invaded ‘to Protect Israel’ – US Official," Asia Times Online, March 31, 2004. Zelikow also served with Rice on the National Security Council when George H. W. Bush was President, and co-authored a book with her on German reunification. He was also one of the principal authors of the second Bush Administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy, which is the most comprehensive official presentation of the so-called Bush Doctrine.

140 Jason Keyser, "Israel Urges U.S. to Attack," Washington Post, August 16, 2002. Also see Aluf Benn, "PM Urging U.S. Not to Delay Strike against Iraq," Ha’aretz, August 16, 2002; Idem, "PM Aide: Delay in U.S. Attack Lets Iraq Speed Up Arms Program," Ha’aretz, August 16, 2002; Reuven Pedhatzur, "Israel’s Interest in the War on Saddam," Ha’aretz, August 4, 2002; Ze’ev Schiff, "Into the Rough," Ha’aretz, August 16, 2002.

141 Gideon Alon, "Sharon to Panel: Iraq is Our Biggest Danger," Ha’aretz, August 13, 2002. At a White House press conference with President Bush on October 16, 2002, Sharon said: "I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for the friendship and cooperation. And as far as I remember, as we look back towards many years now, I think that we never had such relations with any President of the United States as we have with you, and we never had such cooperation in everything as we have with the current administration." For a transcript of the press conference, see "President Bush Welcomes Prime Minister Sharon to White House; Question and Answer Session with the Press," U.S. Department of State, October 16, 2002. Also see Kaiser, "Bush and Sharon Nearly Identical on Mideast Policy."

142 Shlomo Brom, "An Intelligence Failure," Strategic Assessment (Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University), Vol. 6, No. 3 (November 2003), p. 9. Also see "Intelligence Assessment: Selections from the Media, 1998-2003," in ibid., pp. 17-19; Gideon Alon, "Report Slams Assessment of Dangers Posed by Libya, Iraq," Ha’aretz, March 28, 2004; Dan Baron, "Israeli Report Blasts Intelligence for Exaggerating the Iraqi Threat," JTA, March 28, 2004; Greg Myre, "Israeli Report Faults Intelligence on Iraq," New York Times, March 28, 2004; James Risen, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), pp. 72-73.

143 Marc Perelman, "Iraqi Move Puts Israel in Lonely U.S. Corner," Forward, September 20, 2002. This article begins, "Saddam Hussein’s surprise acceptance of ‘unconditional’ United Nations weapons inspections put Israel on the hot seat this week, forcing it into the open as the only nation actively supporting the Bush administration’s goal of Iraqi regime change." Peres became so frustrated with the UN process in the following months that in mid-February 2003 he lashed out at the French by questioning France’s status as a permanent member of the Security Council. "Peres Questions France Permanent Status on Security Council," Ha’aretz, February 20, 2003. On a visit to Moscow in late September 2002, Sharon made it clear to Russian President Putin, who was leading the charge for new inspections, "that the time when these inspectors could have been effective has passed." Herb Keinon, "Sharon to Putin: Too Late for Iraq Arms Inspection," Jerusalem Post, October 1, 2002.

144 Ehud Barak, "Taking Apart Iraq’s Nuclear Threat," New York Times, September 4, 2002.

145 Benjamin Netanyahu, "The Case for Toppling Saddam," Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2002. The Jerusalem Post was particularly hawkish on Iraq, frequently running editorials and op-eds promoting the war, and hardly ever running pieces against it. Representative editorials include "Next Stop Baghdad," Jerusalem Post, November 15, 2001; "Don’t Wait for Saddam," Jerusalem Post, August 18, 2002; "Making the Case for War," Jerusalem Post, September 9, 2002. For some representative op-eds, see Ron Dermer, "The March to Baghdad," Jerusalem Post, December 21, 2001; Efraim Inbar, "Ousting Saddam, Instilling Stability," Jerusalem Post, October 8, 2002; Gerald M. Steinberg, "Imagining the Liberation of Iraq," Jerusalem Post, November 18, 2001.

146 Aluf Benn, "Background: Enthusiastic IDF Awaits War in Iraq," Ha’aretz, February 17, 2002. Also see James Bennet, "Israel Says War on Iraq Would Benefit the Region," New York Times, February 27, 2003; Chemi Shalev, "Jerusalem Frets As U.S. Battles Iraq War Delays," Forward, March 7, 2003.

147 Indeed, a February 2003 poll reported that 77.5 percent of Israeli Jews wanted the United States to attack Iraq. Ephraim Yaar and Tamar Hermann, "Peace Index: Most Israelis Support the Attack on Iraq," Ha’aretz, March 6, 2003. Regarding Kuwait, a public opinion poll released in March 2003 found that 89.6 percent of Kuwaitis favored the impending war against Iraq. James Morrison, "Kuwaitis Support War," Washington Times, March 18, 2003.

148 Gideon Levy, "A Deafening Silence," Ha’aretz, October 6, 2002.

149 See Dan Izenberg, "Foreign Ministry Warns Israeli War Talk Fuels US Anti-Semitism," Jerusalem Post, March 10, 2003, which makes clear that "the Foreign Ministry has received reports from the US" telling Israelis to cool their jets because "the US media" is portraying Israel as "trying to goad the administration into war." There is also evidence that Israel itself was concerned about being seen as driving American policy toward Iraq. See Benn, "PM Urging U.S. Not to Delay Strike"; Perelman, "Iraq Move Puts Israel in Lonely U.S. Corner." Finally, in late September 2002, a group of political consultants known as the "Israel Project" told pro-Israel leaders in the United States "to keep quiet while the Bush administration purses a possible war with Iraq." Dana Milbank, "Group Urges Pro-Israel Leaders Silence on Iraq," Washington Post, November 27, 2002.

150 The influence of the neoconservatives and their allies is clearly reflected in the following articles: See Joel Beinin, "Pro-Israel Hawks and the Second Gulf War," Middle East Report Online, April 6, 2003; Elisabeth Bumiller and Eric Schmitt, "On the Job and at Home, Influential Hawks’ 30-Year Friendship Evolves," New York Times, September 11, 2002; Kathleen and William Christison, "A Rose by Another Name: The Bush Administration’s Dual Loyalties," CounterPunch, December 13, 2002; Robert Dreyfuss, "The Pentagon Muzzles the CIA," The American Prospect, December 16, 2002; Michael Elliott and James Carney, "First Stop, Iraq," Time, March 31, 2003; Seymour Hersh, "The Iraq Hawks," New Yorker, Vol. 77, issue 41 (December 24-31, 2001), pp. 58-63; Glenn Kessler, "U.S. Decision on Iraq Has Puzzling Past," Washington Post, January 12, 2003; Joshua M. Marshall, "Bomb Saddam?" Washington Monthly, June 2002; Dana Milbank, "White House Push for Iraqi Strike Is on Hold," Washington Post, August 18, 2002; Susan Page, "Showdown with Saddam: The Decision to Act," USA Today, September 11, 2002; Sam Tanenhaus, "Bush’s Brain Trust," Vanity Fair, July 2003. Note that all these articles are from before the war started.

151 See Mortimer B. Zuckerman, "No Time for Equivocation," U.S. News & World Report, August 26/September 2, 2002; Idem, "Clear and Compelling Proof," U.S. News & World Report, February 10, 2003; Idem, "The High Price of Waiting," U.S. News & World Report, March 10, 2003.

152 "An Unseemly Silence," Forward, May 7, 2004. Also see Gary Rosenblatt, "Hussein Asylum," Jewish Week, August 23, 2002; Idem, "The Case for War against Saddam," Jewish Week, December 13, 2002.

153 Just before the U.S. military invaded Iraq, Congressman James P. Moran (D-Va) created a stir when he said, "If it were not for the strong support of the Jewish community for this war with Iraq, we would not be doing this." Spencer S. Hsu, "Moran Said Jews Are Pushing War," Washington Post, March 11, 2003. However, Moran misspoke, because there was not widespread support for the war in the Jewish community. He should have said, "If it were not for the strong support of the neoconservatives and the leadership of the Israel Lobby for this war with Iraq, we would not be doing this."

154 Samuel G. Freedman, "Don’t Blame Jews for This War," USA Today, April 2, 2003. Also see Ori Nir, "Poll Finds Jewish Political Gap," Forward, February 4, 2005.

155 It is no exaggeration to say that in the wake of 9/11, the neoconservatives were not just determined, but were obsessed with removing Saddam from power. As one senior Administration figure put it in January, 2003, "I do believe certain people have grown theological about this. It’s almost a religion – that it will be the end of our society if we don’t take action now." Kessler, "U.S. Decision on Iraq Has Puzzling Past." Kessler also describes Colin Powell returning from White House meetings on Iraq, "rolling his eyes" and saying, "Jeez, what a fixation about Iraq." Bob Woodward reports in Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), p. 410, that Kenneth Adelman "said he had worried to death as time went on and support seemed to wane that there would be no war." Also see ibid., pp. 164-165.

156 The first letter (January 26, 1998) was written under the auspices of the Project for the New American Century and can be found on its website. The second letter (February 19, 1998) was written under the auspices of the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf and can be found on the Iraq Watch website.Also see the May 29, 1998 letter to Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott written under the auspices of the Project for the New American Century and found on its website. The neoconservatives, it should be emphasized, advocated invading Iraq to topple Saddam. See "The End of Containment," Weekly Standard, December 1, 1997, pp. 13-14; Zalmay M. Khalizad and Paul Wolfowitz, "Overthrow Him," in ibid., pp. 14-15; Frederick W. Kagan, "Not by Air Alone," in ibid., pp. 15-16.

157 See Clinton’s comments after he signed the "Iraq Liberation Act of 1998." Statement by the President, White House Press Office, October 31, 1998.

158 One might think from the publicity and the controversy surrounding two books published in 2004—Richard Clarke’s Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004) and Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O’Neill (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004) – that Bush and Cheney were bent on invading Iraq when they assumed office in late January 2001. However, this interpretation is wrong. They were deeply interested in toppling Saddam, just as Bill Clinton and Al Gore had been. But there is no evidence in the public record showing that Bush and Cheney were seriously contemplating war against Iraq before 9/11. In fact, Bush made it clear to Bob Woodward that he was not thinking about going to war against Saddam before 9/11. See Plan of Attack, p. 12. Also see Nicholas Lehmann, "The Iraq Factor," New Yorker, Vol. 76, issue 43 (January 22, 2001), pp. 34-48; Eric Schmitt and Steven Lee Meyers, "Bush Administration Warns Iraq on Weapons Programs," New York Times, January 23, 2001. And Cheney had defended the decision not to go to Baghdad throughout the 1990s and during the 2000 campaign. See Timothy Noah, "Dick Cheney, Dove," Slate, October 16, 2002; "Calm after Desert Storm," An Interview with Dick Cheney, Policy Review, No. 65 (Summer 1993). In short, even though the neoconservatives held important positions in the Bush Administration, they were unable to generate much enthusiasm for attacking Iraq before 9/11. Thus, the New York Times reported in March 2001 that "some Republicans" were complaining that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz "are failing to live up to their pre-election advocacy of stepping up efforts to overthrow President Hussein." At the same time, a Washington Times editorial asked, "Have Hawks Become Doves?" See Jane Perlez, "Capitol Hawks Seek Tougher Line on Iraq," New York Times, March 7, 2001; "Have Hawks Become Doves?" Washington Times, March 8, 2001. 158

159 Woodward, Plan of Attack, pp. 25-26. Wolfowitz was so insistent on conquering Iraq that five days later Cheney had to tell him to "stop agitating for targeting Saddam." Page, "Showdown with Saddam." According to one Republican lawmaker, he "was like a parrot bringing [Iraq] up all the time. It was getting on the President’s nerves." Elliot and Carney, "First Stop, Iraq." Woodward describes Wolfowitz as "like a drum that would not stop." Plan of Attack, p. 22.

160 Woodward, Plan of Attack, pp. 1-44.

161 Regarding the neoconservatives’ influence on Cheney, see Elliott and Carney, "First Stop, Iraq"; Page, "Showdown with Saddam"; Michael Hirsh, "Bernard Lewis Revisited," Washington Monthly, November 2004, pp.13-19; Frederick Kempe, "Lewis’s ‘Liberation’ Doctrine for Mideast Faces New Tests," Wall Street Journal, December 13, 2005; Carla Anne Robbins and Jeanne Cummings, "How Bush Decided that Hussein Must Be Ousted from Atop Iraq," Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2002. On Cheney’s critical role in the decision-making process, see Glenn Kessler and Peter Slevin, "Cheney is Fulcrum of Foreign Policy," Washington Post, October 13, 2002; Barbara Slavin and Susan Page, "Cheney Rewrites Roles in Foreign Policy," USA Today, July 29, 2002.

162 The New York Times reported shortly after 9/11 that, "Some senior administration officials, led by Paul D. Wolfowitz … and I. Lewis Libby … are pressing for the earliest and broadest military campaign against not only the Osama bin Laden network in Afghanistan, but also against other suspected terrorist bases in Iraq and in Lebanon’s Bekka region." Patrick E. Tyler and Elaine Sciolino, "Bush Advisers Split on Scope of Retaliation," New York Times, September 20, 2001. Also see William Safire, "Phony War II," New York Times, November 28, 2002. Woodward succinctly describes Libby’s influence in Plan of Attack (pp. 48-49): "Libby had three formal titles. He was chief of staff to Vice President Cheney; he was also national security adviser to the vice president; and he was finally an assistant to President Bush. It was a trifecta of positions probably never held before by a single person. Scooter was a power center unto himself…. Libby was one of only two people who were not principals to attend the National Security Council meetings with the president and the separate principals meetings chaired by Rice." Also see ibid., pp 50-51, 288-292, 300-301, 409-410; Bumiller and Schmitt, "On the Job and at Home"; Karen Kwiatkowski, "The New Pentagon Papers,", March 10, 2004; Patrick E. Tyler and Elaine Sciolino, "Bush Advisers Split on Scope of Retaliation," New York Times, September 20, 2001. On Libby’s relationship to Israel, an article in the Forward reports that "Israeli officials liked Libby. They described him as an important contact who was accessible, genuinely interested in Israel-related issues and very sympathetic to their cause." Ori Nir, "Libby Played Leading Role on Foreign Policy Decisions," Forward, November 4, 2005.

163 This letter was published in the Weekly Standard, October 1, 2001.

164 Robert Kagan and William Kristol, "The Right War," Weekly Standard, October 1, 2001; Charles Krauthammer, "Our First Move: Take Out the Taliban," Washington Post, October 1, 2001. Also see "War Aims," Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2001.

165 Even before the dust had settled at the World Trade Center, pro-Israel forces were making the case that Saddam was responsible for 9/11. See Michael Barone, "War by Ultimatum," U.S. News and World Report, October 1, 2001; Bill Gertz, "Iraq Suspected of Sponsoring Terrorist Attacks," Washington Times, September 21, 2001; "Drain the Pond of Terror," Jerusalem Post editorial, September 25, 2001; William Safire, "The Ultimate Enemy," New York Times, September 24, 2001.

166 See James Bamford, A Pretext to War (New York: Doubleday, 2004); chaps. 13-14; Woodward, Plan of Attack, pp. 288-292, 297-306. Also see ibid., pp. 72, 163, 300-301.

167 Woodward, Plan of Attack, p. 290.

168 See Bamford, Pretext to War, pp. 287-291, 307-331; David S. Cloud, "Prewar Intelligence Inquiry Zeroes In On Pentagon," Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2004; Seymour M. Hersh, "Selective Intelligence," New Yorker, Vol. 79, issue 11 (May 12, 2003), pp. 44-50; Kwiatkowski, "New Pentagon Papers"; Jim Lobe, "Pentagon Office Home to Neo-Con Network," Inter Press Service News Agency, August 7, 2003; Greg Miller, "Spy Unit Skirted CIA on Iraq," Los Angeles Times, March 10, 2004; Paul R. Pillar, "Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2 (March-April 2006), pp. 15-27; James Risen, "How Pair’s Finding on Terror Led to Clash on Shaping Intelligence," New York Times, April 28, 2004; Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, "Threats and Responses: A C.I.A. Rival; Pentagon Sets Up Intelligence Unit." New York Times October 24, 2002.

169 The Office of Special Plans relied heavily on information from Ahmed Chalabi and other Iraqi exiles and it had close links with various Israeli sources. Indeed, the Guardian reports that it "forged close ties to a parallel, ad hoc intelligence operation inside Ariel Sharon’s office in Israel specifically to bypass Mossad and provide the Bush administration with more alarmist reports on Saddam’s Iraq than Mossad was prepared to authorize." Julian Borger, "The Spies Who Pushed for War," Guardian, July 17, 2003.

170 See, for example, Douglas J. Feith, "The Inner Logic of Israel’s Negotiations: Withdrawal Process, Not Peace Process," Middle East Quarterly, March 1996. For useful discussions of Feith’s views, see Jeffrey Goldberg, "A Little Learning: What Douglas Feith Knew and When He Knew It," New Yorker, Vol. 81, issue 12 (May 9, 2005), pp. 36- 41; Jim Lobe, "Losing Feith, or is the Bush Team Shedding Its Sharper Edges?" The Daily Star, January 31, 2005; James J. Zogby, "A Dangerous Appointment: Profile of Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense under Bush," Middle East Information Center, April 18, 2001; "Israeli Settlements: Legitimate, Democratically Mandated, Vital to Israel’s Security and, Therefore, in U.S. Interest," The Center for Security Policy, Transition Brief No. 96-T 130, December 17, 1996. Note that the title of the latter piece, which was published by an organization in the Lobby, says that what is in Israel’s interest is therefore in America’s national interest. In "Losing Feith," Lobe writes: "In 2003, when Feith, who was standing in for Rumsfeld at an interagency ‘Principals’ Meeting’ on the Middle East, concluded his remarks on behalf of the Pentagon, according to the Washington insider newsletter, The Nelson Report, [National Security Advisor Condoleezza] Rice said, ‘Thanks Doug, but when we want the Israeli position we’ll invite the ambassador’."

171 The "Clean Break" study was prepared for The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies in Jerusalem and published in June 1996.A copy can be found on the Institute’s web site.

172 Akiva Eldar, "Perles of Wisdom for the Feithful," Ha’aretz, October 1, 2002.

173 "Rally Unites Anguished Factions under Flag of ‘Stand with Israel’," Forward, April 19, 2002; "Forward 50," Forward, November 15, 2002.

174 John McCaslin, "Israeli-Trained Cops," Washington Times, November 5, 2002; Bret Stephens, "Man of the Year," Jerusalem Post (Rosh Hashana Supplement), September 26, 2003; Janine Zacharia, "Invasive Treatment," in ibid. Other useful pieces on Wolfowitz include Michael Dobbs, "For Wolfowitz, A Vision May Be Realized," Washington Post, April 7, 2003; James Fallows, "The Unilateralist," Atlantic Monthly, March 2002, pp. 26- 29; Bill Keller, "The Sunshine Warrior," New York Times Magazine, September 22, 2002; "Paul Wolfowitz, Velociraptor," Economist, February 9-15, 2002.

175 According to Feith’s former law partner, L. Marc Zell, Chalabi also promised to re-build the pipeline that once ran from Haifa in Israel to Mosul in Iraq. See John Dizard, "How Ahmed Chalabi Conned the Neocons,", May 4, 2004. In mid-June 2003, Benjamin Netanyahu announced that, "It won’t be long before you will see Iraqi oil flowing to Haifa." Reuters, "Netanyahu Says Iraq-Israel Oil Line Not Pipe-Dream," Ha’aretz, June 20, 2003. Of course, this did not happen and it is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future.

176 Matthew E. Berger, "New Chances to Build Israel-Iraq Ties," Jewish Journal, April 28, 2003. Also see Bamford, Pretext to War, p. 293; Ed Blanche, "Securing Iraqi Oil for Israel: The Plot Thickens,", April 25, 2003. Nathan Guttman reports that "the American Jewish community and the Iraqi opposition" had for years "taken pains to conceal" the links between them. "Mutual Wariness: AIPAC and the Iraqi Opposition," Ha’aretz, April 8, 2003.

177 Nir, "FBI Probe." On the eve of the war, Bill Keller, who is now the executive editor of the New York Times, wrote: "The idea that this war is about Israel is persistent and more widely held than you think." Keller, "Is It Good for the Jews?" New York Times, March 8, 2003.

178 In an op-ed written in mid-2004, Hollings asked why the Bush Administration invaded Iraq when it was not a direct threat to the United States. "The answer," which he says "everyone knows," is "because we want to secure our friend Israel." Senator Ernest F. Hollings, "Bush’s Failed Mideast Policy Is Creating More Terrorism," Charleston Post and Courier, May 6, 2004; "Sen. Hollings Floor Statement." Not surprisingly, Hollings was called an anti-Semite, a charge he furiously rejected. Matthew E. Berger, "Not So Gentle Rhetoric from the Gentleman from South Carolina," JTA, May 23, 2004; "Sen. Hollings Floor Statement"; "Senator Lautenberg’s Floor Statement in Support of Senator Hollings," June 3, 2004, a copy of which can be found on Hollings’ web site. On Moran, see note 151. A handful of other public figures like Patrick Buchanan, Maureen Dowd, Georgie Anne Geyer, Gary Hart, Chris Matthews, and General Anthony Zinni, have either said or strongly hinted that pro-Israel forces in the United States were the principle movers behind the Iraq war. See Aluf Benn, "Scapegoat for Israel," Ha’aretz, May 13, 2004; Matthew Berger, "Will Some Jews’ Backing for War in Iraq Have Repercussions for All?" JTA, June 10, 2004; Patrick J. Buchanan, "Whose War?" American Conservative, March 24, 2003; Ami Eden, "Israel’s Role: The ‘Elephant’ They’re Talking About," Forward, February 28, 2003; "The Ground Shifts," Forward, May 28, 2004; Nathan Guttman, "Prominent U.S. Jews, Israel Blamed for Start of Iraq War," Ha’aretz, May 31, 2004; Lawrence F. Kaplan, "Toxic Talk on War," Washington Post, February 18, 2003; E.J. Kessler, "Gary Hart Says ‘Dual Loyalty’ Barb Was Not Aimed at Jews," Forward, February 21, 2003; Ori Nir and Ami Eden, "Ex-Mideast Envoy Zinni Charges Neocons Pushed Iraq War to Benefit Israel," Forward, May 28, 2004.

179 Michael Kinsley, "What Bush Isn’t Saying about Iraq," Slate, October 24, 2002. Also see idem, "J’Accuse."