Arms control advocates contend that by attacking Iran in the name of preventing the emergence of a “rogue” nuclear state, the United States may have “taken a sledgehammer” to the entire nuclear nonproliferation regime. Iran could be one of the first technologically capable powers to confirm that fear. The clerical regime has indicated that the country may withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Such a move would eliminate any official monitoring of Tehran’s nuclear research and nuclear fuel enrichment. North Korea took a similar step in 2003, and the move clearly facilitated the growth of Pyongyang’s embryonic nuclear-weapons program.
Foreign policy experts and members of the news media also note that Washington’s responses to the nuclear threat that North Korea, on the one hand, and Iran, on the other, allegedly pose to regional and world peace are diverging more sharply than ever before. The United States and its Israeli ally are now waging a major air war against Iran – supposedly to prevent that country from weaponizing its nuclear program. Their stance toward North Korea is far more subdued. Although U.S. leaders continue to officially demand that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) commit to adopting a non-nuclear status and relinquish the weapons that it has already built, that demand is widely regarded throughout the international system as ineffectual posturing. Even more significant, neither the United States nor an ally is taking any military action against the DPRK.
The contrast between Washington’s caution in dealing with a nuclear-armed North Korea and the flagrant U.S. coercion of Iran, which possesses no such weapons, could hardly be more striking. It has not gone unnoticed. Pyongyang’s successful defiance of the United States regarding the nuclear issue could well produce an important lesson for Iran’s leaders. Pyongyang has covertly built a small arsenal of approximately 50 nuclear warheads and an increasingly sophisticated fleet of ballistic missiles to deliver them. U.S. and other leaders now treat North Korea with caution and restraint, however grudgingly. Conversely, an Iran without nuclear weapons is being pounded severely. Iranian leaders would be obtuse not to at least try to acquire (through construction or purchase) a modest deterrent similar to North Korea’s.
Until President Donald Trump’s first administration, Washington sought to prevent through diplomacy either Pyongyang or Tehran from pursuing a nuclear weapons program. That approach apparently achieved some success with respect to Iran in 2015 when the clerical regime signed a multilateral agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which placed restrictions on its nuclear program to ensure that it remained peaceful. The document also contained provisions for frequent and intrusive UN inspections. Trump, however, rescinded U.S. approval of that agreement in May 2018, dismissing it as “a bad deal.” Thereafter, Israeli officials and their American supporters have repeatedly warned that Tehran was just months or perhaps even weeks away from building a nuclear arsenal. There has never been compelling evidence supporting those allegations, but such warnings had become ever-present during the months leading up to the current war.
Hawkish American analysts express concern that Trump administration officials and the rest of the policy community may be so focused on the situation in Iran that they ignore ominous developments in North Korea. Timothy W. Martin, the Wall Street Journal’s bureau chief in Seoul, notes that DPRK dictator Kim Jong Un points to Iran’s current predicament to justify his government’s earlier decision to go nuclear. “The present situation clearly proves,” Kim said, “how just the strategic option and decision of our state were in rejecting the enemy’s cajolery and perpetuating our nuclear possession.” At a party congress in February 2026, “Kim ordered officials to rapidly develop additional nuclear weapons, including ground-based launchers and its naval forces.”
There are news reports that Pyongyang has offered to assist Tehran in developing a nuclear weapons program. One report even asserts that the DPRK is now willing to provide operational weapons to Iran.
Given the fanatical determination of both Israel and the United States to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear-weapons capability, it is hard to predict whether Tehran can overcome that formidable obstacle in the foreseeable future. However, it is unquestionably true that Washington and Tel Aviv have created an enormous incentive for Iranian leaders to at least make the effort.
Moreover, the assault on Iran has increased Pyongyang’s credibility and prestige. North Korea’s daring decision to build a nuclear deterrent, despite the risks of economic and perhaps even military retaliation, looks wise in retrospect. Iran and other countries that have adversarial relations with the United States could well draw a similar lesson. Once again, Washington’s clumsy handling of an important foreign policy issue may create needless dangers for Americans.
