KARACHI – Although the trial of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad is gripping theatre, attention should not shift from matters of fundamental importance. Basic questions remain about the longer-term prospects for post-Saddam Iraq, and these ought not to remain out of focus.
Insofar as the United States could transfer power in and over Iraq, it did so on June 28 – but rather furtively. Technically, Iraq is now an “independent” country. Its membership in the United Nations had never lapsed and would anyhow continue.
But what is happening in Iraq is a fierce armed struggle, another war in fact, between the U.S.-nominated authority and an ambiguously constituted resistance. A pattern in the latter’s activity is now visible.
On the one hand, it is attacking the symbols of new government’s authority – police stations, public works and oil industry installations. Included in this is the design to cripple Iraq’s economy so that the newly constituted U.S.-appointed authority can be perceived to have failed. Hence the persistent attacks on oil export facilities.
On the other hand, the new Iraqi government, anointed by Paul Bremer, the U.S. proconsul, is to come down hard on the resistance. Emergency or martial law is likely to be employed with the help of coalition forces.
Its priority action is to try Saddam Hussein, in a relatively open trial. It hopes to gain credibility and acceptance by detailing the ghastly oppression that Saddam Hussein had perpetrated on other Iraqis to strengthen his own personal regime. But trying Saddam may be a double-edged sword.
Saddam was not a tinpot of dictator, found in many smaller African states. He was a political figure even if he was ruthless and intolerant.
He belonged to the Ba’athist Party that has dominated the Arab mind since early 1970s, and its two factions were ruling Iraq and Syria. The Syrian one is still in power, if also somewhat weaker and more apologetic about its own earlier excesses.
But make no mistake: In the entire Arab world, the idea of Arab nationalism, strongly propagated by Col. Gamal Abdul Nasser, from 1950s onward, still dominates. Ba’athists were, in self-perception, an improvement on Nasser’s rather weak notion of Arab nationalism.
The U.S. accusations of the Iraqi resistance, including some Ba’athist remnants, were not off the mark
Although the emphasis from now onward is likely to be Saddam’s brutalities and killings, some positive aspects of his rule should not to be ignored. All said and done, Iraq was a secular country, though by no means democratic.
Much has been made of the fact that the Shi’ite majority was oppressed and kept down. But who can forget that in the eight-year war against Iran, most of the Iranian army comprised Shi’ites and they fought the Iraqis to the last man. Not many of the Shi’ite soldiers defected to a Shi’ite Iran amidst the exigencies of war. It cannot but be that a Ba’athist legacy survives, even if weakened.
Even a quick look at the dramatis personae reveals much. The nominal Iraqi authority, to which Paul Bremer transferred some of his functions, has no inner unity or a coherent set of ideas and ideals.
Its officials may be said to favor democracy and capitalism – the ruling ideology of United States. But other than that, they are distinguished only for the fact that they were picked up by U.S. intelligence as acceptable guys.
But behind them stand 200,000 coalition forces, led by the U.S. army. This is, in terms of firepower, an invincible force.
Meantime, the most talked about component of the resistance is the militant Islam or al-Qaeda-linked various fundamentalist groups and forces – an import from outside Iraq.
There is sure to be a floating membership of ordinary Iraqis who are mad at foreigners coming and occupying their country. The pervasive Arab nationalism provides the overall ideological umbrella for the resistance in which the fiercest would be the Ba’athists, though perhaps not as fierce as al-Qaeda-linked Islamic militants.
The resistance does not have the firepower or staying power. Fundamentally, it is an unequal battle, because no one can conceive that the resistance can drive out the coalition forces.
But the strength of ideas is on the side of resistance: they stand for the ouster of foreign influence and resurgence of Arabs. It is a powerful notion, even if it does not have tanks, helicopters and big guns.
The doomsayers about Iraq relied on Iraqi Shi’ites being swept by the ideas emanating from theocratic Iran. They would rise up and wish to form a Shi’ite state in southern Iraq that would notionally link up with Iran and would seek the support of other Shi’ites in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia’s eastern parts.
This is as far as the script went, after which there would be chaos and conflict where Iraq was and perhaps around it.
The Iraqis appear unwilling to let the doomsayers prove right. But this is early in the process, and whether the prognostication will prove right in the end is too early to say.
The outstanding fact about which there is no doubt is the fierce conflict raging between the resistance and the coalition-propped new Iraqi government. The subject does not admit of clear-cut, much less a sweeping judgment. Why? Because of the multiplicity of foreign interests that relentlessly impinge on Iraq.
The U.S. and the Britain are the strongest influences that want to shape the future of Iraq. Somewhere behind them lurk the Israelis, operating through their undercover agencies or through U.S. officials. The main Israeli interest, however, should not be lost sight of: Israel does not want a strong, united and progressive Iraq, secular or Islamic.
Then, there are regional powers that have vital interests. Iran and Turkey stand out, while Syria, Egypt and even the Palestinians are not uninterested. Each of them has some influence in Iraq, and each wants the Iraq of tomorrow to be according to its own wishes. All in all, the evolving situation is a witch’s brew.
