Motorists honked in celebration in this western Iraqi town as news spread of the assassination of the president of the Iraqi Governing Council Ezzidin Salim Monday.
Many people clapped and raised their fists. “The GC is nothing,” one man shouted. “They are not the Governing Council. They are the Prostitution Council.”
Sfook, a storeowner in the city said, “They are not Iraqi! They weren’t here suffering during Saddam’s time like we were. They are only puppets of the Americans!”
This has been the sentiment throughout the U.S. occupation in Ramadi, about 120 km (75 mi.) west of Baghdad, and in many other places. “They only care for themselves,” Abu Talat said in al-Adhamiya district of Baghdad last week. “And how can they represent Iraqis if none of us voted for them?”
The assassination of Salim underscores both the instability of the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq and the anger most Iraqis feel towards the U.S.-appointed council.
Salim was killed by a car bomb Monday while he waited to enter the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) compound in central Baghdad. Another member of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) Akila Hashimi was killed in September last year.
While tragic, the assassination will have little impact on the”transfer of sovereignty” scheduled for June 30 because the IGC never had any real authority to begin with.
The Bush administration had said the council “will have real power and real responsibilities.” But the document signed by U.S. administrator L. Paul Bremer that created the IGC on July 13 last year made clear that the council would have little, if any, real power or autonomy.
Regulation 6, section 2 of the CPA Orders reads as follows: “In accordance with Resolution 1483, the Governing Council and the CPA shall consult and coordinate on all matters involving temporary governance of Iraq, including the authorities of the Governing Council.”
This means essentially that the IGC cannot do anything without first consulting the CPA. In addition, the CPA retains veto power over any decision the IGC takes, effectively usurping any authority the IGC may have.
Perhaps the biggest accomplishment of the IGC was a refusal to allow Turkey to deploy troops in Iraq. It set up a tribunal that may try Saddam Hussein. The IGC has also appointed several ministers, but they have limited powers.
Governing Council members never could agree on a president for the council. They had to adopt a rotating system that installs a new member at the helm every 30 days.
In setting up the Council, U.S. officials seemed concerned more about ethnic and religious representation than about how effective members would be. That selection has meant 13 Shias, five Kurds, five Sunnis, a Christian and a Turkman. Three of the 25 members are women.
Allegations of indecision, corruption, and controversy have hovered over members.
Perhaps the most prominent example is Ahmed Chalabi, who has been convicted in absentia in Jordan for embezzlement of $300 million from a bank. Born in Iraq, he has spent most of his life outside the country.
Chalabi has been blamed widely for giving the U.S. government false information during the invasion of Iraq. Many people here believe he is only attempting to position himself as the next dictator of Iraq.
Many other members have been accused of awarding contracts to friends and family members, and of outright self-serving with their newfound privilege.
Nepotism has been rife in the council. The new oil minister happens to be the son of a council member.
Most IGC members were exiles in the days of Saddam Hussein. Iraqis resent them for returning now and immediately taking seats in an interim government.
Among the Council’s “achievements” is the approval of a new Iraqi flag that most Iraqis loathe. The new flag is blue, white, and yellow. Many Iraqis see this as closer to the Israeli flag than the old Iraqi flag.
Islamic scholar Sheikh Adnan Al-Robai’y has challenged the legality of the new flag.
“The law of directing the state that was issued by the Governing Council mentioned in one of its articles that the flag and the emblem and the national anthem will be determined by a law,” he wrote in an article circulated here. “And in another article they mentioned that the law of directing the state comes into effect after the 30th of June of this year. Logically, the article that determines the flag must also come into effect after the 30th of June.”
Few Iraqis believe that the Governing Council will be able to make independent decisions as the time for “transfer of power” approaches June 30.
