Iraq and Afghanistan have two new leaders, but the strategy of terrorism is the same that was so fanatically pursued by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. They are Egyptian-born Abu Ayyub al-Misri, who reportedly replaced Zarqawi in Iraq, and the second one is Mullah Dadullah Akhund, a one-legged guerrilla commander in southern Afghanistan [1]. He is determined to at least match, if not exceed, Zarqawi in his reputation for the gory beheading of his captives and widely publicizing it to terrorize the civilian population into minimizing any notion of cooperation with the Western forces.
Abu Ayyub al-Misri
The world does not know very much about Misri, except that he is a native of Egypt and is also known as Sheik Abu Hamza al-Muhajir. Unlike Zarqawi’s penchant for publicity during the last days of his life, Misri has been maintaining a low profile. But that could change within no time. After all, Zarqawi also preferred to lurk in the background initially.
Misri got his jihad-related training in Afghanistan, and played a key role in facilitating the movement of jihadists from Syria to Iraq under the leadership of Zarqawi. He is currently operating out of Baghdad.
Misri got inducted in the jihadist movement by joining the Islamic Jihad of Egypt in 1982. Ayman al-Zawahiri was the leader of that entity then. Thus, it is clear is that, unlike Zarqawi, who was fiercely independent and could not be controlled by the larger al-Qaeda, Misri is likely to take orders about his operational focus and objectives from the "mother" organization. His previous experience enables him to recapture the momentum on terrorist attacks that al-Qaeda in Iraq had lost because of the death of Zarqawi. At the present time, Misri has a $200,000 bounty on his head.
According to European intelligence, Misri has been effective in global networking during the past several years. The upside of that activity is that he is reportedly quite successful in getting volunteer jihadists as well as funds for the Islamist insurgency in Iraq. The downside is that the existence of a worldwide network makes it an excellent target for the Western intelligence sources to pick apart. All they need to do is to keep capturing visible functionaries until they stumble on to key figures. The likelihood of such a development is highly likely, given the intense search for such networks and functionaries in various Western and Muslim countries. That is one reason why al-Qaeda became a movement after its ouster from Afghanistan by the U.S. forces in 2001. In that capacity, it has been playing an effective role in motivating terrorists worldwide.
Mullah Dadullah Akhund
Mullah Dadullah Akhund has been a part of the Taliban movement since 1994 and has fought several battles since. However, he has acquired prominence only recently. Dadullah seems to have the "nine lives" of a proverbial cat. There were at least three reports of his capture or death; however, those stories turned out to be apocryphal.
Like the Taliban leader Mullah Omar, Dadullah is a Pashtun, and is one of Omar’s most trusted underlings. Because of his genocidal campaign against the Harazas (Shias) of the Bamyan province in 2000, Omar relieved him of his command. However, when the Taliban needed his brutality against the Northern Alliance during the U.S.-led military operation that was aimed at ousting the Taliban regime, Dadullah was reinstated as a commander. He is reported to have massacred hundreds of Tajiks and Uzbeks, including civilians, during that campaign.
Looking at the savagery of his terrorist campaign in Afghanistan, it seems that Dadullah is in competition with the savage legacy of Zarqawi. He seems to have a special penchant for videotaping the throat-slitting of his captives and distributing those videos for the purpose of terrorizing the populace. At the same time, he is reported to have trained a slew of young suicide bombers for a bloodletting of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF).
Just this year, under his leadership the terrorist campaign in Afghanistan has not only intensified, but is also indiscriminately killing civilians as well security personnel, a la Zarqawi. According to Newsweek, Dadullah’s "name became so identified with atrocities that Taliban radio would report he was engaged in battles even when he was not, as a ploy to unnerve opposing forces."
The Common Strategy of Terror
Under the leadership of Misri and Dadullah, the jihadist campaign against the United States and ISAF has entered a bloody phase. The jihadists in both theaters are of the view that they have an upper hand for the simple reason that their capacity to absorb losses far surpasses those of the United States or other Western forces. The Iraqi and Afghan insurgents are fully aware that pressure is building inside the United States to withdraw from Iraq. Even the Republicans are leaning toward the option of setting a withdrawal date. In the case of Afghanistan, every Afghan grew up learning how indefatigable and unrelenting the spirit of their countrymen really is in defeating and expelling all the great powers. In the past, it was the UK and the Soviet Union. Now it is the turn of the United States. That very spirit is also driving the Taliban, as their movement is rebounding steadily.
In Afghanistan, there is also a heavy reliance on the use of the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that have taken a high toll on Western forces in Iraq. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the use of suicide bombers is being used as an integral aspect of asymmetric warfare. As one Taliban official is reported to have noted, "Suicide attacks are our most effective weapon against the coalition forces." Hundreds of youth are reportedly ready to participate in suicide attacks.
Needless to say, the publicity campaign about suicide bombers is a highly potent tactic. Even if the numbers of these guerrillas are overstated, such an exaggeration keeps the enemies highly nervous. The fact that suicide bombers are being used in Iraq and Afghanistan, one can imagine the amount of terror such a propaganda technique creates in the mind of U.S. and other Western forces in both the Iraqi and Afghan theaters of operation.
Iraq
If there was any doubt that Zarqawi’s emphasis on sectarian violence would not be renewed under Misri, that uncertainty is gone. Sectarian violence has continued with the same intensity. That raise questions about the veracity of the letter of October 2005 that Zawahiri allegedly wrote to Zarqawi in which the former admonished the latter for killing Shias. However, it is also possible that if al-Qaeda in Iraq’s focus was to maintain the momentum toward civil war, such violence might be regarded as an effective, vital, and necessary tactical tool by al-Qaeda of Iraq.
There are still two unknowns, however. First, it is not known whether those who worked closely with Zarqawi will unquestionably accept Misri’s leadership, or whether intra-organizational dissent will result in the killing or capture of still more experienced terrorist leaders. Even the U.S. military stated that it was not sure whether Misri would be able to command the same type of loyalty as Zarqawi.
Second, there are expectations that the Sunni groups of Iraq will not cooperate with al-Qaeda of Iraq. But it will be a long while before such hopes become a reality. The government of Maliki has recently offered a "reconciliation plan." However, the Islamist insurgents are in this fight until death. That plan excludes "hardline Ba’athists." Even the determination of who is or isn’t a hardline Ba’athist is so subjective and controversial that not too many takers will be forthcoming. The U.S. officials in Iraq are unhappy that Maliki might be swept up by the momentum to create unity and will be inclined to pardon even those who were involved in killing American soldiers. All in all, the plan has good intentions, but it is likely to attract few, if any, takers.
Afghanistan
Even though the ISAF has decided to take over the brunt of the military operations from the U.S. forces in Afghanistan, the commitment of the ISAF may be understood by examining the resolve of the individual member countries in NATO. Of those, there are already speculations that Italy will withdraw its forces in the near future.
The Taliban and al-Qaeda seem to have concluded that the United States is on the losing end of the fight in Iraq. That conclusion seems to be working as a further impetus in the intensification of terror-related acts in portions of Afghanistan. The insurgents are reportedly controlling 20 or more districts in the Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul, and Helmand provinces, regions where the ISAF forces are deployed. In fact, reports from those regions state that government officials work for the government of Afghanistan during daytime, but start working for the Taliban after dusk.
Conclusion
The United States and other Western countries envision their participation in Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the global war on terrorism. The Islamist forces, on the contrary, envision their fight as a battle for the "glory of Islam." As such, they are motivated to fight until the bloody end. This resolve makes them a deadly force that has the potential of shaking the resolve of U.S. and other Western governments to stay in Afghanistan and Iraq for very long. The intensification of violence in both countries is a deliberate, calculated part of the Islamist strategy of keeping the Western forces off balance. In the final analysis, the Islamists are determined to create a situation in both those countries whereby Western forces are faced with either withdrawal or death. That is the most ominous common aspect of the Islamist strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan.
1. It should be noted that an Egyptian lawyer has recently questioned the claim of American military officials that Misri is Zarqawi’s successor. According to his claim, Misri has been in an Egyptian jail for the past several months. However, to the best of my knowledge, no further confirmation of that claim has been made yet.
