So what are we to make of all those apparently significant changes both in the Bush foreign policy team and his top military commanders? The question is whether he is clearing the decks for action or rearranging the deck chairs.
Given that the Bushlet is supposed to unveil his latest strategy for the war in Iraq on Wednesday, the moves look like preparation for moving to a new phase – a new way forward, if you will – with those the decider-in-chief now believes are the right people in place to execute the plan. Those other commanders had a nasty tendency to tell him things he didn’t want to hear.
Gen. George Casey, the top military commander in Iraq, and Gen. John Abizaid, head of the Central Command (which encompasses the entire Middle East and more), have both expressed skepticism about the idea of a "surge" in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq without a very specific mission that can be measured and accomplished. Easing them out suggests the president has decided on a surge and doesn’t want skeptics in charge. Or to put it less politely, he may have arranged to have competent yes-men below him.
THE NEW GUYS
Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, slated to be promoted to replace Gen. Casey, served two tours in Iraq and helped to oversee the drafting of the military’s new manual on counterinsurgency. That suggests familiarity with Iraq and perhaps a shift to more aggressive action against various insurgents.
Adm. William Fallon, slated to become the top man at Central Command, may seem an unusual choice, given that the action is on the ground. But he commanded a carrier group during the first Persian Gulf war. Does his appointment suggest a renewed emphasis on naval forces, which would seem most useful in deterring or neutralizing Iran? A couple of retired military folks on CNN praised him as probably the military’s most competent commander, regardless of service, so perhaps his competence rather than experience relevant to possible stand-off military action against Iran was the factor.
Or it might have been that there’s no record I could find of him challenging a policy or being troublesome to higher-ups.
THE MISSION
So what kind of policy would these new guys (at least in these positions) be asked to implement? The New York Times‘ Michael Gordon and Thom Shanker think they know:
"The troop increase option under discussion," they write in Friday’s Times, "would focus on improving security in Baghdad. Under this approach, two Army combat brigades would be sent to the capital during the first phase of the operation. A combat brigade generally consists of about 3,500 soldiers. At the same time, a third brigade would be positioned in Kuwait as a reserve, and two more brigades would be on call in the United States.
"The expectation is that these three brigades would eventually be sent to Baghdad as well, thought the president would have the option to limit the reinforcements. Part of the increase could be achieved by holding some units past their currently scheduled return home."
Focusing on Baghdad supposedly means the administration views stabilization of the capital as the chief precondition for anything resembling stability, and that it sees sectarian violence as a bigger threat than the Sunni insurgency.
Several potential problems loom. As Ted Carpenter, vice president for military and foreign policy studies at the libertarian Cato Institute told me, "If the goal is to restore order in Baghdad, they’ll have to go after [Muqtada al-] Sadr and his Mahdi Army. But Sadr is part of Maliki’s support group and going after him aggressively will make many Shia unhappy." That’s putting it mildly.
A more general objection is that experience with relatively successful counter-insurgency campaigns, notably the recent Balkans wars, suggest that an additional 20,000 or 30,000 troops will be a pittance compared to what’s really needed. Most of those I’ve talked to who claim to know – backed up by reading – suggest that 500,000 troops would be needed to succeed in Iraq, with 130,000 of those in Baghdad. No conceivable surge would reach such numbers.
Even Frederick Kagan, one of the neocon theorists still willing to argue for what he calls victory and lay out a plan for it in a recent American Enterprise Institute publication, calls for seven brigades – along with a permanent increase in the size of the Army and Marines to sustain ongoing Iraq action, longer tours for the ground forces, including the National Guard (for several years).
THE NEGROPONTE SHUFFLE
John Negroponte’s move from Director of Intelligence, a cabinet-level position with daily access to the president, to Deputy Secretary of State, a sub-cabinet job, seems curious on the surface. Some news stories suggest he was frustrated at not being able to get a handle on the 16 fractious intelligence agencies of which he was nominally in charge. Others suggest that many, including people at the top level of the White House, were frustrated at his lack of executive and administrative ability.
Whether the move came at his request or the president’s, the number two job at State seems to fit his career-diplomat profile better, especially if he is slated to be the de facto Secretary of State, handling most of the substantive work while Condoleezza Rice does the ceremonial tasks. Having been the first post-Saddam ambassador to Iraq suggests some familiarity with the problems there. Unfortunately, his career doesn’t suggest an inclination to ask tough questions of superiors deluded by hubris.
The appointment of Zalmay Khalilzad, current ambassador to Iraq, to be U.S. ambassador to the United Nations has been rumored for weeks.
THE WIDER WORLD
Iraq is far from the only issue that is likely to confront the United States or those who are just fascinated by the entire world. On one aspect of international relations things are likely to get considerably worse: trade.
Public Citizen, the Nader-founded lobby, has crowed that seven seats in the Senate and 28 in the House passed from "free trade" to "fair trade" advocates. In practice this means using international trade negotiations to impose labor and environmental mandates on poorer countries before their struggling economies can absorb them with only modest damage. Fairly free international trade is the most hopeful way of reducing poverty globally, but those who style themselves as "populist" advocates for the poor are almost uniformly hostile to free trade. Go figure.
I don’t expect President Bush to acknowledge serious mistakes beyond the occasional tactical miscalculation in Iraq, let alone to entertain the possibility that the war itself was a mistake. When in doubt, bet on obstinacy from this president. The only dim hope is that Republican desires to see Iraq in the rearview mirror rather than in the headlights come 2008 may lead to ratcheting down the U.S. commitment over the next two years.
BEYOND IRAQ
Beyond Iraq, the blogosphere is full of people predicting, as they have for a couple of years, that an Israeli or U.S. attack on Iran is imminent. I still think the generals – and the complications of a divided government – will talk Bush out of this neocon desire. But relations with Iran are unlikely to take a turn for the better, and Iran’s influence in the Middle East, already bolstered by the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, is likely to increase.
I suspect that not much of real significance, beyond perhaps another explosion and continuing desultory six-nation talks, will happen with respect to North Korea. Neither South Korea nor China wants regime change or conflict there. Japan and South Korea might take some first steps toward acquiring nuclear weapons capability – which just might be more stabilizing than destabilizing.
Despite rhetorical devotion to democracy, don’t expect much action on behalf of Burma (now Myanmar), which tried democracy in 1990 only to have it crushed by the military government. Aung San Suu Kyi, who won that election (and the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize), remains under house arrest.
CENTRAL ASIA AND BEYOND
The death of President Niyazov of remote Turkmenistan, could presage unexpected trouble in Central Asia. In most of the "stans," the former Soviet provincial rulers became instant nationalists and continued running things, so Central Asia didn’t undergo the social and political upheavals experienced by Russia and the Baltic countries. When the current dictators die without obvious successors, expect turmoil. Because Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have significant energy resources coveted by China and Russia, this could have international implications.
Elsewhere Somalia may be stabilized for the moment but butchery continues in Darfur. A visitor returning from Israel told me recently everybody there expects another Israeli-Lebanon war before anything like progress on resolving Israeli-Palestinian differences. Meanwhile Syria is trying to reassert its influence in Lebanon.
All in all, 2007 looks like more problems than opportunities to me.
