There are always multiple causes for an event so complex as a war – and what’s going on now between Israel and Hezbollah fighters based in Lebanon has gone well beyond the skirmish phase. However, the current conflict is to a considerable degree an example of “blowback,” the old CIA term for unanticipated negative consequences from an action abroad, from the Iraq war, not least from the way the administration chose to sell the war to the American people and itself once all the earlier justifications blew up in its face.
To be sure, the administration talked about spreading democracy and changing the character of the Middle East by example (and force of arms) fairly early on. But after the 9/11 connection, the elusive WMDs and the hinted Saddam-al-Qaeda connection turned out to be unviable as justifications, planting a democracy in Mesopotamia became the only justification the Bushies could offer with even a modicum of self-respect.
It was going to be wonderful. The U.S. troops would be welcomed with hosannas and flowers, the Iraqi people would quickly take advantage of the opportunity for self-rule and establish (perhaps with a few fits and starts, given that real democracies are always a bit messy) a working democracy. Before long it would be the envy of the Middle East and other countries, whether through reform or uprising (or perhaps a nudge or two from triumphant U.S. troops who might stay around long enough to help liberate a few more eager aspiring democracies before returning home with crowns of laurel on their noble brows), would emulate the example and the Middle East would be freer, more stable, and grateful to America for generations to come.
Reality has been rather different, and in Gaza and Lebanon it bit back with a vengeance.
Setting a Pattern
Surely there must have been somebody in the Bush administration who understood that establishing a genuinely democratic society involves something more than holding an election. There is some evidence – see Larry Diamond’s book – that some people in the Coalition Provisional Authority tried, and even some evidence that more than a few Iraqis understood that the conditions for something resembling democracy involve more than dropping a ballot in a box and getting your finger dyed purple. You need something resembling a civil society whereby people work together for common goals without coercion or too many orders from above, a rule of law that is understood to apply to the rulers as well as the ruled, a willingness to change rulers peacefully, and preferably a market economy developed beyond the rudimentary bartering stage of development.
This was never going to be easy in a country with no tradition of democracy that was emerging from decades of brutal authoritarian rule under Saddam. So the United States settled for the form without the substance. The administration cheered purple fingers – not that there wasn’t a certain amount to cheer there – as if elections with only a little associated violence were the second coming of the Declaration of Independence.
Taking Undue Credit
That set a pattern for other spinning in the Middle East and other parts of the Muslim world. Although Libya had been trying to worm itself back into the good graces of the West for a decade or more, the spinmeisters interpreted the decision to give up nuclear weapons research as arising solely from the Iraq war. When a crisis emerged after the attempted assassination of Rafik Hariri in Lebanon that led to the expulsion of Syrian occupiers and a relatively fair election, the neocons and their amen corners held it up as another example of how the strategy was working. The Middle East was on the way and a new democratic dawn was virtually inevitable.
When elections were due in the Palestinian Authority in January of this year the administration was feeling downright cocky. It virtually insisted to prime minister Mahmoud Abbas that of course the political wing of the terrorist/jihadist group Hamas should be allowed, nay encouraged to field candidates. Whether they were just out of touch, or perhaps they figured they didn’t even need the few clumsy efforts they made to ensure that Hamas would be defeated. Democracy was on the march, thanks to Dubya and his inspired leadership.
But Hamas won, and wonder of wonders it didn’t abandon its hostility to Israel and suddenly become the second coming of Gandhi. In Lebanon, free elections brought the political wing of Hezbollah a certain presence in parliament and a new respectability. If not for Lebanon’s system that assures representation for all religious groups, including Christians, Hezbollah might have won more seats.
Should it really be surprising that both Hamas and Hezbollah were feeling a little cocky?
Things Fall Apart
The kidnapping of Israeli soldiers, both by Hamas from Gaza and Hezbollah from Lebanon, was hardly justifiable and might have been intended to provoke a violent response from Israel. The jihadist fighters did their kidnappings on Israeli soil. They might not have expected quite the response Israel gave them, but they surely expected some violent response. They got it.
The images of death and devastation are so appalling, the destruction seems so senseless, that it is not difficult to understand the emotional impulse behind the call for the United States to “do something” about the fighting between Israel and the forces of Hezbollah, the jihadist group the effectively controls southern Lebanon. Surely the Sole Superpower has some responsibility to try to negotiate a cease-fire, to engage in shuttle diplomacy, to – do something.
For various reasons, however, including having 130,000 troops tied up in what looks like a never-ending and perhaps worsening insurgency in Iraq, U.S. options in the region are limited. The word is that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice plans a trip to the region. But I would be surprised if she did much more than express concern and renew a few contacts.
At this stage that may well be the best course. Despite – or because of – the likelihood that the fighting involves not just Hezbollah but other countries in the Middle East, the U.S. will do well to move cautiously.
Setting the Stage
The basic facts on the ground, though subject to some dispute and differing interpretations, are reasonably clear. Hezbollah, the Shi’ite Islamist/jihadist group, grew in opposition to the previous Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, between 1982 and 2000. It is controlled or heavily influenced by Syria and through Damascus financed and supplied with weapons by Iran. When Israel withdrew in 2000, Israelis thought they were reestablishing defensible borders, but Hezbollah militants proclaimed, and probably believed, that their resistance had driven the Israelis out.
Since then, Hezbollah, probably using Iran’s money, has established hospitals and other social-service institutions to cement its authority and popularity. Following the “Cedar Revolution” after the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri – and the expulsion of Syrian forces that had effectively controlled Lebanon for years – Hezbollah’s political wing, as noted above, participated in parliamentary elections and gained some representation in the still-weak Lebanese government headed by prime minister Fouad Siniora. In possession of a reported 14,000 rockets, some of which it has lobbed from time to time into northern Israel, it seems to feel confident.
But why would it choose to provoke Israel at this particular time? Perhaps it was in solidarity with the Hamas guerrilla fighters in Gaza who kidnapped an Israeli soldier a couple of weeks before. Remember when that conflict seemed like the worst that might happen? But there could be other reasons.
One is that the U.N. commission investigating Rafik Hariri’s assassination issued an interim report in June, implicating Syrians and suggesting an international tribunal to try suspects, almost all of whom would probably be Syrian or Syrian-controlled. The other is that the U.N. Security Council is on the verge of a resolution condemning Iran’s alleged attempt to build nuclear weapons, which would probably have dominated last week’s G-8 meeting in St. Petersburg had there not been a shooting war in the Middle East. Iran could have given its Hezbollah clients orders, or a sign of approval, to divert attention from that development.
It’s difficult to tell for sure just how heavy are the hands of Syrian and Iran in all this. But the mullah regime surely had some influence, and at present looks to emerge stronger whatever happened in the next few weeks in southern Lebanon. Perhaps that is why countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and some of the emirates were quick to denounce the Hezbollah provocation. As Sunni-ruled countries, at some level they have to be concerned about the apparent ambitions of Shi’ite (and Persian) Iran.
From Israel’s perspective, the kidnapping of its soldiers demanded retaliation and offered an opportunity to eliminate, or at least degrade, Hezbollah’s capacity to attack Israel. One can argue as to whether the response was proportionate to the threat, but it’s not difficult to understand why Israel would attack. Israel’s modern military is by far the most capable in the region. It looks for sure as if there will be a ground invasion, since it is clearly impossible to destroy all of Hezbollah’s rockets and launching sites with attacks from the air alone.
Even if such an invasion were to prove tactically successful, it could create its own blowback. Even with ground troops it is unlikely the Israelis will be able to kill or neutralize all the Hezbollah people and weapons. And there’s more to Hezbollah than a military wing; the organization is embedded into Lebanese life on a number of levels. Israel has already killed a number of innocent Lebanese civilians and is sure to kill more. This will create more resentment and hatred for Israel that will surely be manifested in future hostile actions for years to come.
Peace was always a long shot in the Middle East. After the last couple of weeks the odds look even longer than they have in a while.
