It now appears likely that the Iraqis will come up with some sort of written constitution by the Aug. 15 deadline. Although President Bush has expressed aversion to strict deadlines for the United States, both Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and the new U.S. ambassador to Iraq (what ever happened to John Negroponte, whose veteran savvy was supposed to be the key to a smooth transition in Iraq? Oh, that’s right, he’s fixing something bigger now) Zalmay Khalilzad, formerly U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, have pushed on the Iraqis to meet the deadline. And apparently a number of Iraqis in the transitional leadership, especially the Shi’ites, have their own reasons for wanting to meet the deadline.
Those who would like to see a substantial withdrawal of U.S. troops at the earliest possible date (assuming it can’t begin yesterday) have reason to be pleased at this prospect. If the Iraqis adhere to an admittedly somewhat arbitrary timetable to move toward at least the form if not the substance of self-governance, it is much more likely that the United States will be able to begin withdrawing troops according to an informal schedule that U.S. military commanders in Iraq have hinted strongly could begin next spring.
A strong case can be made that from the perspective of U.S. core interests and probably from the perspective of long-term Iraqi interests (at least most Iraqis), an early U.S. withdrawal from Mesopotamia, though not without risks and costs, would be far more beneficial than harmful. That fact should not blind us, however, to the likelihood that having a written constitution in place could be more a symbolic than a real step toward the desirable aspiration of a regime in Iraq that, if not necessarily democratic or especially liberal, is at least an improvement on Saddam Hussein and not much of a threat to its neighbors. I’m reasonably sure Iraq’s chances are better with the U.S. forces gone than with them still there. But that doesn’t mean that the chances are especially good.
Papering Over Problems
Meeting the Aug. 15 deadline would give both the Bush administration and the provisional Iraqi government the ability to say that the process of moving toward self-government is on track. It would provide formal assurance that thinking about reducing the number of U.S. troops in Iraq – toward which the U.S. seems to be pointing, although President Bush recently made it clear that he still prefers to use the word "war" rather than something "softer" that implies a nonmilitary element – is at least feasible. But will it resolve any of Iraq’s lingering problems of governance or simply paper over them?
I talked with Nathan Brown, on leave from the political science department at George Washington University and now with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who has written four books on Arab politics and has been following the constitution-writing process closely. He has written a fine introduction [.pdf] to problems the drafting committee faces, and has translated drafts as they become available. He says Iraq’s problems fall into three main categories: religion, federalism, security.
At the root of many of Iraq’s problems, as I have previously discussed here and here, Iraq is an inherently artificial country. Its borders were drawn by British imperialists after World War I, and they took little account of religious and ethnic realities. Present-day Iraq is about 65 percent Shia Muslims, just under 20 percent Sunni Muslims, and almost 20 percent Kurds, who are generally Sunni in religion but differ ethnically from the Arabs who predominate elsewhere. Among Sunnis and Shi’ites alike, there is a spectrum ranging from extremely religious to almost secular, although those who use religion as an excuse to justify violence tend to get most of the attention.
Sharia Fixation
The Shia majority on the drafting commission has included language stipulating that Islamic law, or sharia, will be "the source, but not the primary or only source, of law," according to Mr. Brown, but language barring laws in direct contradiction of Islamic law, is likely to remain. The unresolved question is who – parliament, a supreme constitutional court, clerics? – will decide what is a clear contradiction. This could leave the status of women fuzzy. And will the state or religious authorities regulate marriage?
The possibility that the drafters will produce a document that enshrines a Shi’ite understanding of sharia as Iraq’s governing document has attracted a certain amount of hand-wringing from various quarters, including the U.S. government. The problem is that Iraq is so divided that any position at the extreme – an Iran-like sharia-dominated regime or an almost purely secular regime – would stir up bitterness and opposition. This may turn out to be an insoluble problem for Iraq. The constitution drafters are likely to come up with a compromise that papers over differences without resolving them or making any of the factions happy.
If there were more trust among Iraqis that one faction would not seize a temporary advantage to assert domination over other factions, this would not be much of a problem. But trust is something, according to most of the area experts I have talked to, that is hardly in oversupply in Iraq.
Devolving Power?
The federalism issue is important because the Kurds in the north have had effective semi-autonomy since 1991 and don’t want to give up much of it to a central state likely to be dominated by Shi’ites. While the general principles of strong local government to handle many day-to-day affairs and, in theory, a federalist system – perhaps under another term to reduce the taint of copying or kowtowing to the United States – seem to have been accepted, the devil can be in the details.
Let’s be fair here. The United States is the country that has probably had federalism – a central government with limited designated power and power over a great deal of day-to-day governance lodged at the local level – embedded in its founding documents more thoroughly than any other country. Yet there is hardly unanimity in the United States, after more than 200 years of experience, on just what federalism should mean in practice or how it should be embodied in day-to-day policies. Law professors and judges can sound, in their erudite commentaries, as if they were about to come to blows over phrases and concepts that seem arcane to most ordinary Americans.
To expect Iraq, which does have a tradition of tribal governance but has little experience of what most political scientists would recognize as a civil society with Muslim characteristics, to get it right on the first try is to expect the miraculous.
The drafters face a number of difficult questions. Saddam Hussein reworked the boundaries of the Kurdish regions. Will they be changed to reflect where Kurds actually live? Will local governments, new regional governments, or the national government control oil revenues? Will both Kurdish and Arabic be official languages? What will happen to Kirkuk, which was predominantly Kurdish before Saddam engaged in "ethnic cleansing" – and happens to be the center of a potentially lucrative (if the Iraqis get their act together and the insurgents can be neutralized or suppressed) oil-producing region?
Insecurity
As to security, civil war now seems a more pressing concern than a possible military coup. Does that suggest a strong military force controlled by a central government? If so, what will be the status of existing local militias? Neither Kurds nor Shi’ites are likely to give them up. Can they be kept from disrupting the larger society? How?
Add the fact that foreign terrorists still seem to be able to move in and out of Iraq with little difficulty or hindrance from either U.S. or Iraqi security forces. Area experts have told me from early on – beginning mere weeks after the U.S. invasion – that without physical security, political stability is something of a pipe dream.
One more problem. Just what will be the relationship with U.S. forces, even if those forces are substantially reduced? Few people I’ve talked with or read think the United States will draw down the troops in Iraq to zero.
It might well be that the ultimate outcome will resemble an affective division of the country into three or more components, as advocated in Liam Anderson’s and Gareth Stansfield’s 2004 book, The Future of Iraq. That would reduce the possibility that a future dictator could build Iraq into a more serious threat to its neighbors. There’s an outside chance this could be accomplished peacefully and systematically, but if it happens it is more likely to be accompanied by a good deal of gratuitous bloodshed.
These problems are likely to be papered over in the constitution rather than resolved. That might give the U.S. permission to begin withdrawal, but we should be honest. U.S. withdrawal should occur as quickly as possible, for a multitude of reasons. But neither U.S. withdrawal not the current constitutional process is likely to create a peaceful and productive society in Iraq any time soon.
