NEW DELHI – Hot on the heels of its landmark "nuclear cooperation" agreement with the United States, which allows New Delhi to keep its nuclear weapons, the Indian government has entered into a controversial deal with Russia for the supply of nuclear fuel for two civilian power reactors.
The deal is expected to be formally announced and signed by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov during his two-day visit to New Delhi beginning Thursday. Accompanying Fradkov is the head of the Russian federal atomic energy agency, Sergei Kiriyenko.
The India-Russia fuel supply deal has been opposed by the U.S. government and may well queer the pitch for the ratification by US Congress of the Mar. 2 agreement signed between visiting President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Under it, India must separate civilian nuclear facilities from military ones and place civilian facilities under international safeguards. In return, the US promised to adjust its domestic laws and seek a change in international rules to enable full civil nuclear cooperation with India.
”Growing discontent within the Congress with India’s nuclear activities would complicate matters enormously for the advocates of the India-U.S. agreement," argues Achin Vanaik, professor of international relations and global politics at Delhi University, and an independent nuclear expert. ”Rejection of the deal by the Congress will kill it.”
Under the fuel supply agreement, for which Russia has already notified the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), 60 tons of lightly enriched uranium will be shipped to two ageing reactors built by a US company in the mid-1960s, which are already under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
India does not produce enough enriched uranium to feed the reactors which are located at Trombay, close to the western port city of Mumbai.
According to NSG guidelines," its members cannot export any nuclear material or equipment to a country which has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. Exceptions can only be made in respect of exports which are necessary to ensure the safety of nuclear installations.
"Safety" is the very clause that India invoked in 2001 while importing 58 tons of fuel for the two reactors from Russia. This attracted a sharp rebuke from the NSG. At a special session, the group declared that the shipment was not in keeping with the "spirit" of the safety exception clause. Russia had to give an undertaking that it would not repeat its action.
”The safety clause is meant to prevent or correct ‘a radiological hazard to public health and safety which cannot reasonably be met by other means,’ said an engineer at India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), insisting on anonymity for fear of losing his job. ”No such hazard existed in 2001 at Tarapur. The reactors were short of fuel but could have been safely shut down. This is true of the current situation too.”
While justifying the deal with Russia, the Indian government did not cite any "radiological hazard," but said the fuel is necessary to "enable the plant to continue to operate in safety and provide much-needed electricity to the western power grid." Its spokesperson said a fuel shortage at Tarapur would have affected their operations under ”reliable and safe” conditions.
”Invoking the safety clause seems to have been a mere excuse or ruse,” says Vanaik. ”It provides a basically untenable technical cover for a move with political significance.”
Through the Russian fuel-supply arrangement, India is eager to signal that its 30 year-long isolation from global civilian nuclear commerce has ended and that major nations are keen to resume nuclear exports to it.
The Russian deal was reached close to Bush’s visit to India. It came up for discussion last December, during President Vladmir Putin’s visit to India. But the Russians turned down India’s request. The Bush-Singh deal radically altered the climate.
Just last month, French President Jacques Chirac and Singh signed an agreement to restart nuclear trade as soon as the NSG is persuaded to amend its guidelines for the "special" case of India, as Bush promised to do in the deal with India.
India is considering the import of six 1,000 Mw reactors from France and has identified a new site, near Mumbai, for locating some of them. France has long been keen to sell nuclear material to India. In the early 1980s, it supplied fuel to Tarapur after the US walked out of its agreement to do so following India’s first nuclear test in 1974.
The US itself is keen to sell nuclear material to India. On March 13, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wrote in The Washington Post defending the nuclear deal with India, citing its economic benefits: "India plans to import eight nuclear reactors by 2012. If US companies win just two of those reactor contracts, it will mean thousands of new jobs for American workers."
India’s strategy seems to be to weaken or breach NSG guidelines by seeking exemptions for itself. In defense, it cites Bush’s commitment to encourage Washington’s "partners to consider India’s request" for fuel for Tarapur. India hopes that it can get this by dangling the carrot of lucrative contracts to the major powers.
This may work up to a point. But India risks further antagonizing the numerous US lawmakers who are skeptical towards the Bush-Singh nuclear deal. The chairs of both the House of International Relations Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committees have resisted the administration’s pressure to act quickly on proposals to amend US laws.
Representative Edward Markey has stated: ”If Russia goes forth with the sale of nuclear material to India without consensus from the NSG, this will begin a new era in which the rules that governed nuclear trade for decades are gradually swept away.” He pledges to oppose the U.S.-India nuclear deal’s ratification.
Policy-shaping opinion in the US is sharply divided, with many South Asia specialists and nuclear experts endorsing the deal, but a somewhat higher number opposing it.
”The US is in an extremely awkward position,” says Daryl Kimball, executive director of the non-partisan, Arms Control Association. ”Through its agreement with India, the Bush administration has ceded much of its authority and credibility to object to actions by states that break NSG rules.”
Supporters of the deal include the U.S.-India Business Council. As part of its lobbying efforts, it has set up a special website. Not to be underestimated are the deal’s advocates in the influential two million-strong Indian-American community. The battle has been well and truly joined.
(Inter Press Service)
