NEW DELHI – Indian leaders are finding, to their dismay, that they confront far tougher choices in implementing a controversial nuclear agreement they signed with the United States than they had bargained for.
These choices pertain to a sequence of steps New Delhi must take that could prove a potential obstacle to the deal’s execution, based upon its approval by the U.S. Congress.
Under the agreement, signed on July 18 by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the U.S. promised to make a one-time exception for India in the international nuclear control regime, recognize it as a "responsible" nuclear weapons-state (NWS), and resume civilian nuclear commerce with it.
In return, India would separate its civilian nuclear facilities from military ones and "voluntarily" place the former under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It would also sign an Additional Protocol with the IAEA providing far more intrusive-than-normal inspections of civilian facilities.
On Monday, U.S. ambassador to India David Mulford bluntly announced that India must submit a plan for civilian-military separation so that Washington can judge whether or not it is "credible" and decide to present it to the Congress.
The agreement’s approval would demand a change in U.S. domestic laws, in particular the Nonproliferation Act of 1978, which prohibits civilian nuclear transactions with, and triggers sanctions against, a country that is pursuing a nuclear weapons program.
India, which shocked the world by detonating five nuclear bombs in May 1998, has an ambitious nuclear weapons program for which it desperately seeks recognition, especially from the U.S.
From initial condemnation of the tests, Washington has moved to an awkward acceptance of India’s NWS status. This followed rounds of high-level talks on the nuclear and missiles issue and a political-military reconciliation under which the two states launched a "strategic partnership."
If implemented, the July agreement would bring this process to fruition and give it official imprimatur. However, India would still not have the status of a nuclear power under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970, which only recognizes five NWSs (the U.S., Russia, Britain, France, and China).
Indian leaders had promised that the agreement’s implementation would be strictly "reciprocal." On July 28, Manmohan Singh told Parliament: "Indian actions will be contingent at every stage on actions taken by the other side." He said India’s commitments would be "conditional upon, and reciprocal to, the U.S. fulfilling its side" of the deal. He also said the separation of civilian and military installations would take place in a phased manner over a period of time.
Singh reiterated that the decision to place civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards would be strictly voluntary and "based solely on our own duly calibrated national decisions" and in keeping with the agreed principle that "India should have the same benefits and advantages" as the five NPT-recognized NWSs.
However, ambassador Mulford’s statement and recent depositions by senior U.S. officials before congressional committees put a divergent interpretation on India’s obligations under the deal. Although India need not complete the separation of civilian and military facilities before Congress approves the agreement, it must draw up a "game plan" to do so before Congress considers the deal.
On Nov. 2, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "Our judgment is that it would not be wise or fair to ask congress to make such a consequential decision without evidence that the Indian government was acting on what is arguably the most important of its commitments – the separation of its civilian and military nuclear facilities."
To do this, India "must craft a credible and transparent plan and have begun to implement it before the administration would request congressional action."
This sequence of steps flies in the face of "reciprocity" and "Indian actions" being "contingent at any every stage on actions taken by the other side." India must take the first step.
"This is unlikely to go down well with India’s political class," says Kamal Mitra Chenoy, professor of international politics at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, in the capital.
The right-wing, nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which was responsible for India declaring itself a nuclear weapon state in 1998, when it ruled the country, has already been bitterly critical of the July deal as one taken without wider national consensus.
As for the Left, the minority Manmohan Singh government is critically dependent on communist parties for survival and credibility. "Already, the government is under attack for having voted against Iran at the IAEA at the behest of the U.S. and in order to defend the nuclear deal," says Chenoy.
The Left, the centrist Samajwadi Party, and the Janata Dal (Secular) have launched a joint campaign on the issue of India’s vote against Iran. They have held mass rallies in New Delhi and Lucknow and accused the government of undermining an independent foreign policy as well as India’s vital interest in a major gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan, which holds the key to Asian cooperation in energy.
However, even more controversial will be the U.S. demand, voiced by Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert G. Joseph before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that India’s offer of placing civilian facilities under the IAEA safeguards should not be "voluntary," unlike for the five "recognized" NWSs.
Joseph said that "we would not view a voluntary offer arrangement as defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint or consistent with the [July 18] Joint Statement."
According to M.R. Srinivasan, former chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, of the hundreds of civilian nuclear installations they have, the five NWSs have so far placed only 17 under the IAEA safeguards.
Their agreements allow the removal of civilian facilities from safeguards and the transfer of nuclear materials out of them. If India is to have, as claimed by the government, the "same responsibilities and practices" as the five NWSs, it should be permitted to transfer material from civilian facilities.
However, Joseph was categorical that in India’s case the IAEA safeguards "must be applied in perpetuity" and "nuclear materials in the civil sector should not be transferred out."
This is a clear case of what New Delhi has repeatedly condemned as "double standards." It claimed the deal was meant to correct imbalances. A note issued by the prime minister’s office on July 29 explicitly stated that: "NWSs, including the U.S., have the right to shift facilities from civilian category to military, and there is no reason why this should not apply to India."
The Indian nuclear establishment has special concerns about at least two kinds of installations: the 500 MW prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR) under construction, and plants that reprocess spent fuel from civilian power reactors to extract plutonium from it. This plutonium can be used to make bombs.
India is loath to place the PFBR under safeguards because it claims it is a "research reactor." It is equally reluctant to lose a cheap source of plutonium from the power reactor reprocessing plants.
India’s dilemmas come in the context of opposition to the agreement aired by many U.S. proliferation experts and congressmen, who say it will weaken the nonproliferation regime.
The deal is also likely to face opposition from the 55-member Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, which the Bush administration hoped to win over. The Group is divided; Russia, France, and Britain, which want to sell nuclear technology and materials to India, support the agreement while Sweden, Japan, and New Zealand have voiced their disapproval.
Complicating matters is India’s domestic politics. With widening divergences between Indian and U.S. interpretations of the deal and growing discrepancies between U.S. demands and Singh’s pledges, a domestic consensus will prove elusive. This will limit the government’s options.
(Inter Press Service)
