Recent reports suggest that North Korean (DPRK) troops may be assisting Russia in its war with Ukraine – a development that underscores their growing strategic partnership, formalized by a treaty pledging mutual military, economic, and cultural cooperation. This alliance, formalized through a recently enacted treaty, could bolster Vladimir Putin’s position ahead of Donald Trump’s inauguration in January, as Trump has pledged to end the war in the early days of his second administration. Any involvement of DPRK troops – whether logistical or kinetic – could help to expedite Russian operations. These developments, set against the backdrop of Russia and North Korea’s recently enacted comprehensive strategic partnership, highlight the deepening ties between the two nations, raising critical questions about the Ukraine war, DPRK-Russia relations, and US diplomacy in the region.
The Kremlin’s Pragmatic Gambit
The treaty, signed during Vladimir Putin’s state visit to the DPRK on June 18, 2024, ratified in November and taking full effect on December 4, 2024, marks a pivotal moment in DPRK-Russia relations. While Western media have focused on the defense-related aspects – such as alleged sales of DPRK ammunition to Russia and the rumored deployment of North Korean troops to the Russian Federation – the treaty encompasses far more than military cooperation.
Allegations of DPRK troop deployments to Russia have dominated Western headlines, though neither Moscow nor Pyongyang has confirmed them, and much of the evidence was clearly fabricated. The Pentagon claims that several thousand DPRK troops likely traveled to Russia earlier this year, ostensibly for “training exercises,” and are now stationed in rear echelons behind the front lines in the Kursk region in response to a Ukrainian invasion that was launched in August 2024. Even if DPRK troops are confined to logistical and support roles, their presence could enable Russia to redeploy its troops to critical fronts, enhancing its operational capabilities.
This aligns with speculation that Putin hopes to drive all Ukrainian forces from Russian soil before Trump’s inauguration, preferring to negotiate an end to the war from an uncompromised position of strength.
The recently enacted treaty commits both nations to mutual military assistance, stating, “In case any one of the two sides is put in a state of war by an armed invasion from an individual state or several states, the other side shall provide military and other assistance with all means in its possession without delay in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the laws of the DPRK and the Russian Federation.”
What Does North Korea Get?
For Pyongyang, this alliance represents more than immediate utility; it’s an investment in long-term security. Should DPRK soldiers die in support of Russian objectives, their sacrifice would create a powerful moral and political obligation – cementing the alliance with a “blood debt” of sorts. This concept of a ‘blood debt’ not only strengthens the immediate alliance but also ensures that Pyongyang could call upon Russia in times of need, leveraging this shared sacrifice to secure military support in the face of putative future conflicts with South Korea or US-led efforts at regime change.
DPRK troops are unlikely to be deployed to Donbass. However, as such restraint would signal that Russia’s reciprocal commitment to the Korean peninsula would remain limited to defending against incursions across the DPRK’s recognized borders. Pyongyang’s recent constitutional changes, renouncing claims to South Korean territory, further support this cautious strategy that is aligned with both nations’ interests.
While claims about DPRK troops in Kursk – ranging from photos of supposed combat operations to absurd reports of soldiers falling prey to internet porn addictions – have been widely debunked, they underscore the prevalence of misinformation about the alliance. As the owner of several DPRK cell phones and tablets, I can confirm that these devices cannot connect to the internet outside of North Korea, rendering such allegations implausible.
As always in wartime, propaganda and misinformation are ubiquitous. Especially in the age of artificial intelligence, the fog-of-war obscures the facts on the ground, leaving us no alternative to speculation. While the details of DPRK military operations in Russia remain unclear, what is undeniable is the broader scope of the DPRK-Russia partnership. The treaty goes far beyond military cooperation, into economic, scientific, academic, and cultural domains, reflecting a deliberate effort to institutionalize their multifaceted engagement.
This treaty is a blend of Hobbesian power politics and Machiavellian strategy, with Russia securing short-term military gains and the DPRK solidifying long-term security guarantees. However, like all pragmatic alliances, this one depends on circumstances that could shift quickly.
While Western partnerships often came with political preconditions – such as demands for denuclearization or human rights reforms – the Russian alliance is markedly pragmatic, emphasizing mutual benefits in military, technological, and economic spheres without imposing ideological constraints. Both sides understand the importance of survival, but neither is under delusions about the limits of the other’s loyalty.
Building a Strategic Partnership
The following list of delegations exchanged since the treaty was signed in July illustrates the depth of engagement between the two nations, ranging from academic exchange to military strategy, and highlights the deliberate effort to institutionalize this partnership across multiple sectors:
Korean Delegations to Russia:
- Ministry of Energy: Discussed energy infrastructure development.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Negotiated agreements on international cooperation.
- Ministry of Sports: Collaborated on joint training programs and sports diplomacy.
- Korean Workers Party: Held discussions on political cooperation and trade agreements.
Russian Delegations to Korea:
- Education Ministry of Primorskiy Kray: Focused on exchange programs for students and educators.
- Security Council of the Russian Federation: Discussed joint security initiatives and intelligence sharing.
- Ministry of Agriculture: Negotiated joint agricultural research and food security programs.
- Ministry of Information Technology and Digital Development: Signed agreements on cybersecurity and technological innovation.
- Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation: Discussed trade agreements and financial services partnerships.
- Overseas Koreans of Russia: Explored cultural and diaspora relations between Russian-Koreans and the DPRK.
- Military Academy: Examined training and knowledge-sharing opportunities.
- Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology: Discussed joint environmental protection programs.
- Ministry of Sports: Formalized agreements on collaborative sporting events and competitions.
- Ministry of Defense: Held high-level talks on strategic cooperation and mutual security interests.
These delegations illustrate a deliberate effort by both nations to build a robust, enduring relationship. By providing the support North Korea once sought from Western counterparts – without the political preconditions of denuclearization or human rights reforms – Russia has positioned itself as Pyongyang’s most reliable partner.
Having personally worked on several academic, sports, science and music exchange programs between the US and DPRK in the past, I witnessed firsthand their eagerness for international collaboration, especially with American scientists, athletes, artists and academics. Those efforts, like the basketball diplomacy efforts I helped to facilitate with Dennis Rodman, provided rare windows of engagement between the US and DPRK before they were abruptly terminated by political restrictions, most notably the Trump administration’s 2017 travel ban.
DPRK-Russia’s Difficult History
While the DPRK-Russia partnership marks a significant shift, its roots stretch back over 150 years, forged through a complex history of cooperation, mistrust, and survival. Their modern relationship began to the 1860s, when waves of Korean migrants sought refuge in the Russian Far East. Fleeing famines and floods in North Hamgyong Province, these settlers introduced agriculture to Russia’s Primorsky Krai region, solidifying Russian control of the territory annexed from China in 1858. By the early Soviet period, Koreans thrived under the new regime, playing key roles in the region’s development.
However, Stalin’s 1937 deportation of 200,000 Koreans to Kazakhstan and Central Asia – on suspicions of collusion with Japan – left a lasting scar. This mass displacement, driven by paranoia rather than evidence, shattered trust between Koreans and Moscow. The descendants of these deportees carry this legacy to this day. My own work on a research project examining the health of Koreans in Kazakhstan underscored the enduring psychological and cultural trauma of these events.
Despite this rupture, Soviet-Koreans played a pivotal role in the establishment of the DPRK and its government after Japan’s defeat in World War II. However, relations between Pyongyang and Moscow were fraught with tension. During the Korean War, while China contributed large numbers of troops, the USSR limited its involvement mostly to logistical and air support. By the late 1950s, Pyongyang purged many Soviet-aligned Koreans, accusing them of dual allegiances, and expelled them back to the USSR. These events deepened mutual suspicion and created a repeated pattern of transactional cooperation followed by estrangement.
The Cold War era brought further complexities. While Western narratives often depict the DPRK, the USSR, and China as close allies behind the Iron Curtain, the reality was far more fractured. Moscow and Beijing saw each other as rivals, and the DPRK adeptly exploited the Sino-Soviet split to extract aid and concessions from both sides. This strategic balancing act was emblematic of Pyongyang’s survivalist approach to foreign policy – a dynamic that persists today.
Russia’s Post-Soviet Balancing Act
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992 marked a major turning point. Bereft of Soviet support, North Korea became increasingly isolated, with China emerging as its sole remaining “ally.” In the first years of the post-Soviet era, Russia prioritized stability on its borders and initially worked to catalyze US-DPRK engagement, hoping to prevent the emergence of a nuclear-armed DPRK. Russia sought closer relations with Washington and even joined NATO’s “Partnership for Peace,” reflecting hopes for integration into the European security framework.
Russia’s focus shifted toward developing economic ties with South (rather than North) Korea, viewing Seoul as a more lucrative partner for trade and investment. Moscow also aligned itself with US-led efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, including support for the 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework, for which they offered to provide Russian-built light water reactors as part of the deal, if the West footed the bill, though that never materialized. This involvement reflected Moscow’s desire for a stable, denuclearized DPRK and improved relations with the West.
By the early 2000s, Russia joined the Six-Party Talks, favoring a step-by-step approach to DPRK denuclearization. However, as North Korea began conducting successful nuclear and missile tests, Moscow backed a series of nine UN Security Council resolutions between 2006 and 2017, imposing harsh sanctions on Pyongyang.
Under Vladimir Putin’s leadership, Russia began pivoting toward the promotion of a multipolar world order to counter US hegemony. This shift was reflected in the 2000 “Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation” with DPRK. Although the treaty lacked military assistance provisions, it underscored Moscow’s interest in maintaining strategic ties with Pyongyang without provoking broader tensions.
The geopolitical calculus changed dramatically by 2024, as Russia’s international isolation due to the Ukraine war aligned its strategic interests with those of Pyongyang, marking the beginning of a new era in their relationship. Facing its own international isolation and economic sanctions due to the Ukraine war, Russia vetoed a UN resolution to continue sanctions enforcement on DPRK through the UN Panel of Experts. This marked the beginning of a thaw in relations between Moscow and Pyongyang. The newly ratified DPRK-Russia treaty now represents a partnership born of mutual necessity: for Russia, DPRK provides ammunition, manpower, and political support against the West; for DPRK, Russia offers technological expertise, economic opportunities, and a powerful security guarantor.
Echoes of History: Navigating the New Great Game
Russia’s evolving relationship with the DPRK signals a definitive end to its role as a mediator in US-DPRK relations and a pivot toward a deeper strategic alignment with Pyongyang. Historically, Russia sought to stabilize the Korean Peninsula to minimize the risk of conflict along its border. Its involvement in the 1994 Agreed Framework and the Six-Party Talks reflected these priorities. However, its current reliance on DPRK military support and its focus on promoting a multipolar world makes cooperation with US overtures unlikely, as such efforts could weaken its alliance with Pyongyang. This transformation from mediator to strategic ally highlights the profound changes in Russia’s foreign policy priorities as it continues to confront the West.
In 2017, I co-led an academic exchange program funded by Columbia University to collaborate with Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang. When Trump’s travel ban rendered the initiative moot, the DPRK proposed relocating the program to China or Russia, where we could teach their scientists to use internet resources for medical research. Despite enthusiastic support from Russian academics and government officials, a collaborative workshop planned for Vladivostok in 2019 was ultimately derailed by US government opposition. This missed opportunity reflects broader failures in US-DPRK engagement, leaving a void that Russia has since filled. The DPRK-Russia alliance delivers what Pyongyang once sought from the West, leaving the US in a weakened negotiating position.
If Trump resumes negotiations with the DPRK, he will face a far more challenging landscape. Despite his personal rapport with Kim Jong Un, the DPRK’s strengthened position and closer integration with Russia will surely complicate US efforts. Moscow now views US-DPRK engagement as a threat to its interests and will likely resist any attempts to drive a wedge between Pyongyang and Moscow.
Nevertheless, the DPRK’s historical pragmatism leaves the door open for negotiations. Pyongyang has long leveraged rivalries between major powers to its advantage. However, any renewed engagement must acknowledge the DPRK’s strengthened position since 2019. As I have written elsewhere, progress will require the US to offer more substantial incentives such as a treaty to end the Korean War, the exchange of liaison offices, recognition of the DPRK as a nuclear state (a reality that must be acknowledged), removal of the travel ban on US citizens visiting the DPRK, and substantial changes to the never-ending UN sanctions regime.
The DPRK-Russia partnership has immediate implications for the Ukraine war and East Asian security. By providing Pyongyang with the support it once sought from the West, Moscow has weakened the US negotiating position. However, the DPRK’s history of juggling rival powers suggests that future engagement is still possible.
Ultimately, the success of any US strategy depends on its ability to navigate the new dynamics created by the recently expanded DPRK-Russia alliance. As Trump considers renewed diplomacy with Kim Jong Un, he must contend with a North Korea that is more emboldened and less reliant on Western engagement than ever before. To avoid irrelevance in East Asia and beyond, the US must recognize the changed dynamics and recalibrate its approach before the window of opportunity closes entirely.
Joseph D. Terwilliger is Professor of Neurobiology at Columbia University Irving Medical Center, where his research focuses on natural experiments in human genetic epidemiology. He is also active in science and sports diplomacy, having taught genetics at the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology, and accompanied Dennis Rodman on six “basketball diplomacy” trips to Asia since 2013.
