When U.S. President George W. Bush breaks bread with his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, for lunch at the White House Thursday, their diplomatic – if not their culinary – plates will almost certainly be full to overflowing.
Given China’s astonishing ascent to global-power status over just the past decade, there is scarcely any issue in which its interests, as well as those of the U.S. hyperpower, are not at play.
From access to Venezuela’s and West Africa’s oil resources to the growing imbalances in global trade – of which China’s more-than-$200 billion surplus with the U.S. is perhaps the most-spectacular example – Washington and Beijing find themselves playing the closest possible attention, particularly to whether their actions will be interpreted as friendly or hostile by the other power.
Indeed, the fact that the evolving relationship between the two nations remains so uncertain – in Washington-speak, is China a “strategic partner” or a “strategic rival”? – makes it more difficult to define whether their interests on any given issue are complementary or competitive.
While both powers avow a strong interest in curbing nuclear proliferation, especially in potential global hotspots like North Korea and Iran, it is clear that Pyongyang’s proximity to China, for example, makes Beijing far less likely to support the kind of pressure favored by Washington that could bring down the regime and destabilize the region.
And while the Bush administration complains frequently that, in its quest to secure oil and gas for its galloping, energy-thirsty economy, China is making deals with and effectively supporting some of the world’s more unsavory regimes in Sudan and Burma (not to mention Iran), Beijing can legitimately point out Washington’s own record in this area is spotty at best.
Just last week, for example, the warm Washington reception accorded Equatorial Guinea’s brutal president, Teodoro Obiang Nguema, by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice suggested that China might be forgiven for seeing some element of self-interested hypocrisy on Washington’s part in the competition to secure access to energy resources in a tight market.
Thursday’s summit, which is scheduled to last only one hour before a largely ceremonial lunch, will hardly be long enough to resolve any of the major bilateral issues, let alone the future evolution of the relationship. Most analysts see the meeting, the fifth between the two leaders in just the past year, as mostly symbolic.
“Both sides have played a very good game of lowering expectations for this visit,” noted Minxin Pei of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “So if nothing happens, it will be viewed as a success; [and] if something happens, it will be viewed as a spectacular success.”
Bush himself had originally proposed that the summit take place at his ranch in Texas where the two men could spend much of a day together in a relatively relaxed setting.
But Hu, who became president in 2003, reportedly insisted on a more official venue – indeed, Beijing is referring to the summit as a “state visit” – in order both to more forcefully convey China’s emerging global-power status and to demonstrate to people back home that he is the equal of his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, who was hosted with full pomp and circumstance by former President Bill Clinton in 1997.
Given the absence of a specific agenda or the expectation of new agreements or joint statements, much attention here will be focused on the tone of that Hu and his delegation will set in his meetings both with Bush and other dignitaries, particularly with regard to the most politically salient issues.
Of these, the most important include China’s huge and growing bilateral trade surplus and prospects for revaluing the yuan; its enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR); its willingness to pressure Iran and North Korea on their nuclear programs; its patience in dealing with Taiwan; and possibly its concerns about fast-deteriorating relations with Washington’s main East Asian ally, Japan.
Beijing has tried to address, at least partially, most of these concerns in recent weeks. Hu’s pre-summit visit to Seattle this week featured high-profile tours of Boeing, with which China has signed a $4.6 billion commercial-aircraft deal, and Microsoft, which has concluded path-breaking IPR agreements worth hundreds of millions of dollars with Chinese companies earlier this month.
A companion delegation that included more than 100 Chinese business executives hopes to wrap up some billions of dollars more in purchases of U.S. exports before Hu returns to Beijing.
Hu, who himself traveled to Pyongyang last month, dispatched his defense minister there earlier this month, apparently to press Kim Jong-Il to end a six-month boycott of the “Six-Party Talks” to protest U.S. financial sanctions. Similarly, he sent his vice foreign minister to Tehran this week as part of an apparent effort, according to U.S. analysts, to press it to return to negotiations about suspending its uranium enrichment program.
On the eve of his departure, he also called for the resumption of long-severed official discussions with Taiwan, which China views as a renegade province, during a meeting with the former leader of Taiwan’s opposition Nationalist Party.
“I think he would like to convey that China is not a threat, that China’s growing clout is benign for the world,” said Michael Green, the White House’s top Asia specialist during Bush’s first term and now with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
While these steps are clearly designed to strengthen those in the Bush administration and Congress who favor “strategic partnership," their impact may not be enough to appease more skeptical or hostile forces. These include increasingly protectionist lawmakers and the Pentagon, whose civilian leadership has depicted sustained annual double-digit increases in China’s defense budget as a growing threat to Washington’s military dominance in the Pacific.
While increasing Chinese purchases of U.S. exports is helpful, it will not fundamentally reverse the growing trade imbalance which, according to Fred Bergsten, director of the Institute for International Economics, will reach $300 billion next year. Beijing’s refusal to revalue the yuan, which he said is “undervalued by anywhere from 20 to 40 percent," will lead “to a major protectionist trade reaction here," according to Bergsten.
Similarly, Chinese efforts to coax Iran and North Korea toward toward significant concessions on their nuclear programs are appreciated, but Beijing’s opposition to join U.S. allies in supporting sanctions effectively strengthens administration hardliners who favor a strategy of “containment."
“[T]here’s a lot of frustration … on the foreign policy front,” noted CSIS’ Derek Mitchell, a top Asia aide to Clinton. “There’s a sense that the Chinese are not giving on anything. [U.S. officials] are not sure if it’s a matter of confidence or arrogance,” he added, noting that Beijing, in marked contrast to the pattern of previous summits, has not released prominent political prisoners as a goodwill gesture in advance of this week’s visit.
What that means is that the battle within the Bush administration between those, led by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who see China as a rival and those, led by Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, who see it as a potential partner, is unlikely to be resolved at Thursday’s lunch.
(Inter Press Service)
