I can’t claim to have much insight beyond that of a reasonably well-informed outside observer about what’s going on in Ukraine. For all I know, by the time this sees cyberspace it could have blown up into a prelude to full-scale civil war, although it does seem most parties in Ukraine really want to avoid this. For more detailed analysis you could do worse than to consult Daniel Drezner’s link-rich blog, with the understanding that he shares the belief of many Westerners that it is essential to support the Western- or Europe-oriented Viktor Yushchenko, who lost in the official results but who was leading in exit polls. I’m not quite so sure – Jude Wanniski, who might not always be right, but is always provocative, has a different view.
I suspect that real freedom-lovers might be justified in declaring a plague on all houses in Ukraine. That’s one reason a proposal that had a brief half-life might be worth more serious consideration.
I think it would be interesting to consider what could turn out to be a sidelight in the Ukraine controversy – the idea of splitting Ukraine through secession or a rough equivalent in granting virtual autonomy to areas that had supported the Russian-backed candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, might not have been such a bad idea after all. It will likely turn out that the threat was a ploy and secession may not be a real issue. But it’s fascinating and a little befuddling to see how quickly and automatically secession is dismissed as beyond the pale in standard diplomatic discussions.
Stability Equals Current Borders?
After Viktor Yushchenko disputed the election of Viktor Yanukovich, political leaders in Donetsk in eastern Ukraine passed a non-binding resolution in favor of a vote for autonomy or secession if the presidential vote-counting crisis persists. Secretary of State Powell then announced that it was supremely important to keep the country intact. White House spokesman Scott McClellan called on all and sundry to unite behind "Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity."
Why?
International borders, by and large, are the product of conquest, war, and historical happenstance more often than the result of a rational process to create borders that make ethnographic sense or minimize conflict. They are not sacred or set in stone. A student of history would predict that many borders will change in the future, more than likely through violent means.
Yet, diplomats typically act as if changing borders through open negotiation or democratic means were the very essence of undesirable instability. It’s quite strange, especially with a number of counterexamples in the general region.
Czechoslovakia had its "velvet revolution" shortly after the demise of communism, and then had a "velvet secession" when Czechs and Slovaks decided they really didn’t have all that much in common and would prefer separate sets of politicians. All this was accomplished without shedding a drop of blood.
The other recent "velvet" changes are somewhat less relevant to this point, but nonetheless worth mentioning. A year ago in Georgia, the newly-elected president marched into parliament bearing a long-stemmed rose after a change in regime that was accomplished without violence. A few years ago, Milosevic in Serbia was ousted by peaceful means. Timothy Garton Ash, cited above, generally an insightful observer though perhaps a bit knee-jerk on the current Ukrainian crisis, views non-violence as the new "European way." He quotes a young female protester in Kiev, expressing hope for a peaceful solution: “As in Georgia a year ago … as it should be in a civilized country."
Why Not Division?
Most observers believe outright civil war is possible in Ukraine in the wake of the recent electoral controversy. Why would secession automatically be worse, to be avoided at all costs?
In the case of Ukraine, it makes a certain amount of sense – and might reemerge as an option if new elections are held and the results are as close as they were in last week’s election. The eastern portion of the country, partially as a result of purposeful Soviet policies, has been substantially "Russified" (thought it was to some extent before the Soviets pushed Russification), in that Russian is spoken at least as much as Ukrainian, and most churchgoers are Russian Orthodox. The eastern portion is also more industrialized, which is also to some extent a legacy of Soviet rule before 1991.
The western portion of Ukraine is more agricultural than industrial, and more nationalistic as well. Churchgoers in this region tend to be Ukrainian Catholic. People in this region, which went heavily for Yushchenko, tend to distrust Russians more than in the eastern portion of the country.
Maybe Not
There are reasons militating against division as well. Ukraine as a whole is heavily dependent on Russia for petroleum-based energy, to the tune of 85 percent of annual energy requirements. The western portion of the country, which used to be viewed as the breadbasket of Europe in days gone by, has little industry, heavy or otherwise. Would it be able to access energy and heavy equipment for agriculture if the country were divided?
If both portions of the country embraced free and unrestricted trade, of course, that wouldn’t be a problem. But how likely would they be to do so, despite the manifest benefits that would accrue? Beyond that difficulty, it does seem likely that Russian President Vladimir Putin, despite George W. Bush’s conviction some years ago that he could see into his soul and pronounce it a good one, really does have in mind something like a reconstituted Russian empire, or at least substantial control/influence over Russia’s near neighbors.
Even if Putin were to acquiesce in a division of Ukraine without being too tempted to use Russian force to prevent it, he would be likely to use trade as an imperial weapon and take advantage of Ukraine’s dependence on Russia for energy. A western Ukraine might be able to offset that with trade and/or aid from the European Union, but it might take a while; and a fair amount of economic suffering, which could lead to political instability, could occur in the meantime.
So perhaps it doesn’t make sense to divide the Ukraine.
Another Option
Whether secession or division turns out to be the answer for Ukraine, it should become an option more often taken seriously – perhaps in such hotspots as Iraq in the not-too-distant future. Political leaders tend to want to control as large a territory as possible, but their motives often have more to do with twisted perceptions of glory and prestige than with the prospects for stability and prosperity. In cases like Ukraine, especially if the next election (assuming one is held fairly peacefully) turns out to be closely contested and bitter, division might be the most peaceful way to handle the situation.
A central government with strictly limited powers that grants virtual autonomy to diverse regions is another option, of course. But central governments are seldom content to confine themselves within strictly limited powers. As the world sorts itself out in the near future, division should be a serious option, not one that is automatically dismissed by diplomats and political leaders. Oftentimes the status quo is more destabilizing and conflict-inducing than a possible division or secession.
