The notion of a short and decisive war has always been a temptation for politicians. This notion holds a promise of quick victories, low costs, and clear triumphs. However, the course of history over the last few decades has indicated that wars do not always follow this pattern. The current conflict between the United States and Iran seems to be a clear manifestation of this reality, as the early indications of a quick victory are not supported by the fundamental realities of the conflict.
The fundamental reason why a quick victory might not be possible in this conflict is not related to military capabilities. The military capabilities of the United States are overwhelming, as they are far ahead of Iran in terms of technology, logistics, and global reach. In the early phases of this conflict, the U.S. forces, along with the Israeli military, struck thousands of targets in Iran, targeting its missile capabilities, naval forces, and military installations. According to experts, the initial objective of this campaign was to destroy the Iranian naval capabilities, missile systems, and nuclear facilities, as well as weakening Iranian influence in the region.
However, military success does not automatically translate into a corresponding level of political achievement. As many a strategic analyst has noted, “destroying capabilities does not necessarily translate into regime collapse, political transformation, or stability.” While military instruments are effective at destroying capabilities, they are not as effective at creating alternatives.
This tension represents the heart of the strategic problem facing the United States.
As a matter of fact, even before the war began, American intelligence assessments reportedly indicated that military intervention was not likely to result in a change of regime in Iran because the Iranian system was so resilient, and there was no opposition to replace it.
Such intelligence assessments are part of a larger trend in modern warfare, wherein systems under military pressure tend to become more, not less, cohesive. Leadership changes occur rapidly without necessarily altering the fundamental structures of power. In this current conflict, the speed with which a new leader was installed into the Iranian leadership structure was a manifestation of this trend.
For the strategist who hopes to achieve a rapid level of regime collapse, this level of resilience represents a formidable obstacle.
Another factor affecting the prospects of a swift victory is the symmetry of the strategic goals and objectives. While the US might hope for a decisive victory in the form of destroying the military capability of the adversary or changing its politics, the same is not necessarily true for Iran. In fact, it is possible that the Iranian strategy is simply to survive.
In an asymmetric war, survival is victory.
The Iranian strategy seems to be one of survival and waiting it out, and analysts are observing how the escalation of the war is less dependent on the ability of the two adversaries to match each other in conventional warfare and more dependent on the ability of one of the adversaries to make the conflict unsustainable for the other. This means the war is now one of endurance rather than one of firepower.
A prime example of this is the energy sector and how it can be considered a part of the strategic environment. The current situation with the Strait of Hormuz, through which one-fifth of the world’s total oil supply is shipped, has already caused economic concerns for the world as a whole. Analysts predict that if the current situation is not rectified, the price of oil could rise significantly, causing economic consequences for the world as a whole.
Similar concerns are now coming from financial institutions as well, with some predictions indicating that the conflict could have significant effects on the world’s markets and economic growth, thus showing the economic consequences of the escalation of the conflict.
The economic consequences of the conflict create a whole new aspect of the strategic environment of the war. The conflict is no longer limited to military facilities and vessels; it is now affecting global trade routes and economic growth, as well as the politics of nations.
History has shown that conflicts of such nature are rarely brief.
The United States has faced similar strategic conundrums in the past. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan both began with rapid military successes that destroyed pre-existing governments within a matter of weeks. However, the political and security aftermaths took years to resolve. The conclusion should not be drawn that military force is ineffectual in these situations but rather that military victories do not necessarily equate to political success.
The case in Iran is more complex.
Iran is a nation with a large population, a diversified military infrastructure, and a multitude of regional ties. Its strategy is based on decentralized networks and forms of coercion. As a result, this conflict is less susceptible to a knockout blow that a more conventional military campaign would seek to achieve.
Even if a significant portion of Iran’s military infrastructure is destroyed, the political and strategic aftermaths remain uncertain. A nation with a population of nearly ninety million people, a well-entrenched political infrastructure, and decades of experience dealing with sanctions has a tremendous ability for adaptation.
The lack of clarity on the endgame makes the situation even more complex. Analysts have posed a basic question several times in this context: How does the war end?
If the endgame is the destruction of certain military capabilities, then the endgame is measurable. However, if the endgame is political transformation, then the endgame is not so clear.
Without clarity on the political endgame, the military operations could expand in scope and complexity, and the strategic endgame becomes increasingly ambiguous.
This ambiguity has led to the so-called ‘mission creep,’ where the scope of the operations expands in response to the latest developments.
This is the reason why many strategic analysts are skeptical about the possibility of a quick end to the war.
Wars are not won based on the number of targets destroyed or the speed at which they are destroyed. Wars are won based on the political staying power, the economic fallout, the regional fallout, and the staying power of the two parties involved.
In this respect, the real strategic issue is not who has the greatest firepower in the early stages of the war.
The more relevant issue is who has the greatest staying power.
If the conflict does develop into a test of staying power – using military force, economic pressure, and regional containment – then the idea of a rapid and decisive victory could be an illusion.
History has consistently shown that wars that are perceived as simple at the outset tend to become complex once they are underway.
The current conflict has the potential to prove this maxim. It is easy to envisage a short war. It is much harder to envisage a peace.
Jenny Williams is an independent American journalist and writer with an interest in foreign policy, human rights, and peace. She aims to provide thoughtful commentary on U.S. engagement abroad and its consequences. Contact: jennywilliams9696@gmail.com.
