Since September 11, 2001, and the global war on terror that ensued, leadership decapitation has been the preferred method of dealing with groups designated as terrorist organizations. The theory behind decapitation is simple. In order to kill the snake you must first cut off its head.
Twenty-three years later, Israel has seen no reason to abandon this counterterrorism policy in its conflict with Hamas and Hezbollah. Since October 7, 2023, Israel has assassinated no less than 16 leaders within the Hamas, and Hezbollah organizations. The most recent, and certainly the most significant from Israel’s perspective, is the elimination of Yahya Sinwar on October 17. Sinwar, who was the leader of Hamas in Gaza was considered by Israel to be the mastermind behind Hamas’s attack on October 7.
In addition to Sinwar, Israel has managed to terminate several other high value leaders such as the Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, and the Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah.
One wonders what the outcome of all these decapitations will mean for the war in general, and for Hamas and Hezbollah in particular? Will it result in the degrading or collapsing of these organizations?
After more than two decades of this leadership targeting policy many researchers and analysts have concluded that “decapitation does not increase the likelihood of organizational collapse.” Ironically, “organizations that have not experienced decapitation are more likely to cease activity than those that have faced leadership targeting.”
Of course, the ability of an organization to withstand the decapitation of its leadership depends on many factors. According to Jenna Jordan, the data suggests that organizational resilience is related to the size, age, and religious makeup of a group. For example, groups with 500 or more members become remarkably resilient. And those organizations that have been in existence for 20 or more years become extremely difficult to destabilize. Moreover, religious groups are much more resistant to the adverse effects of leadership decapitation than groups that are purely ideological.
Furthermore, Jordan observed that bureaucracy and organizational architecture may significantly contribute to a group’s ability to withstand decapitation. Highly bureaucratic organizations are far more resilient against the effects of targeted killing than decentralized groups. Another factor that contributes to an organization’s ability to survive decapitation is the level of popular support the group receives.
When applying this data and criteria to Hamas and Hezbollah it appears that Israel’s decapitation strategy is unlikely to succeed in weakening either of these groups or causing them to slide into organizational collapse.
If anything, the data suggest that these organizations will not only survive, but they will likely grow stronger as a result of Israel’s decapitation policy. As Jordan observes, within two years after the assassination of Sheikh Yassin, the founder of Hamas, and his successor, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, “Hamas went on to win the majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council in 2006.” Furthermore, Israel has been targeting Hamas leaders since 1988 and yet the group continues to be both popular and operationally active.
There is, of course, a danger in leadership targeting. It can have a boomerang effect. On Saturday, October 19, Israeli media reported that Hezbollah attempted to assassinate Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu. A drone which was launched from Lebanon struck a home near the PM’s house in Caesarea. The Netanyahu residence was clearly the target. However, neither Netanyahu nor his wife were home at the time of the attempted assassination according to Israeli media. Yet, when it comes to leadership targeting it appears that the principle of sowing and reaping applies.
Despite the fact that leadership decapitation appears to accomplish little when targeting groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, Israel will likely continue the policy. From the Israeli point of view, decapitation is efficient, relatively inexpensive, and plays extremely well to the domestic audience.
However, the elimination of Sinwar will reveal something that heretofore has been hidden from most casual observers. It will no doubt anger them to learn that it was Netanyahu, not Sinwar, who was the biggest obstacle to returning the hostages and ending the war. The killing of Sinwar will now put this reality on full display for the whole world to see.
As it turns out, neither the policy of leadership decapitation, nor Netanyahu, can escape the law of unintended consequences.
Jim Fitzgerald is a minister in the Presbyterian Church in America and a missionary in the Middle East and North Africa. His articles have appeared in American Greatness, American Thinker, Antiwar.com, and the Aquila Report.
