Geneva Talks Seen as Potential Breakthrough
While experts here are being deliberately tentative in their assessments of Thursday’s meeting in Geneva between Iran and the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany (P5+1), there appears to be a growing sense that the results could lay the basis for a long-sought diplomatic breakthrough.
Much depends on whether Iran complies with its reported agreement to provide access to inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to its newly disclosed underground uranium-enrichment facility near Qom within two weeks. The director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohammed ElBaradei, is expected in Tehran this weekend to work out the details.
But even more promising, according to analysts here, was Iran’s agreement in principle to ship most of the enriched uranium it has developed over the last several years at its Natanz facility to Russia and France for processing into fuel for a small reactor that makes isotopes for nuclear medicine.
"(If) the scheme is implemented, it would be a major confidence-building measure," noted Gary Sick, a specialist at Columbia University who worked on Iran at the White House under former Presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan.
"Iran’s current stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU) has been cited as Exhibit A in dire warnings that it is drawing perilously close to bomb-making capability, on the grounds that if further enriched, that stockpile could already provide enough material for a single bomb," he wrote on his blog Friday.
"But the deal hammered out at Geneva would turn three quarters of it from its current gas form into solid fuel rods, which are extremely difficult to turn into weapons-grade material," Sick wrote.
If, indeed, most of Iran’s LEU stockpile is shipped out of the country – the technical details of which are supposed to be addressed at an IAEA meeting Oct. 18 in Vienna, according to Iran’s PressTV – most experts here believe that regional tensions, which have been stoked by repeated Israeli threats to attack Tehran’s nuclear facilities, should subside. This would offer more time for negotiations to build greater trust between Iran and its interlocutors, the U.S. foremost among them.
Similarly, the growing pressure from Israel and its right-wing supporters in Congress and elsewhere for "crippling sanctions" to be imposed against Tehran – multilaterally, if possible, unilaterally, if necessary – even as negotiations get underway could also fade, especially if the follow-up meetings create a sense of positive momentum.
Still, analysts were insistent on hedging their hopeful assessments by emphasizing the necessity of Iran’s timely compliance with the agreements reached in Geneva, while neo-conservatives and other Iran hawks expressed strong skepticism, if not contempt, for Obama’s claims that the talks constituted a "constructive beginning" toward "serious and meaningful engagement."
"On long evidence, the regime has no intention of stopping a nuclear program that would give it new power in the region, and new leverage against America," warned the Wall Street Journal’s neo-conservative editorial board, which also complained that the meeting itself had given "(President Mahmoud) Ahmadinejad and Iran’s mullahs) new legitimacy" after the unprecedented demonstrations against the government after the disputed June elections.
"Expect Iran to follow the North Korean model, stringing the West along, lying and wheedling, striking deals, only to reneg (sic) and start over," it went on, asserting that the recently disclosed Qom facility may be just one island in "an archipelago of such small covert facilities…scattered around Iran."
Writing in the far-right National Review, nuclear specialist Henry Sokolski charged that the administration and its P5+1 partners had "blinked" by "dropp(ing) any hint of penalizing Tehran and let(ting) it continue to make nuclear fuel at Natanz."
He also cast suspicion on any deal to ship Iran’s LEU stockpile outside the country."(T)he fuel that France and Russia will send back to Iran will be far more weapons-usable – it will be enriched with 19.75-percent nuclear-weapons-grade uranium – than the 3.5-percent-enriched brew Iran currently has on hand. If Iran were to seize this more enriched fuel, it could make a bomb much more quickly that it could now," he wrote.
While that scenario was deemed highly unlikely by most analysts – one noted that it would badly embarrass Russia which, until now, has been Tehran’s most steadfast defender on the U.N. Security Council – even the most hopeful analysts noted that the Geneva talks marked just the first step down what could be a long and difficult road.
"One swallow does not a summer make, and it would be a mistake to think that the results of the Geneva meetings were anything more than the first baby steps along a perilous and unpredictable path," according to Sick.
At Thursday’s meeting, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns and Iran’s senior representative, Saeed Jalili, reportedly discussed a range of issues, including human rights and regional security, during a 45-minute tete-a-tete. It marked the highest-level public diplomatic exchange between Washington and Tehran since relations between the two nations were broken off in 1979.
While that in itself marked something of a watershed, analysts noted the discussions themselves strongly suggested that both sides were prepared to be more flexible on key issues surrounding Iran’s nuclear program than in the past.
"There is a tacit acceptance [by the U.S.] that Iran has the right under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to enrich uranium, which has always been a key issue for the Iranians," said Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council (NIAC).
"And the Iranians themselves have indicated that, if this principle is accepted, they can show greater flexibility, and it seems we saw the first sign of that yesterday when they agreed in principle to address concerns about their stockpiles of LEU," he added.
"This expands the time horizon and enables the two parties to build trust," he went on. "And in an environment where trust has been created, a solution can be found that is acceptable to all, which, from the Iranian perspective, includes their ability to enrich and proceed with what Secretary [of State Hillary] Clinton has called a verifiably peaceful program"
(Inter Press Service)
Read more by Jim Lobe
- Early End to US Combat Role in Afghanistan Draws Cheers, Jeers, Confusion – February 3rd, 2012
- US Group Urges ‘More Credible’ Military Threat Against Iran – February 1st, 2012
- Growing Elite Opposition to Military Option Against Iran – January 27th, 2012
- Leading Think Tank Urges Naval Buildup in South China Sea – January 10th, 2012
- Less Counter-Insurgency, More Asia in New U.S. Strategy – January 6th, 2012





sokolski
October 3rd, 2009 at 6:47 pm
(this post continues from the post above) As for the chance that Iran might seize the enriched fuel they might get from France or Russia, I agree with Mr. Lobe's assessment that this hardly the most likely scenario for Iran making its first bomb. That said, it ought not to be dismissed as a weapons material source per se. A good place to start for the analysis on this point is Victor Gilinsky, Harmon Hubbard, and Marvin Miller, "A Fresh Examination of the Proliferation Dangers of Light Water Reactors," http://www.npec-web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Sin… at pp. 14 and 41. This report, which Amory Lovins, Los Alamos National Laboratory, the IAEA's safeguards advisory group, the U.S. State Department, and the Natural Resources Defense Council’s own analyses have corroborated, describes the relative ease of diverting LEU fuel either abruptly or gradually. (see below for the rest of this post)
sokolski
October 3rd, 2009 at 6:51 pm
(this post continues the posts above) In any case, the report explains why it would be worth getting at enriched fuel even if it is in fuel rods. As is explained in the report, only modest effort would be required to open reactor fuel cladding and then to prepare the fuel so it can heated and fluorinated. The result for Iran would be having access to roughly a bomb’s worth of UH6 enriched feed that was enriched not to 3.5 percent, but to 19.75 percent. (for the last of this post, see below)
sokolski
October 3rd, 2009 at 6:51 pm
(the last of this monster) With this more enriched uranium feed, the level of effort or time Iran would need to make weapons grade uranium would drop very significantly (i.e., it would take less than one quarter the time to produce weapons grade uranium starting with 19.75 percent enriched feed than it would if Iran started with 3.5 percent, for more details see Greg Jones, "Iran's Centrifuge Enrichment Program as a source of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons: An Update," August 17, 2009 available at http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/fil… also posted on http://www.npec-web.org). In Iran’s case, assuming one was using 5,000 of the machines at Natanz that were only 20 percent efficient, you would be talking about a reduction from roughly 5 months of effort to get weapons grade uranium, to something slightly less than four weeks.
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sokolski
October 3rd, 2009 at 6:48 pm
(this post continues from the post above) If this is how Iran proceeds, Iran would be able to keep roughly 500 kgs of the LEU it has already produced (i.e, enough to make 15 kgs. of weapons grade uranium, which is nearly the full 20 kgs. conservatively estimted to be needed for a bomb's worth). It is worth noting that it would take Iran no more than five to 10 more months for to produce yet another 500 kgs of LEU. Long story, short, as long as Natanz continues to enrich uranium, we are, at most, only a few months away from it acquiring all it needs to fuel its first bomb. This is the case, even if Iran decides to send all of its LEU out of country today. (this post continues below)
sokolski
October 3rd, 2009 at 6:48 pm
I think this piece is spot on correct about the need to follow up whatever was agreed to in Geneva with much stricter restrictions on Iran's nuclear fuel making activities. Unfortuantely, it is still not clear when Iran will send out its lightly enriched uranium or how much it will send out. Clarification of these points must await upon further negotiations later this month. In any case, I undersand that Iran only needs roughly 70-80 kilograms of fresh 19.75 enriched fuel to keep its research reactor running for another five years and that it can run the reactor with what it has on hand for another 12 to 18 months. This gives Iran some time before it has to send any of its low enriched uranium to Russia. In any case, to produce the 70-80 kilograms of fresh fuel, Iran would only need to send Russia roughly half (i.e., 500 kgs.) of the low enriched uranium (LEU) Iran already has produced. (this post continues below)
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sokolski
October 3rd, 2009 at 6:50 pm
(this post continues the post above) Abrupt diversion must be a concern especially in cases where the diversion could lead to nuclear weapons materials being produced in a relatively short time (i.e., days or weeks). Also, because Iran refuses to allow near-real time surveillance, gradual undetected diversion is still possible). This later point was highlighted by Dr. Marvin Miller's safeguards analysis as well as diversion scenarios developed by the IAEA’s safeguard advisory group. (this post continues below)