According to President Bush, the additional 21,500 U.S. troops to be deployed in Iraq will provide "the force levels we need" to secure Baghdad. The president would have us believe previous lack of success is because "there were not enough Iraqi and American troops to secure neighborhoods that had been cleared of terrorists and insurgents" and that "this time, we’ll have the force levels we need to hold the areas that have been cleared."
The current force in Iraq is about 130,000 U.S. troops. The planned surge will bring the total to 150,000 troops, which is about the same number in Iraq during the fall of 2005. But if 150,000 U.S. soldiers could not impose security then, why should we believe that they will be able to do so now? The harsh reality is that – from a purely military tactical operational perspective – a much larger ground force is needed to even have a fighting chance of ending the violence in Iraq. If the history of the British experience in Northern Ireland (a close parallel to America’s precarious position in Iraq) is a guideline, any realistic hope of restoring security and stability requires as many as 20 soldiers per 1,000 civilians. With a population of about 25 million people, that translates to a force of 500,000 troops in Iraq. Baghdad alone (6 million people) would require 120,000 soldiers or nearly all of the current U.S. ground forces deployed in Iraq.
More importantly, the vast majority of troops need to be combat troops. But the so-called "tooth-to-tail" ratio of combat-to-combat support units in Iraq is, at best, 1:1, which means that only half the troops are combat units – or 75,000 of the 150,000 U.S. soldiers in Iraq after the surge. And roughly half of the total combat troops would be on patrol at any given time while the other half rest. (For example, Sen. John McCain [R-Ariz.], an advocate of increasing the force in Iraq, stated in November 2003: "We have got 130,000 troops there. At any time there’s 30,000 of these on patrol – of the 130,000 that are there – because of this tooth-to- tail ratio that we call in the military.") Most experts, however, believe the tail is much longer. The Pentagon does not publish official numbers of combat-to-combat support units in Iraq (according to former Army intelligence analyst William Arkin: "I don’t know what the actual ‘tooth-to-tail’ ratio is today, but I suspect it is huge. Someone has to operate the gyms, the Internet cafes, provide the hot meals and hot water, the amenities that far too many in uniform expect and ‘require’ at their bases."), but a reasonable estimate for the tooth-to-tail ratio is probably somewhere between 1:2 to 1:4 (although some believe it could be as big as 1:10) – which would mean only 30,000-50,000 combat troops out of a total force of 150,000.
If the odds are against the surge working, the relevant question is: What happens next? The obvious answer is: More troops. But the Bush administration is already laying the groundwork for another – and far more dangerous – answer: Iran.
When President Bush announced his intention to increase the force in Iraq he also accused Iran of "allowing terrorists and insurgents to use their territory to move in and out of Iraq. Iran is providing material support for attacks on American troops." The next day, U.S. forces conducted a raid of an Iranian government representative’s office in the Kurdish city of Irbil and detained five Iranians on suspicion of being "closely tied to activities targeting Iraqi and coalition forces." Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, defended the military’s actions: "It is clear that the Iranians are complicit in providing weapons, and it’s also clear that we will do all we need to do to defend our troops in Iraq by going after the entire network, regardless of where those people come from." Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also took Iran to task: "The president made very clear last night that we know that Iran is engaged in activities that are endangering our troops, activities that are destabilizing the young Iraqi government, and that we’re going to pursue those who may be involved in those activities." And sounding very Don Rumsfeldian, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned, "If you’re in Iraq and trying to kill our troops, then you should consider yourself a target."
Even more serious is the recent revelation of a new Bush administration policy authorizing U.S. forces to kill or capture Iranian operatives in Iraq. Such a policy is precariously close to waging war against Iran.
Fueling speculation of possible direct military action against Iran (presumably against their nuclear program) is the replacement of U.S. Army Gen. John Abizaid as the commander of Central Command with U.S. Navy Adm. William Fallon. As a former commander of a carrier battle wing during the first Gulf War in 1991 and of a naval group supporting NATO operations during the Bosnia conflict four years later, Fallon is experienced in combined naval and air operations – not exactly what’s needed to prosecute a counterinsurgency ground war in Iraq, but just the ticket for air strikes against Iran.
Predictably, President Bush claims that the United States is not preparing for military action against Iran: "That’s a presumption that simply is not accurate. We believe that we can solve our problems with Iran diplomatically and are working to do that." Of course, he made similar denials about Iraq. And we all know how that turned out.
