The present severed from the past is easily misunderstood. In discussions of the Russia-Ukraine war, not enough is made of the historical facts that, at the end of the Cold War, the newly independent Ukraine promised not to join NATO, and NATO promised not to expand to Ukraine.
Not enough is made of the fact that Article IX of the 1990 Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, “External and Internal Security,” says that Ukraine “solemnly declares its intention of becoming a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs….” That promise was later enshrined in Ukraine’s constitution, which committed Ukraine to neutrality and prohibited it from joining any military alliance: that included NATO.
Nor is enough made of the fact that in 1990 and 1991, the Bush administration gave assurances to Gorbachev – assurances that arguably reached the level of a deal – that NATO would not expand east of Germany, including to Ukraine.
But even less is made of what the Clinton administration later promised Yeltsin nor of what the U.S. already knew at the time of where plans of NATO expansion to Ukraine would lead.
Recently declassified documents clearly show that, between 1993 and 2000, the U.S. already knew that a cornered Boris Yeltsin was distraught about NATO expansion and about the West’s broken promise, that expansion to Ukraine was a red line, and that if Russia ever enforced that red line, the U.S. would respond forcefully.
Though Czechia, Hungary and Poland were invited to begin accession talks in 1997 and joined NATO in 1999, a secret October 1994 policy paper, written by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and entitled “Moving Toward NATO Expansion,” makes it clear that the decision to expand NATO had already been made by that time. The paper explicitly keeps “the membership door open for Ukraine.”
Interestingly, though Russia is always publicly painted as a predatorial nation with imperial ambitions, a confidential 1993 cable states that most Eastern European states seek NATO membership “not [because they] feel militarily threatened by Russia” but because they believe “that NATO membership can help stave off the return of authoritarian forces” in their own countries. Though the cable makes the exception that Ukraine and the Baltic states may feel threatened by Russia.
By September 1994, Clinton had explicitly told Yeltsin that NATO would expand. While visiting Yeltsin in the hospital on December 16, 1994, Vice President Al Gore clarifies that “What Clinton told you in September was that eventually NATO will expand.”
But Gore promises Yeltsin that “the process will be gradual and open and we will consult carefully with you.” He adds that “The process will be conducted in parallel with a deepening of the US-Russia partnership and your partnership with NATO.”
Though less than a week later, a secret NSC memorandum clarifies that Russia will not be given “a veto or right of prior consultation over NATO decisions,” this promise of a deepening “institutionalized relationship between NATO and Russia – possibly in the form of a Treaty (“alliance with the Alliance”) or Charter” that will be established in parallel with NATO expansion is repeatedly mentioned. A secret memorandum written by Anthony Lake to Clinton on July 17, 1995 identifies “plans to develop a formalized NATO-Russia relationship in parallel with enlargement.” The spirit of this promise would be broken.
Importantly, it is evident that the Clinton administration was very aware of Russia’s opposition to NATO expansion and of their feeling of betrayal. Knowing that expansion is an impossible sell in Russia, Gore promises Yeltsin that expansion won’t occur before 1996 because “[w]e understand you have parliamentary elections in mid-1995 and it would be hard for you if we moved forward then.
In the July 17, 1995 memorandum, Lake informs Clinton of a “hardening Russian opposition to NATO expansion.” In a section called “Intensifying Russian Opposition,” Lake says that “opposition to NATO enlargement appears to be hardening across the political spectrum among the Russian political elite.” He reports that key Russian officials insist “that NATO enlargement and NATO-Russia cooperation are incompatible.” He recognizes that Yeltsin has “approved… a strategy for delaying and possibly derailing NATO enlargement.” Lake forecasts little hope of the position softening because “Russia’s opposition is deep and profound.”
Though much has been made of William Burns’ important 2008 warning that “Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all redlines for the Russian elite (not just Putin),” it was not the first such warning.
In a 1991 appeal cited in M.E. Sarotte’s Not One Inch, U.S. ambassador to Moscow Robert Strauss warned that “the most revolutionary event of 1991 for Russia may not be the collapse of Communism, but the loss of something Russians of all political stripes think of as part of their own body politic, and near to the heart at that: Ukraine.” An internal 1991 draft paper recommended leaving “the possibility of Ukraine joining the NATO liaison program” for “a later time.” Sarotte reports that Richard Holbrooke, who aggressively pushed expansion, called NATO in a briefing paper “an Alliance [Ukraine] can probably never enter.”
A secret/sensitive memorandum dated July 29, 1996 clearly states that Russia seeks to “draw red lines around certain countries (e.g. the Baltics and Ukraine) to prevent their ever being considered for NATO membership.”
The declassified documents make it clear that, at the time of the decision to expand NATO east toward Russia, the Clinton administration knew that Russia vehemently opposed expansion and especially expansion to Ukraine. They also knew that crossing that red line could lead to trouble.
The July 29, 1996 memo shows, not only knowledge of Russian opposition, but understanding of it: “From a Russian perspective, they cannot (and probably should not ever want to) endorse formally NATO enlargement.”
An August 23, 1996 draft memorandum written by deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbot says that “The Russians are saying that they will not ‘negotiate’ on the issue of Baltic and Ukrainian eventual membership in NATO.” Using the language of conflict for, perhaps, the first time, Talbot says that “[t]his has the distinctly ominous implication of a warning to us…”
Remarkably, having recognized that Russia had drawn a red line at NATO expansion to Ukraine, the U.S. proceeded to invert that red line: “An important part of our job will be to make sure our red lines stick – and that the Russians’ <sic> don’t cross ours (i.e., trying to label UNACCEPTABLE Ukrainian and Baltic membership.” Enlarging on the new language of conflict, the memo then says that if Russia’s “nasty implication [of a warning] becomes explicit, we should slam back hard…” This is the most prescient line in the declassified documents, forecasting a “hard” American response if Russia asserts it red line at NATO expansion to Ukraine.
And it is clear that the Clinton administration had no illusions about Russia’s serious concerns or about their resentment of Clinton’s breaking the promise that was made to them at the end of the Cold War. In a memorandum to Strobe Talbot, Dennis Ross says that the Russians “see NATO expansion” as their being “humiliated,” but “worse,” that it confirms that “they will face potential threats closer to their borders.” Ross adds that the Russians “feel they were snookered at the time of German unification” by the breaking of “[Secretary of State James] Baker’s promises on not extending NATO military presence into what was East Germany” which was “part of a perceived commitment not to expand the Alliance eastward.”
In an important meeting between Clinton and Yeltsin in Helsinki on March 21, 1997, Yeltsin’s frustration and anger are made clear. Discussing the NATO-Russia Founding Act, Yeltsin makes sure that Clinton knows that Russia’s “position has not changed. It remains a mistake for NATO to move eastward.” He then says, “But I need to take steps to alleviate the negative consequences of this for Russia. I am prepared to enter into an agreement with NATO not because I want to but because it is a forced step.”
Yeltsin then personally tells Clinton, “But one thing is very important: enlargement should also not embrace the former Soviet republics. I cannot sign any agreement without such language. Especially Ukraine.”
Yeltsin implores Clinton that “[d]ecisions by NATO are not to be taken without taking into account the concerns or opinions of Russia.” He also demands that “nuclear and conventional arms cannot move eastward into new member to the borders of Russia.” Clinton then promises Yeltsin “to make sure that we take account of Russia’s concerns as we move forward.” Another broken promise.
Interestingly, as an indication that the U.S. recognizes that objections to NATO expansion are not just Putin’s objections but Russia’s, in a November 16, 2000 meeting, Talbot suggests that “the next round of NATO enlargement might be easier under Putin than it had been under Yeltsin.”
Reuniting the present with the context of its past is crucial, not for condoning Russia’s war against Ukraine, but for understanding it. More importantly, it will be crucial when it finally comes to resolving and ending it.
Ted Snider is a regular columnist on U.S. foreign policy and history at Antiwar.com and The Libertarian Institute. He is also a frequent contributor to Responsible Statecraft and The American Conservative as well as other outlets. To support his work or for media or virtual presentation requests, contact him at tedsnider@bell.net.
