The winds of change are blowing through Ukraine. The most obvious change – and the only one much discussed in the mainstream media – is Donald Trump. From a Cold Warrior president who defined the war in Ukraine as “the great battle for freedom: a battle between democracy and autocracy” that cannot be lost, the U.S. elections have brought a president to the White House who has promised to end the war and a vice-president who is prepared to deprive Ukraine of NATO and territory to do it.
But change was coming whether there was a change in the White House or not. The battlefield has changed. For Russia, that battlefield was always less about territorial gains and more about the attrition of Ukrainian soldiers and weapons. The change is that that attrition has reached a level of devastation that Ukraine is now losing as much land as it is losing lives and weapons. That change is reflected in the messaging of the mainstream media that has begun to replace the words “stalemate” and “slow Russian advances” with headlines of “Russia’s Swift March Forward in Ukraine’s East.”
Russia is capturing key strategic villages and fortified cities as it marches west toward its goal of securing the Donbas. In the words of The New York Times, “Ukraine’s defensive lines buckled” and “its troops are so stretched that they can no longer hold some of their positions.” Russian troops “quickly advance whenever [they find] a weak spot.” Worse, as they advance past fallen fortified cities, they find “largely open terrain with sparse Ukrainian defensive lines.”
A November 10 article by the BBC has the large headline, “Ukraine front could ‘collapse’ as Russia gains accelerate, experts warn.” The article informs its surprised audience that Russia is rapidly taking land and that, the 1,000 sq km “taken between 1 September and 3 November” suggests that “the push accelerated in recent months.” As the headline heralded, the BBC then quotes a defense researcher’s evaluation that, at the current rate, Ukraine’s front “might actually collapse.”
But there are changes of a different kind too. Western support for Ukraine is starting to crack. There were two very different signs of that in the last weeks. Perhaps the most suggestive of change is that, for the first time in two years, a leader of a major U.S. partner has broken ranks and spoken to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Germany’s chancellor, Olaf Scholz, initiated a phone call with Putin on November 15. The two leaders spoke for an hour and, according to German officials, “Putin and Scholz agreed to stay in contact.” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky worries that this change has opened “a Pandora’s box” that could lead to “other conversations” and erode the isolation of Putin.
Days later, The Financial Times reports, at the meeting of the G20 in Rio de Janeiro, “[t]he world’s biggest economies have signalled weakening support for Ukraine, issuing a joint declaration that watered down previously agreed criticism of Russia’s war against the country.” At the same time, The Financial Times says, “Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has come under increased pressure from some western allies to consider peace talks despite Russian troops occupying about a fifth of the country’s territory.” The Rio joint statement reduced last year’s New Delhi statement’s seven paragraphs on the war in Ukraine to a lone paragraph. And that benign paragraph says little and says only what no one could disagree with: even Russia and Ukraine would both agree with it.
Changing support for the war and diplomatic and political changes are happening within Ukraine as well. The most recent Gallup poll, conducted in August and October 2024, has revealed real change among Ukrainians. The 73% of Ukrainians who believed Ukraine should continue fighting until it wins the war at the start of the war has now watered down to a mere 38%. At the start of the war, in February 2022, only 22% felt that Ukraine should negotiate an end to the war as soon as possible. In 2023, that number was still only 27%. Today, that number has swelled to a majority for the first time with 52% saying yes. Since the poll excluded about 10% of the population in Russian controlled regions, the numbers might be even more dramatic. Support for the war has dropped below 50% in all regions of Ukraine.
Not only support for the war, but support for Zelensky, has dropped. Once an untouchable war leader with approval ratings in the stratosphere, support for Zelensky was already fading by the end of 2023. And now, The Economist reports that “[i]f elections were held tomorrow, Mr Zelensky would struggle to repeat the success of the landslide win he secured in 2019.” The article says that The Economist has had access to internal polling that shows that “he would fare badly in a run-off against Valery Zaluzhny,” the general who served as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for most of the war.
Though The Economist says that Zelensky “fares better when pitched against other opposition figures, some of whom are actively disliked,” sociologist Volodymyr Ishchenko of Freie University in Berlin told me that some readings of polls show that he would probably also lose to Kyrylo Budanov, the chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense. Neither Zaluzhny nor Budanov has made a pubic announcement about running.
A “former colleague” of Zelensky told The Economist that “Zelensky has only one way out to get out with an intact reputation,” and that is to keep his campaign promise to be a one term president, not run for re-election, “and go down in history as the man who united the nation in war.”
Though Zelensky’s office denies that it is preparing for an election, The Economist reports that “some groundwork appears to have begun. Regional election headquarters are mobilizing, and work on candidate lists is beginning.”
In addition to the scientific polling, there is also unconfirmed intrigue. The Russian Foreign Intelligence Services said in a statement that it has obtained information that the U.S. State Department is working “on scenarios for replacing the current leadership in Ukraine, if necessary.” Consistent with the modern U.S. doctrine of using democracy to undermine democracy in silent coups that are disguised as democracy in action or as the legal and constitutional workings of a country’s parliament or congress, one “legitimate” method for eliminating Zelensky being considered is to push Ukraine into elections before the war is over.
The plan foresees employing U.S. funded NGO’s, democratization foundations and think tanks to inject the idea of elections into Ukrainian society. Once the idea receives “broad public support,” candidates would then be nominated in coordination with the State Department. Western sponsored activists would then push for the creation of a pro-American party that would “play a key role in restraining any Ukrainian leader.”
This idea of taking out a government that owes its existence, in part, to the legacy of the U.S. supported coup in 2014 by a U.S. supported coup in 2025 is, of course, unconfirmed. But it has gotten caught up in the winds of change that are verifiably blowing through Ukraine. The change from Biden to Trump, the changes on the battlefield, the changes in diplomatic and global support and the changes within Ukraine on support both for the war and for Zelensky forecast a turbulent time of coming change in Ukraine.
Ted Snider is a regular columnist on U.S. foreign policy and history at Antiwar.com and The Libertarian Institute. He is also a frequent contributor to Responsible Statecraft and The American Conservative as well as other outlets. To support his work or for media or virtual presentation requests, contact him at tedsnider@bell.net.
