“We’re going to do everything we can to keep a wider war from breaking out,” U.S. President Joe Biden promised when war erupted in Gaza. But that foreign policy legacy is in tatters. War has spread from Gaza to Lebanon and has arrived at the doorstep of Iran. There is a real danger that the war could continue to spread.
On October 1, Iran demonstrated its capability to evade Israel’s air defense systems and deliver ballistic missiles to their targets in Israel. Since then, Hezbollah has demonstrated the ability to evade Israel’s air defense systems with slower moving drones.
Israel has promised a response that “will be lethal, precise and above all, surprising.” Iran has promised that if that happens, their “retaliation will be stronger than the previous one.” In a limping effort to still contain the war, rather than withhold U.S. supplied weapons from Israel if they hit targets in Iran the U.S. deems too escalatory, the U.S. promised to reward Israel with a “compensation package” of comprehensive diplomatic and weapons protection if they restrained from striking those targets.
Those ballistic missile and drone demonstrations may have made the added protection seem desirable. On October 9, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Biden that Israel will not strike nuclear or oil facilities in Iran in the current round of retaliations, targeting, instead, only military facilities. U.S. officials believe that calibration could make further escalation less likely.
But even if Israel avoids hitting nuclear enrichment and oil production sites, military strikes, sabotage or assassinations could still bring the risk of a wider war. That wider war could happen in three ways.
The first is that Iran has promised to retaliate if Israel retaliates, and that promise did not specifically restrict itself only to strikes on nuclear and oil facilities. Iran could still feel the need to respond to significant strikes on missile launchers, missile or drone factories or warehouses, military bases or to assassinations of high ranking military or political leaders. That response is promised to be “decisive and regretful” and more severe than the October 1st one and would surely lead to further escalation. Israel has not promised that they will not strike nuclear or oil facilities the next time.
The second is that the Israeli defense against any Iranian retaliation to strikes on Iranian military facilities could draw the United States into a war with Iran. Upon receipt of the Israeli promise not to strike excessively escalatory sites, the Biden administration delivered on its promised “compensation package.” That package featured an advanced missile defense system called a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, or THAAD, which is intended to help Israel defend against ballistic missiles.
But the really controversial part of the package is that the THAAD will be accompanied by around 100 U.S. troops who will be operating it. That means that American troops will be inserted directly in the conflict and could be on the ground in Israel shooting down Iranian missiles. That, from Iran’s perspective, could place the U.S. at war with Iran and could put U.S. assets in the region in Iran’s targets. It also creates the possibility of U.S. troops being killed in Israel.
The third is that, though it is far from certain, as in Ukraine, the U.S. risks getting drawn into a conflict with Russia. Iran is now a full member of the Russia and China led international multipolar organizations BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. At the upcoming BRICS summit later this month, Iran is expected to sign a comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia. On October 11, Putin held talks with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, and on September 30, the day before the Iranian strikes on Israel, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin was in Tehran. And The New York Times reports that “Iran has requested advanced air-defense systems from Russia as it prepares for a possible war with Israel” and that “Russia has started delivering advanced radars and air-defense equipment.”
Despite the Biden administration’s confidence that it could contain the war in Gaza from becoming a wider war, both events and America’s response to those events, have raised the risk of a wider war.
Ted Snider is a regular columnist on U.S. foreign policy and history at Antiwar.com and The Libertarian Institute. He is also a frequent contributor to Responsible Statecraft and The American Conservative as well as other outlets. To support his work or for media or virtual presentation requests, contact him at tedsnider@bell.net.
