Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s “Ukrainian Victory Plan” has received, not unexpectedly, a very tepid reception in Washington. Biden administration officials seem to have received it as less of a “comprehensive strategy” and more of a “repackaged request” for Zelensky’s wish list of weapons and lifting of restrictions on their use. The plan has, reportedly, “dispirited Biden’s top aides” who say that it “offers no clear path to a Ukraine victory.”
To succeed, Zelensky’s plan required the fulfillment of two hopes: success in his Kursk invasion into Russian territory and permission to fire long-range Western missiles deeper into Russian territory. The first has now failed and the second failed to materialize. And even if it were still to materialize soon, soon may no longer be soon enough.
Biden announced $8 billion in military aid to Ukraine that had to be used up by the end of September because Congress refused to extend the Presidential Drawdown Authority. The package includes precision-guided glide bombs, a Patriot air defense battery, drones, air-to-ground munitions and the promise to train 18 more Ukrainian pilots on F-16 fighter jets next year. But Biden’s announcement contained no lifting of restrictions on long-range missiles and no mention of NATO membership. It was a consolation prize to Zelensky, who didn’t take home the real prize, and may signal the death of the “Ukrainian Victory Plan.”
Resisting the pressure from Zelensky and some of their Western allies, Biden continues to hear from his intelligence community that the erasure of restrictions on long-range weapons entails “potential risk and uncertain rewards.” The Intelligence community and the Pentagon continue to assess that the liberation of long-range missiles could lead to significant escalation, with Russia being “likely to retaliate with greater force against the United States and its coalition partners,” and little hope of transforming the battlefield because “the Ukrainians currently have limited numbers of the weapons and it is unclear how many more, if any, the Western allies might provide.”
The hopes that Zelensky pinned on the Kursk offensive have faired even worse. The hope was that the incursion into Russia would increase the pressure on Russia to negotiate and relieve pressure on the Donbas front by diverting Russian forces from Ukrainian territory to Russian territory. But it did neither. Zelensky and his commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi may already have to answer for the heavy losses of the troops and advanced weaponry in Kursk and for the dangerous advance of Russian troops against a crumbling Ukrainian front that was left weakened by the diversion of their best trained troops. But now there are reports that the news is getting worse.
There are reports that Russia, who is now counter-attacking in Kursk, has struck Ukrainian forces, including the 82nd Airborne Assault Brigade at more than a dozen locations along the Kursk front. The 82nd, which is highly trained and heavily equipped by NATO, is leading the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk. But there are now unconfirmed reports that the 82nd is being rotated out of Kursk to be sent back to the real war in Ukraine. That decision may signal Ukraine’s realization that the Kursk invasion was a costly miscalculation that led to the loss of elite troops, sophisticated equipment and very costly defeats along the Donbas front.
And those losses on the Donbas front are the other part of the worsening news. While attention has been focussed on Pokrovsk, there are now reports of the impending loss of Vuhledar (Ugledar), the other key logistical hub that the Ukrainian armed forces depends on to supply their forces in the east and defend territory to the west.
The Russian armed forces have broken through the 72nd Mechanized Brigade’s defenses. Vuhledar is crucial for Ukraine’s defense of the southern part of Donetsk in the Donbas. The Russian forces have now surrounded the town and trapped the 72nd brigade inside. They have reportedly been informed that they must either stay and face death and destruction or surrender. The Russian armed forces have provided contact information to arrange surrender and medical and other necessities. Many Ukrainian soldiers are reported to have surrendered already.
The failure of the Kursk invasion, the desperation and retreat along the Donbas front, and the seeming death of Ukraine’s buzzer beater victory plan may be leading to the dawning admission in both Washington and Kiev that a retreat to the treaty negotiated in Istanbul may be the strategically soundest move.
That treaty stipulated that Ukraine could pursue European Union membership but would provide a written guarantee that they would not join NATO. It provided protection for ethnic Russians in Ukraine, security guarantees for Ukraine and limits on the Ukrainian armed forces. The Donbas would be autonomous, Crimea would be Russian. The Kherson and Zaporozhye regions that Russia has now incorporated were, at that time, still part of Ukraine.
Russia has said that the Istanbul agreement could still be “the basis for starting negotiations.” Putin has recently set out a peace proposal based on the Istanbul agreement, but adjusted for the current territorial realities. “Ukrainian troops must be completely withdrawn from the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics, the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions” and must provide official notification “of the abandonment of plans to join NATO.” At “literally… that very moment” Russia will “issue an order to cease fire and begin negotiations.” Ukraine must also agree to limits on the size of their armed forces, and they must ensure the rights of the Russian speaking citizens of Ukraine.
It is important to note that Putin did not demand that Ukraine legally recognize Russia’s annexation of those territories, a concession that allows Ukraine to acknowledge the reality and move toward peace without formally agreeing to the transfer of territory.
A retreat to that treaty negotiated in Istanbul may be the best outcome Ukraine can hope for, and waiting and continuing to push their case by war will likely only make the outcome worse. The current situation offers withdrawal from the territories lost to Russia, but no formal recognition of their loss. Multiple Russian sources have even suggested that Putin would “settle for what land he has now and freeze the conflict at the current front lines.” But reports from the battlefield suggest that those lines will only get drastically worse for Ukraine the longer they wait to negotiate.
That negotiating and battlefield reality suggests that there may be an urgency for Ukraine to rush back to Istanbul to secure the best deal they can get before the front line moves dramatically further west. That decision would allow Ukraine to keep 80% of its territory, maintain its sovereignty and pursue it Western reorientation in the European Union.
But it would leave a lot of people, starting with U.S. President Joe Biden, former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Volodymyr Zelensky, to answer for their decision to continue fighting the war against Russia after a peace that was acceptable to Ukraine and to Russia was on the table. The most likely outcome after the failed Kursk incursion and the dead Ukrainian Victory Plan is the same settlement Ukraine could have had before the war and before they lost any land, except Crimea, before the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives and before the poisoning of the international environment and the beginning of a new Cold War.
Ted Snider is a regular columnist on U.S. foreign policy and history at Antiwar.com and The Libertarian Institute. He is also a frequent contributor to Responsible Statecraft and The American Conservative as well as other outlets. To support his work or for media or virtual presentation requests, contact him at tedsnider@bell.net.
