For more than a decade, naval and air forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have exerted a strong presence in Taiwan’s immediate neighborhood. One U.S. expert calculated that Taiwan recorded an average of about 10 Chinese military flights a day in 2025, and on some days the number was in the dozens. The message being delivered was that the Chinese military was prepared to act quickly and decisively if pro-independence leaders in Taiwan tried to implement their agenda.
Then, in late February of this year, a sudden, dramatic lull in PRC military flights near the island began. On March 11, New York Times correspondent Chris Buckley noted that 12 of the past 13 days, no Chinese military flights were recorded near Taiwan. “It is such a stark change from established behavior,” observed Ben Lewis, the founder of PLATracker, a website that mines data from the Taiwanese defense ministry. “This gap in activity is the longest we have seen since 2021” What does all this mean? Is the PRC less hawkish toward Taiwan or more hawkish. The mixed evidence should deter us from making rash conclusions in either direction.
The anomaly of reduced military flights generated extensive and diverse speculation among foreign policy experts and journalists. Some observers argued that the pause in PRC military flights could be a subtle indicator of a less confrontational posture toward Taipei. That theory would be consistent with some earlier signs of Beijing’s preference for avoiding any crisis involving Taiwan in the near term. After President Donald Trump’s first summit meeting with PRC President Xi Jinping in December 2025, Trump boasted that he had received a pledge from Xi that the PRC would not take any military action to change Taiwan’s political status during the remainder of Trump’s term.
A more cautious PRC military posture toward Taiwan might also reflect the overall impact of Xi’s rather spectacular purge of numerous generals and admirals in the country’s military command in recent months. Such moves in other countries and historical periods typically create institutional instability and uncertainty.
Nevertheless, one should be cautious about concluding that a hiatus in military flights over the Taiwan Strait is confirmation of a more restrained PRC policy regarding Taiwan even in the narrow military sense. Notably, PRC naval forces did not pull back. “We haven’t seen a comparable decrease in the reported number of P.L.A. naval vessels around Taiwan,” emphasized Brian Hart, an expert on PRC military issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “The dip seems to be isolated to air activity.”
Moreover, the pause in flights abruptly ended on March 15 with a surge of PRC air missions. Taiwan’s defense ministry stated that it had detected 26 Chinese aircraft flying near Taiwanese territory in the previous 24 hours. In addition, another 7 PRC naval vessels sailed into the waters around Taiwan. Those moves do not herald a softer, more accommodating policy.
Indeed, it would seem to be peculiar timing for Beijing to adopt a softer policy, despite the military purge and the other factors mentioned above. Current Taiwanese leader Lai Ching-te has adopted an even bolder stance asserting the island’s right to independence than any of his predecessors. One analyst observed in Time, “Lai has lurched toward formal independence with a succession of speeches making the case for Taiwanese nationhood.” Indeed, Lai devoted nearly all of his initial national address to making the case for Taiwan’s right to sovereignty. As one prominent Taiwanese columnist noted: “Never before has a Taiwanese president devoted an entire speech to laying out clearly, point-by-point and unequivocally how Taiwan is unquestionably a sovereign nation.”
Just a few months after Lai’s election in 2024, PRC forces conducted extensive military drills directed against Taiwan. That pattern occurred again later in the year. Throughout 2025, the pace and scope of PRC military activity increased yet again. In late 2025, even more menacing exercises took place.
Given that track record, it seems odd for Beijing to reverse course so dramatically now. That is especially true when Taiwan’s chief protector, the United States, is preoccupied with the new, potentially very messy military intervention in Iran. Some U.S. hawks contend that Washington’s implicit security guarantee to Taipei is secure despite the Iran distraction. Indeed, one prominent analyst, Reuben F. Johnson, director of research at the Casimir Pulaski Foundation, argues that the Trump administration’s decision to attack Iran may actually boost the credibility of any U.S. commitment to deter Beijing from coercing Taiwan.
Other observers are far more uneasy, however. They contend that a prolonged U.S. war in Iran could make it extremely tempting for Beijing to take action against the rebellious island. If the Iran war turns into an Iraq-style or Afghanistan-style quagmire for the United States, that thesis will be even more credible.
Finally, it is possible that Beijing may be sending Taipei and Washington a dual message. One theme is that the PRC is prepared to ease tensions in the Taiwan Strait if Lai’s government and its U.S. patron are willing to do likewise. Conversely, both the pause and the resumption of military flights remind adversaries just how fast Beijing’s forces can respond to changing conditions. A coercive move against the island is an ever-present Sword of Damocles that the PRC can use at any time. That realization is probably the most appropriate, albeit limited, lesson to draw from the recent events in the Strait.
