Sometimes, Appeasement Is the Best Option

Appeasement was a bad idea in 1938, but it’s often a good idea. Ukraine would be wise to appease Russia.

Ukraine’s supporters in the United States and Europe insist that any agreement ending Kyiv’s war with Russia must not involve Ukrainian territorial concessions, or Russia will profit from an inexcusable act of aggression against its neighbor. However, demanding a return to pre-conflict borders ignores current military realities. Russian forces occupy approximately 20 percent of Ukraine’s prewar territory, and there are no signs that Kyiv’s position is likely to improve. Indeed, Ukraine’s latest offensive into Russian-held territory near Kursk has been a spectacular failure.

The long-term prospects for Ukraine in a war of attrition are not encouraging either. Western intelligence agencies issue reports showing high (probably inflated) estimates about the extent of Russian military casualties, trying to sell the message that continued fighting will prove too costly for the Kremlin. However, those same agencies curiously omit estimates of Ukrainian military casualties, an odd stance if Ukraine actually is winning the war. Russia’s prewar population was approximately 140 million, whereas Ukraine’s was less than 50 million. Worse, the drain on the latter’s population from the fighting has been severe.  Experts estimate that Ukraine’s population has dropped by10 million since Russia’s February 2022 invasion: from 48 million to just over 37 million today, while Russia’s total has barely budged. Moscow’s edge in deployable military personnel and hardware is even greater. The brutal truth is that Russia is in a much better position than Ukraine to prevail in a war of attrition.

Insisting that the Kremlin return all conquered territory to Kyiv in a peace accord is profoundly unrealistic. Ukraine is almost certain to lose a war of attrition – after even more death and destruction. Western backers of Ukraine are doing their client no favor if they press Kyiv to persist in its unrealistic, maximalist demands. Recognizing an unpleasant reality and making essential policy adjustments do not constitute cowardice or feckless appeasement. It means having the wisdom to choose the best available option in a difficult situation.

An especially toxic phenomenon in world affairs has been the tendency of Western political leaders to be obsessed with the supposed lessons of the 1930s. It seems that every time a would-be challenger to any aspect of the existing U.S-directed international order surfaces, that individual is demonized as the “new Hitler.” Likewise, the country he controls supposedly poses a threat comparable to the one Nazi Germany posed. That caricature has been applied to political figures as diverse as Ho Chi Minh, Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, Muammar Qaddafi, and Vladimir Putin.

In virtually all cases, the designated rogue leader has borne little resemblance to Hitler and the extremely aggressive foreign policy that he pursued. Putin, the most recent leader to be vilified as the new Hitler, also fits that pattern. His conduct more closely resembles the skittish, uneasy behavior of a leader in charge of a declining great power that feels cornered by more powerful geostrategic rivals. Putin’s reaction to NATO’s provocative eastern expansion, and especially the Alliance’s attempt to turn Ukraine into a frontline, anti-Russian political and military client, was consistent with the response of a leader who feels increasingly targeted and beleaguered.

One especially bad consequence of seeing every challenger as the new Hitler is the dismissal of any proposed concession to that challenger as shameless, unprincipled appeasement.  We are now witnessing that mentality among Ukraine’s supporters who insist that any peace agreement must entrench the prewar territorial status quo. However, even a casual survey of modern European history and geography would underscore the point that numerous territorial changes have occurred over the past two centuries – to say nothing of earlier eras. Most of those changes took place because of armed conflicts or intense political bullying. Entities in a weaker, losing position had to make concessions to stronger opponents. For the loser in a power struggle to insist on enjoying the rewards of a victor is terribly unrealistic, and such stubbornness may pave the way for an even more devastating defeat. Ukraine is in that situation now.

Today’s political leaders also must stop regarding reasonable concessions as appeasement, and genuine appeasement as an obscenity. Yes, the result of the Munich conference was a disaster for Britain, France, and the rest of Europe, but Munich is not history’s only example of appeasement. Before 1938, losers in power struggles frequently made major concessions, however reluctantly, to limit the negative consequences. For example, British leaders in the mid-1890s faced a looming confrontation with the United States with respect to a boundary dispute between British Guyana and Venezuela. An increasingly angry Washington viewed Britain’s stance as showing disrespect for the Monroe Doctrine and an unwillingness to accept the United States as the undisputed hegemon in the Western Hemisphere. Officials in London wisely decided that the stakes involved were not worth a nasty showdown with Washington.

It is imprudent for NATO to rule out concessions, or even “appeasement” toward Moscow regarding Ukraine. That is especially true when the probable alternative is continuing a war that will consume more lives, ravage even more of Ukraine’s infrastructure, and still eventually culminate in a Russian military victory. In the current Ukraine-Russia war, Kyiv’s supporters on both sides of the Atlantic would be wise to abandon their “no compromise” strategy.

Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter is a contributing editor to 19FortyFive and a senior fellow at the Randolph Bourne Institute and the Libertarian Institute.  He also served in various senior policy positions during a 37-year career at the Cato Institute.  Dr. Carpenter is the author of 13 books and more than 1,300 articles on defense, foreign policy and civil liberties issues.  His latest book is Unreliable Watchdog: The News Media and U.S. Foreign Policy (2022).

Author: Ted Galen Carpenter

Ted Galen Carpenter, Senior Fellow at the Randolph Bourne Institute, is the author of 13 books and more than 1,100 articles on international affairs. Dr. Carpenter held various senior policy positions during a 37-year career at the Cato institute. His latest book is Unreliable Watchdog: The News Media and U.S. Foreign Policy (2022).