President Bush has taken actions and made proposals that he claims were intended to “strengthen” the existing nuke proliferation-prevention regime.
Ha!
Last year, Bush specifically urged the Nuclear Suppliers Group to close what he claims is a "loophole," but is, in fact, one of the three pillars supporting the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In particular, the NPT specifically states that
"Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination."
Inalienable right!
Without discrimination!
Nevertheless, Bush urged the NSG to "discriminate" by transferring uranium-enrichment and reprocessing related technology to only those NPT signatories already possessing such technology.
That is, not to Iran.
Established in 1975, the Nuclear Suppliers Group is comprised of 44 nuclear-supplier states, including China, Russia, and the United States, that have voluntarily agreed to coordinate their export controls governing transfers of nuclear-related materials, equipment, and technology.
NSG members are expected to voluntarily forgo nuclear trade with governments that do not subject themselves to the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards regime. The IAEA has accepted the responsibility for verifying that NSG exports are not used by the importing state for any military purpose.
The NSG has two sets of guidelines listing specific nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies that are subject to export controls.
Part I comprises materials and technology that are uniquely nuclear-applicable, including fissile materials, nuclear reactors and associated equipment, and nuclear-material reprocessing and enrichment equipment.
Part II comprises dual-use equipment that could have nuclear applications.
To be eligible for importing Part I items from an NSG member, states – irrespective of whether they are NPT signatories or not – must have in place a comprehensive IAEA Safeguards Agreement covering all their nuclear activities and facilities.
All of them!
Hence, the enforcement mechanism for preventing nuke proliferation by “importers” is provided by the IAEA, and the enforcement mechanism for preventing nuke proliferation by “exporters” is provided by the coordinated export controls of NSG members themselves.
But Bush has now reversed himself, announcing that “as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states.”
Translation? Even though India has refused to sign the NPT, India should nevertheless “acquire the same benefits and advantages” that the IAEA-NPT-NSG regime bestows on the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China!
Since current U.S. law specifically prohibits that, Bush said he would ask Congress to “adjust” those laws, repealing among other things the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1994 and certain provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Last week, Bush signed in New Delhi what he and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have called a “historic” pact, wherein Bush agreed to supply India with nuclear power plants and enriched uranium fuel, while allowing Singh to not only keep his nukes, but to continue to develop new ones.
Now, Bush may have trouble getting Congress to repeal laws. But not so much trouble getting the NSG to relax its voluntary guidelines.
You see, President Clinton had put great pressure on Russia to apply the NSG guidelines, thereby preventing the construction of the first two Russian nuclear power plants at Koodankulam. Russia successfully argued that the original contract was signed in 1988, before the new and more stringent NSG guidelines came into force in 1992.
Clinton even attempted to prevent the refueling of the Tarapur atomic power station. Russia was only able to supply low-enriched uranium to the American-built plant in 2001 on the basis of “safety” considerations.
But now, Bush himself has promised to “work” to “adjust international regimes” to enable – among other things – the “expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur.”
Well, once Bush has got the NSG guidelines adjusted, what makes the diplomats at Foggy Bottom think the Indians will turn to America for nuclear power plants and fuel supplies? Why not turn to the Russians now that Bush is no longer preventing their assistance?
Or the French?
You’ll never guess who got there the week before Bush and signed a nuclear power plant and enriched uranium fuel cooperation pact with the Indians.
Quoth French President Jacques Chirac:
"Our American friends are not competitive. … French technology is a lot more advanced. …
"The French solution is without risk because it is not subject to the hazards of the American Congress."
Chirac is right on both counts.
C’est la guerre.
