In an interview with Newsweek‘s Lally Weymouth at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland last week, Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency discussed his accomplishments thus far and his plans for a third term.
In 2003, both Iran and Libya had agreed to sign an Additional Protocol to their IAEA Safeguards Agreement, vastly expanding the authority of the IAEA.
"The results in Iran are something I am quite proud of. Eighteen months ago, Iran was a black box – we didn’t know much about what was happening. Now, we have a fairly good picture of what is happening. We understand how complex and extensive that program is. Through our tenacity, Iran’s facilities that could produce fissile material are frozen. And we are still going everywhere we think we need to go to be sure there are no undeclared activities in Iran."
Iran had admitted to some activities – most of them minor – that should have been "declared," but weren’t. Nevertheless, ElBaradei was able to report, "I have seen no nuclear weapons program in Iran. What I have seen is that Iran is trying to gain access to nuclear enrichment technology, and so far there is no danger from Iran."
But what about Libya?
Well, the IAEA has concluded that Libya, too, had been trying to gain access to nuclear enrichment technology. But had there been danger from Libya?
"Libya’s declarations of its past nuclear related activities appear to be consistent with the information available to, and verified by, the Agency."
Many of those activities – some of them very troubling – should have been declared, but weren’t.
For example, Libya should have declared that 2,263 tons of yellowcake had been imported between 1978 and 1981. However, their belated declaration last year has been confirmed by the producers of the yellowcake.
The IAEA found most of the parts – bases, drive motors, drive converters, and magnets – required for the assembly of 10,000 L-2 second-generation gas centrifuges. The parts – many of them not yet uncrated – had been obtained by a "clandestine procurement network" from foreign suppliers and shipped to Libya.
Why were they purchased clandestinely and not declared? Because the United States had unilaterally imposed sanctions on the export by Western suppliers to Libya of many items, including "dual use" equipment that Libya – as an NPT-signatory – had an "inalienable right" to import.
Libya also received two small cylinders of uranium-hexafluoride (UF6) in September 2000 – along with two complete L-2 second-generation gas centrifuges – from "a foreign source" and one large cylinder of UF6 in February 2001, which they should have declared. The IAEA determined that one of the small cylinders contained "natural" UF6 and the other contained "depleted" UF6.
The large cylinder also contained "natural" UF6. Libya has apparently been unable to find any documentation related to the acquisition or procurement of the large cylinder of UF6, presumably also clandestinely procured and delivered.
So the IAEA apparently knows the supplier of the L-2 gas-centrifuges – which need not have been declared – but apparently is not sure where the uranium came from or who produced the UF6 – which should have been declared.
Nevertheless, the Washington Post reported last week that "two senior staff members on the National Security Council have toured China, Japan and South Korea in recent days to brief top officials that U.S. scientific tests strongly suggest North Korea provided Libya with uranium-hexafluoride gas."
The Bush-Cheney administration apparently wants to blame the Koreans for supplying UF6 to Libya back in 2001, thereby shifting the blame to North Korea for the abrogation in 2002 of the Agreed Framework, which had frozen all North Korean nuclear activities, making them subject to IAEA locks and seals.
What does ElBaradei have to say about North Korea?
"North Korea has plutonium for sure – enough to make at least six to eight bombs. Like Iran, we should discuss their security concerns and their sense of isolation and bring a generous offer which would enable them to give up their nuclear ambitions."
Well, the Bush-Cheney administration is not likely to make "a generous offer" to either North Korea or Iran. So what will occupy ElBaradei in a third term?
"I want to get the Iran issue out of the way and get to the bottom of the A.Q. Khan [former head of Pakistan’s nuclear program] network – he provided the complete kit [for a nuclear weapon] to Libya."
