The reported nuclear test by North Korea escalates an already dangerous situation. Diplomatic aftershocks throughout the world highlight the test’s alarming message: we are one step closer to nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. A potentially catastrophic arms race in Northeast Asia will likely ensue.
U.S. foreign policy has failed. When historians turn their gaze to this period, the Bush administration’s refusal to engage in meaningful negotiation will rank as one of the greatest foreign policy blunders. How did this happen, and what can be done?
When Bush first took office, North Korea – a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty – had halted all missile tests and had its nuclear facilities under the watch of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It was broadening diplomatic ties, beginning a series of economic reform measures, and expanding personal and professional exchanges with Europe, South Korea, and China.
Instead of building on this hopeful trend, the president refused to negotiate with North Korea, and declared the country part of an “Axis of Evil.”
The current crisis erupted in October 2002, when U.S. envoy James Kelly reported North Korea had admitted to secretly enriching uranium. Heavy oil shipments were cut off, and the issue went to the UN Security Council. North Korea responded by expelling all nuclear inspectors, restarting its nuclear reactor, and pulling out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
In repeated rounds of talks in Beijing designed to resolve this standoff, the Bush administration refused to offer meaningful tradeoffs to the North Koreans or to even sit down to negotiate. Instead, Bush administration policy has been: “first you disarm, then we’ll talk.” Given the security anxieties of North Korea, this policy was a clear no-starter.
Just when negotiations appeared to have reached a potential breakthrough point in last October, the U.S. Treasury Department froze North Korean financial assets abroad. The North Koreans refused to return to the negotiating table in protest.
With the diplomatic process was stalled, North Korea moved rapidly to build nuclear capability. They tested six short- and mid-range missiles earlier this year and now apparently have conducted a nuclear test.
Although the North Koreans most likely do not have the capacity to actually deliver a viable nuclear warhead at this point, the reported explosion of a nuclear device on the Korean peninsula marks a watershed in the failure of denuclearization efforts in Northeast Asia.
To stop this dangerous trend, the U.S. and all countries in the region must return to the negotiating table in earnest, prepared to offer meaningful tradeoffs in return for a North Korean pledge to place its nuclear facilities under immediate international inspection.
North Korea repeatedly maintains it wants diplomatic recognition from the U.S. and a peace agreement officially ending the Korean War. With a struggling economy it also needs opportunities for trade and investment.
The outlines of a deal are clear: North Korea should freeze its nuclear weapons program, the U.S. should offer security guarantees and pursue diplomatic recognition, and the nations of the region should cooperate to promote economic, technical, and cultural cooperation with North Korea. Diplomacy and trade, not military threats or sanctions, provide the best hope for peace on the Korean peninsula.
There is no time to waste, and no alternative to diplomacy.
