A year has passed since Hamas’ incursion into Israel on October 7th. Dubbed Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, Hamas conducted an improbable attack that resulted in 1200 dead Israelis and over 250 hostages taken into Gaza. Israel also initiated the Hannibal Directive that day, killing some of their civilians to prevent them from being taken into Gaza. In the aftermath of the attack, political pundits and analysts ruminated on why Hamas attacked. From Hamas’ perspective, October 7th was a justified response to 75 years of Israeli oppression against the Palestinian people. Beyond that rationale, experts could not fully explain October 7th. However, in retrospect, other elements may have driven Hamas’ strategic calculus for the October 7th attacks.
One of the motivating factors behind Hamas’ October 7th attack was the group’s unpopularity amongst Palestinians in Gaza. According to James Zogby of the Arab-American Institute, roughly 20% of Palestinians in Gaza supported Hamas before Oct 7th. One of the most notable instances of public disobedience came in July 2023 when thousands of Palestinians took to the streets against the Islamist group over the economic and living conditions in Gaza caused by Israel’s brutal blockade. The demonstrations were violently broken up in what was considered a rare but powerful display of frustration against Hamas’ rule.
Taking these elements into consideration, Hamas sought to use October 7th as an attempt to reconfigure its image as an authoritarian militant group into a fighting force protecting Palestinians against Israeli aggression. Hamas believed that by framing October 7th as a revolutionary act of resistance against Israel, Palestinians would see them as protectors of their struggle and see Hamas in a favorable light.
Geopolitical considerations in the Middle East also contributed to the October 7th attack. Hamas ultimately felt the need to debunk the narrative that the Middle East could ignore the Palestinian struggle entirely. For example, Jordan and Egypt relinquished their political leverage when both nations made peace with Israel without conditioning the creation of a Palestinian state.
In the months before the Hamas attack, Saudi Arabia was on the brink of repeating this same pattern by normalizing relations with Israel. Washington and Riyadh were engaged in high-level discussions in which the Saudis sought a U.S. defense pact. The White House pushed the Kingdom to drop its demands that normalization with Tel Aviv be conditioned on a Palestinian state.
Had such an agreement been actualized, the Palestinian cause would have suffered tremendous damage. Saudi Arabia’s flirtation with Israeli normalization was also part of an overall trend set forth by the Abraham Accords, which were designed to sidestep the Palestinian issue in the region.
Thus, from Hamas’ perspective, attacking Israel was designed to both upend impending Israel-Saudi normalization while seeking to hammer away at the regional obstacles imposed by the Abraham Accords configurations. To date, Hamas has been successful in this regard. Their attack delegitimized the validity of the Abraham Accords and scuttled prospective Israel-Saudi normalization. Consequently, Saudi Arabia has publicly stated it will no longer normalize with Israel unless it ends its occupation and establishes a Palestinian state along the 1967 lines recognized by the United Nations.
Perhaps one of the most overlooked elements causing October 7th was Benjamin Netanyahu’s divide-and-conquer approach of Gaza and the West Bank. The goal was to weaken the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank, which recognizes Israel’s right to exist, while propping up Hamas’ legitimacy and rule in Gaza. In doing so, the idea was to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. Netanyahu himself even bragged about this, stating: “Whoever is against a Palestinian state should be for transferring the funds to Gaza, because maintaining a separation between the PA in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza helps prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state.”
In effect, Israel had pacified Hamas as an armed group and confined them to Gaza while simultaneously destroying the viability of a Palestinian state. Taking this into consideration, Hamas believed the only way to break that paradigm and recalibrate the equation between themselves, Israel, and the Palestinian struggle was to launch an armed attack. Had it not attacked Israel, Hamas believed it would have been aiding and abetting the occupation of Palestinians – a charge that Hamas ironically has oft-levied against their rivals Fatah in the Palestinian Authority.
However, one thing is for certain: Israel’s genocide in Gaza is not a proper response to the events of October 7th. 40,000 Palestinians are dead and most of Gaza’s 2.2 million inhabitants are permanently displaced without a home. Israel’s brutal response is not only a flagrant violation of both U.S. and international law, but it also strengthens Hamas and its narrative that it’s within the interest of the Palestinians to use violence. The reality is that Israel cannot bomb Hamas out of existence, for they are an idea above all else.
To defeat Hamas, Israel has two choices: grant the Palestinians statehood or create a binational state in which Palestinians and Jews share equal rights. Both are just and palatable solutions that would not only end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but defang Hamas entirely.
Abdelhalim Abdelrahman is a Palestinian-American writer and analyst located in Michigan. His work focusing on Palestine has been featured in The Hill, New Arab, Foreign Policy, and Responsible Statecraft.
