It is increasingly apparent that the new political leaders in both Taiwan and Japan are adopting more assertive, even explicitly confrontational, policies toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Their moves are stoking geostrategic tensions throughout the western Pacific. Washington has long regarded Taipei and Tokyo as important U.S. strategic partners. However, the Trump administration also wants to discourage any new military crises in the region. Achieving such a balance may prove to be challenging.
Lai Ching-te (William Lai) who became Taiwan’s president in May 2024 is an even more outspoken advocate of getting explicit international recognition of the island’s sovereignty than was his predecessor Tsai Ing-wen. Both leaders are members of the officially pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), but Tsai aligned with the “light green” (more restrained and pragmatic) faction. Lai openly embraces the goal of Taiwan’s formal independence that the “deep green” faction pursues. His confrontational course seems aimed at securing eventual international recognition of Taiwan’s (currently de facto) independence and a firm commitment from the United States and its allies (especially Japan) to defend Taiwan from PRC coercion.
Not surprisingly, the Beijing government dislikes Lai even more intensely than it did Tsai. One of the first manifestations of the growing hostility was that the PRC’s menacing military maneuvers became larger and even more ominous than they were during Tsai’s years in office. Lyle Goldstein, a scholar on East Asia issues and Director of the Asia Program at the Defense Priorities think tank, voices deep concern about Lai’s goals and temperament. “Instead of taking a low profile and playing down any claims to Taiwan’s independent status like his more cautious DPP predecessor,” Goldstein contends, “Lai has lurched toward formal independence with a succession of speeches making the case for Taiwanese nationhood.” Indeed, Lai devoted nearly all of his initial national address to making the case for Taiwan’s right to sovereignty. As one prominent Taiwanese columnist noted: “Never before has a Taiwanese president devoted an entire speech to laying out clearly, point-by-point and unequivocally how Taiwan is unquestionably a sovereign nation.”
Immediately after his summit meeting with PRC President Xi Jinping in early November 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump stated that that he had received a pledge from Xi that the PRC would not take any military action to change Taiwan’s political status during the remainder of Trump’s term. Even if Trump correctly assessed the PRC leader’s comment (which is uncertain, since neither the U.S. nor PRC official summaries of the summit’s proceedings mention such a promise), Xi might find it extremely difficult to adhere to a policy of restraint if Lai continues to push the envelope on formal independence.
Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, appears to share Lai’s determination to resist Beijing’s pressure tactics. Takaichi has made it clear that her country is committed to preserving at least the status quo of Taiwan’s de facto independence. During a parliamentary debate, she even crossed a longstanding line that Beijing had drawn. Asked repeatedly about a hypothetical Taiwan security contingency, Takaichi abandoned Tokyo’s usual diplomatic evasions and declared that a military crisis over the island would constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, thereby potentially triggering collective self-defense and direct Japanese military involvement.
Beijing’s angry response was not long in coming. Warwick Powell, a scholar at Queensland University of Technology in Australia, noted that Chinese coastguard vessels soon “conducted prolonged patrols in the waters around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, a reminder that Beijing can tighten the screws in the East China Sea whenever it wishes.” Moreover, “Japan suddenly looked isolated. Washington, Tokyo’s treaty ally, offered no public support and quietly proceeded with the planned withdrawal of intermediate-range missiles it had only recently deployed to Okinawa.”
Other Japanese officials, including Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi sought to clarify (modestly soften) the prime minister’s comments regarding Taiwan. Beijing did not seem mollified by Tokyo’s conciliatory gestures, however. On December 14, 2025, the PRC government imposed sanctions on the former chief of staff of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, Shigeru Iwasaki.
Writing in the December 16, 2025, issue of the National Interest, Paul Heer, a senior fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, describes some of the mounting policy dilemmas for Japan and the United States with respect to Taiwan’s current and future political status. Not surprisingly, the biggest concern of both governments is about the nightmare of a massive PRC military offensive against the island. However, Heer contends that a more subtle important development needs to receive greater attention. “The preoccupation in Washington and Tokyo with a potential Chinese attack on Taiwan obfuscates (intentionally or otherwise) the erosion of the United States and Japanese “one China” policies. It also diverts attention from Taipei’s own retreat from a “one China” policy in favor of a de facto “one China, one Taiwan” policy—which, in Beijing’s view, the United States and Japan are tacitly accepting through their apparent acquiescence.” Moreover, a focus on the apocalyptic war scenario “diverts attention from Washington’s and Tokyo’s own drift toward de facto “one China, one Taiwan” policies, as reflected by their nascent preference for Taiwan’s long-term separation from China.”
Heer is correct about the probable strong response from both Japan and the United States to an outright PRC military assault on Taiwan—despite the Trump administration’s rather surprising decision to withdraw the intermediate-range missiles from Okinawa. However, Beijing could take a number of milder coercive measures against the island, including imposing a partial naval blockade as an initial warning. Xi’s government also could escalate tensions with Japan. Intensifying the bilateral territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkako Islands could be especially tempting for Beijing. Those uninhabited spits of land occupy a strategic location, and there are credible indications that the surrounding waters may contain sizable deposits of valuable minerals. Yet, absent a Chinese attempt to seize the islands from Japan’s administrative control, both Tokyo and Washington would be unlikely to mount a major military response to Beijing’s naval maneuvers or depredations.
The governments of Taiwan and Japan have now staked out rather hardline positions, and the level of military cooperation between Taipei and Tokyo clearly is on the rise. However, the Trump administration seems to prefer an indefinite prolongation of the status quo regarding the issue of Taiwan’s political status. A key question is whether political leaders in Taiwan and Japan are inclined to increase the current level of their strategic cooperation without a clear signal from Washington that the United States will support such a change regardless of the risk. The Trump administration needs to clarify U.S. policy—and do so soon.
