On December 13, 2025, two U.S. soldiers and a civilian interpreter were killed near Palmyra, Syria. According to a Pentagon statement, a lone Islamic State (ISIS) gunman disguised as a shepherd opened fire on a joint U.S.–Syrian patrol, killing three and wounding three before Syrian troops shot him dead. Donald Trump responded with characteristic fury; he promised “very serious retaliation” and said Syria’s new president Ahmed al‑Sharaa was “devastated” by the attack. Yet the promise to end America’s “forever wars” has been part of his pitch since 2016, and U.S. troops remain.
The withdrawal that never happened
Trump first told Americans he had “won against ISIS” in December 2018 and ordered U.S. troops home. In reality, Pentagon and congressional pressure kept about half of the roughly 2,000 troops in place. Less than a year later he issued another withdrawal order, but officials left 90 percent of the force to “guard oil fields.” Reports noted that the mission quickly shifted from defeating ISIS to protecting oil; roughly 500 troops stayed behind to keep oil fields from falling into jihadist hands.
Behind the scenes, U.S. officials were playing “shell games.” James Jeffrey, Trump’s envoy for Syria, later admitted they deliberately misled the president about troop numbers. “We were always playing shell games to not make clear to our leadership how many troops we had there,” he confessed. Though Trump publicly agreed to keep only 200–400 troops, the actual number was “a lot more than” that. Journalists eventually learned that roughly 900 U.S. troops remained.
The Pentagon continued to slow‑roll civilian orders after Trump returned to office in 2025. In December 2024 the Defense Department quietly acknowledged there were about 2,000 U.S. troops in Syria – roughly 1,100 more than the 900 “core” personnel previously reported. Officials explained that these extra soldiers were “temporary rotational forces” deployed to meet fluid mission requirements. The new U.S. envoy, Thomas Barrack, announced plans to close most of the eight bases and consolidate operations in Hasakah province. Yet by November 2025 Reuters reported that the Pentagon intended to halve the troop presence to 1,000 and establish a new base at Damascus’ airport – a sign that numbers change on paper while the boots stay.
From jihadist to head of state
Understanding why American troops are still in Syria requires grappling with the identity of its new president. Ahmed Hussein al‑Sharaa – better known as Abu Mohammed al‑Julani – joined al‑Qaeda in Iraq and later founded the al‑Nusra Front. After splitting from al‑Qaeda the group rebranded as Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham (HTS), which the United Nations and United States still classify as a terrorist organisation. In late 2024 HTS swept across Syria, toppling Bashar al‑Assad’s government and ending the thirteen‑year civil war. By January 2025 its leader proclaimed himself interim president and adopted the name Ahmed al‑Sharaa. Despite the rebranding, the Congressional Research Service notes that both HTS and Sharaa remain on U.N. sanctions lists.
Trump embraced Sharaa as an ally. In May 2025 he met the Syrian leader in Riyadh and praised him as a “tough” leader. The following November he welcomed Sharaa to the White House – the first visit by a Syrian head of state since 1946 – and told reporters he was doing “a very good job.” Commentators recalled that only a few years earlier Americans would have balked at a president welcoming a former al‑Qaeda commander. The meeting delivered what Sharaa craved: legitimacy.
Mission creep and local entanglements
While Trump lavished praise on Sharaa, the U.S. mission became ever more confused. The December 13 ambush occurred near the al‑Tanf garrison, a long‑standing U.S. base in Homs province where special forces train the Syrian Free Army (SFA). Across Deir ez‑Zor and Hasakah provinces, U.S. soldiers partner with the Kurdish‑led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and remnants of the SFA, providing intelligence, air support and training. These units have been vital in containing ISIS but also drag the U.S. deeper into Syrian politics.
Proxy attacks in 2024 prompted a temporary surge from about 900 to roughly 2,000 troops. By March 2025 the United States fielded about 2,000 troops in Syria alongside 2,500 coalition personnel in Iraq. Officials now propose reducing to 1,000 and closing most bases, yet sources say the Pentagon intends to retain an airbase in Damascus – evidence that the mission is evolving rather than ending.
Interventionists warn that Sharaa’s government cannot handle ISIS alone and argue that around 1,000–2,000 U.S. troops are needed because HTS has fought ISIS since 2013 and lacks capacity to manage detention camps and large‑scale operations. A non‑interventionist reading draws the opposite conclusion. Keeping troops in Syria has not prevented attacks on U.S. forces – it has created more targets. ISIS still fields between 5,000 and 7,000 fighters in Syria and Iraq. The deadliest previous attack on U.S. troops in Syria occurred in 2019 when four Americans were killed in Manbij. The December 2025 ambush shows that ISIS cells remain capable of inflicting casualties despite years of occupation. Their ability to conduct hit‑and‑run attacks may be enhanced when American forces are stretched thin or tied down training local militias.
A destabilized country and shifting alliances
The ground realities further undermine the case for staying. After Assad’s fall, the Kurds were pushed from key areas by Turkish‑backed forces. Turkey continues to threaten new incursions and views the SDF as an extension of the PKK, which Ankara and Washington both designate a terrorist organization. Iraq wants U.S. coalition troops to remain at the Ain al‑Assad base because it distrusts the new Syrian authorities, who once fought in Iraq. Meanwhile, Israel and Saudi Arabia see Sharaa’s regime as a potential ally against Iran and are pushing for a U.S.‑brokered security pact. These overlapping agendas have little to do with American security but everything to do with regional geopolitics.
Interventionists also claim the U.S. presence denies ISIS oil revenue. Yet U.S. military officials concede that the group’s main income comes from extortion, smuggling and protection rackets; focusing on oil might even give ISIS a propaganda boon. With U.S. forces spread thin, insurgents can find targets, and militants operate in desert areas beyond Damascus’ control. Some argue American troops deter Iran or Russia, but Iranian units have largely withdrawn and Moscow is preoccupied with Ukraine. The 2024 acknowledgement of 2,000 U.S. troops came amid a budget update. Ultimately the mission persists because the foreign policy establishment cannot imagine letting go – even when Trump issued withdrawal orders, his envoys and generals thwarted them.
Why the deaths will continue
American troops remain in Syria because policymakers refuse to accept that they cannot remake the Middle East. Fifteen years after the U.S. first sent special forces to fight ISIS, the mission has mutated into an open‑ended occupation. Washington justifies its presence by pointing to terrorist remnants, protecting oil, deterring Iran or supporting Israel – interchangeable rationales that ensure there is always a reason to stay. Meanwhile, the Syrian battlefield is littered with shifting alliances, jihadist fragments and nationalist grievances. In that environment, a handful of U.S. personnel become symbolic targets, as the December 13 attack shows.
From a non‑interventionist perspective, the solution is simple. America should end its military presence in Syria and let regional actors solve their own problems. This does not mean abandoning diplomacy; Washington can support humanitarian relief and encourage negotiations without soldiers on the ground. But the current strategy – keeping a small force exposed to insurgent attacks while partnering with a former al‑Qaeda commander who remains on a terrorist sanctions list – is morally indefensible. As long as U.S. leaders cling to an ill‑defined mission in Syria, American troops will continue to die for reasons that have nothing to do with defending the United States.
Alan Mosley is a historian, jazz musician, policy researcher for the Tenth Amendment Center, and host of It’s Too Late, “The #1 Late Night Show in America (NOT hosted by a Communist)!” New episodes debut every Wednesday night at 9ET across all major platforms; just search “AlanMosleyTV” or “It’s Too Late with Alan Mosley.”
