Once the Senate confirms John Bolton to be our ambassador to the United Nations, he vows to “forge a stronger relationship between the United States and the United Nations, which depends critically on American leadership.”
Like the leadership exhibited when Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 in defiance of the authority reserved to the UN Security Council by the UN Charter?
True, UN Security Council Resolution 1441 – passed in November 2002 at the insistence of President Bush – had “warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.” But right up until the eve of Bush’s invasion, the Security Council continued to receive reports that Iraq was largely in compliance with its obligations.
In any case, according to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, “[I]t was up to the Security Council to approve or determine what those consequences should be” and that the U.S.-led invasion “was not in conformity with the UN charter” and was, therefore, “illegal.”
In fact, most Members of the Security Council were ready to lift the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq by the Security Council in 1991 in the aftermath of the Gulf War.
After all, the sanctions were imposed principally because the International Atomic Energy Agency discovered that Iraq – a signatory to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons – had secretly been attempting to develop nuclear weapons, in violation of the NPT.
The NPT requires each non-nuclear-weapon Party to the Treaty “to accept safeguards – as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agencys safeguards system – for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
The IAEA Statute declares that IAEA inspectors shall have access “as necessary” to account for source and special fissionable materials and “to determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against use in furtherance of any military purpose.”
What happens if a signatory is found by the IAEA inspectors to be in NPT noncompliance, that is, found to be using safeguarded materials, equipment or facilities “in furtherance of any military purpose”?
Well, the IAEA Statute says, “[T]he inspectors shall report any noncompliance to the Director General who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors.” Whereupon, “[T]he Board shall report the noncompliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.”
In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, the UN Security Council caused to be created a special group of IAEA inspectors – the IAEA Action Team on Iraq – which reported directly to the Security Council. When the Action Team found that Iraq had been using materials, equipment, and facilities – that ought to have been made subject to Iraq’s Safeguards Agreement, but weren’t – in furtherance of a military purpose, they reported that discovery to the Security Council.
The result was UNSCR 687, which empowered the Action Team “to uncover and dismantle Iraq’s clandestine nuclear program” and “to develop and implement an Ongoing Monitoring and Verification System.”
On the eve of Bush’s invasion of Iraq – “justified” to you soccer moms, in the main, by allegations that Saddam Hussein had reconstituted his nuclear weapons programs and was on the verge of having nukes to give to terrorists – the on-the-ground IAEA inspectors reported to the Security Council they could find no indication of any such attempt to reconstitute a nuke program.
So what?
Well, Bonkers Bolton is the principal Bush-Cheney weenie now loudly claiming that Iran has a secret nuclear weapons program that the IAEA hasn’t been able to find, despite two years of intrusive on-the-ground, go-anywhere see-anything inspections.
Furthermore, Bolton is demanding that the IAEA Board refer his wholly unsubstantiated charge to the Security Council for appropriate action.
But the Board is only obligated to refer such a charge in the event IAEA inspectors discover Iran to be in IAEA Statutory noncompliance – that is, using its safeguarded materials, equipment or facilities “in furtherance of any military purpose.”
So what’s the first thing our new UN ambassador will do? Why, demand at the NPT Review Conference next month that the definition of NPT noncompliance be broadened so that, for example, an oil-rich country like Iran would be in NPT noncompliance if it insisted on enriching uranium.
