Republic of Korea (ROK) leaders are having to navigate an increasingly challenging policy course to avoid having their country become entangled in an array of dangerous security problems, both in East Asia and elsewhere in the international system.
The most recent example involved Seoul’s actions in Ukraine. In late September 2026, the Kiev regime transferred two North Korean prisoners of war, who had been fighting with Russian forces, to South Korea. That move was highly confidential, lest it put the ROK government in a highly compromising position. Disclosure of the information could not only cause a rift in Seoul’s delicate relations with Moscow, but could also create a dangerous confrontation between the two rival Korean states.
Instead of maintaining the required discretion and confidentiality, however, Ukraine president Volodymyr Zelensky announced the transfer to the world during a speech before the United Nations General Assembly. Zelensky also sharply criticized North Korea and its leader, Kim Jong-un, for deploying troops on Russia’s behalf. South Korean media then reported that the two captured soldiers had expressed their desire to defect to the ROK. Tensions between North and South Korea promptly spiked.
So did the anger of the ROK administration toward Zelensky. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung immediately accused Ukraine of violating a nondisclosure agreement between Seoul and Kiev about the transfer. Ukraine flatly denied making such a deal. The ROK’s risks of being drawn into the maelstrom of the Russia-Ukraine war seemed to rise.
Seoul already was resisting pressure from Kiev to sell sophisticated weapons to Ukraine. Zelensky’s government has asked the ROK on several occasions, most recently in early August 2026, to send air defense missiles and other crucial systems. Seoul has repeatedly declined those requests. Zelensky’s clumsy conduct regarding the North Korean prisoners of war episode is not likely to enhance Kiev’s prospects going forward.
Yet NATO members, including the United States, have long been pressing the ROK to approve such arms sales. Indeed, Seoul has faced such calls since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It has not been easy for ROK leaders to resist that pressure, but they have done so to this point.
Lee’s stance on the Ukraine arms sale issue is consistent with his government’s overall policy to try to reduce tensions with North Korea. He has even gone beyond endorsing President Trump’s willingness to hold a summit meeting with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un before the end of 2026. In a major speech in late September, Lee called on the United States to ease its onerous, longstanding economic sanctions against Pyongyang, and to accept a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program rather than continue Washington’s hoary insistence on the abolition of that program.
South Korea is making a concerted effort to avoid becoming entangled in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, to promote a possible rapprochement between Washington and Pyongyang, and to ease the ROK’s own tensions with North Korea. Lee and his advisers are also attempting to steer a middle course with respect to the mounting animosity between Japan and the People’s Republic of China. Both Beijing and Tokyo seek Seoul’s backing regarding a number of disputes. One emotional spat is the territorial dispute between Japan and the PRC over control of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands, which has led to several provocative deployments of maritime vessels in the past year.
Japan’s prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, wants her country to play a more active and assertive role in regional security affairs. She also favors adopting a more hardline posture toward China – especially on the issue of Taiwan’s de facto independence. During one debate in the Japanese Diet, she ignored a longstanding warning from Beijing. Asked repeatedly about a hypothetical Taiwan security contingency, Takaichi stated that a military confrontation over the island would constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, a deliberate invocation of the Japanese constitution’s “collective self-defense” clause that would permit direct military intervention. That stance went significantly beyond Tokyo’s traditional position that its military forces exist solely for national self-defense and to fulfill treaty obligations.
Lee and other ROK leaders make it clear that their country is not willing to go down such a confrontational path. Their cautious, prudent stance annoys pro-Taiwan partisans in the United States as well as members of that contingent in Japan.
Seoul’s current geopolitical headaches are classic examples of the challenges that a midsize power located in a volatile neighborhood must face. A weaker “client state” has little choice but to comply with the wishes of the strongest regional power or of a distant, very strong protector. “Client state” was an accurate description of the ROK’s status until the past few years. Seoul relied heavily on the United States and Washington’s principal ally in East Asia, Japan, for defense. The implicit tradeoff for such protection was a willingness to obediently follow Washington’s wishes on most security and economic issues.
But as a midsize power instead of a heavily dependent client, Seoul now has far more policy options. Moreover, there likely will be a greater number of instances in which important ROK national interests do not closely align with those of the United States – or at least not with the policies Washington has adopted. We are now seeing Seoul responding to that altered incentive structure by embracing actions that are designed to minimize risks and enhance the country’s international appeal and influence.
Based on the Lee administration’s handling of Kiev’s quest for support in its war against Russia, extremely delicate relations with Pyongyang, and the growing tensions between Tokyo and Beijing, South Korea’s current policymaking team is amassing an effective record. The Trump administration should be pleased with that development.
