On June 23, Israeli and Lebanese delegations began a new round of talks in Washington even as the U.S.-Iran memorandum entered its first serious test. The interim deal, signed on June 17, was meant to create 60 days of space for a final settlement: a halt in hostilities, a path toward safer navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, limited sanctions relief, and negotiations over the nuclear file. But the deal is now being tested by the very question it was supposed to contain. Can the United States pursue diplomacy with Iran while Israel insists that it must retain unrestricted freedom of military action in Lebanon?
That question should not be evaded. Israel has real security concerns about Iran’s nuclear capacity, its missile program, and the armed groups Tehran supports across the region. Israelis living near the Lebanese border have endured rocket fire and the threat of renewed war. A rushed agreement that merely freezes danger while leaving the machinery of escalation intact would not deserve American support. But serious security concerns do not create a right to veto another country’s diplomacy. They create a case for stronger verification, clearer consequences for violations, and more durable regional arrangements.
The June 17 memorandum is not a finished peace agreement. It is a fragile framework. Its text leaves the hardest questions for the next 60 days: the status of Iran’s enriched uranium, the future of enrichment, sanctions schedules, inspection arrangements, and the mechanisms that would enforce compliance. The United States has since issued a temporary sanctions waiver, while public statements from Washington and Tehran have already diverged over whether Iran agreed to long-term nuclear inspections. Those gaps are not a reason to abandon diplomacy. They are the reason diplomacy must be exacting.
This is where Netanyahu’s position matters. Israel is not a signatory to the U.S.-Iran memorandum, and it is entitled to press its case in Washington. Yet Netanyahu has repeatedly argued that Israeli forces must preserve freedom of action against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, even as the ceasefire there remains part of the wider regional de-escalation effort. That posture turns a legitimate debate over security into something more consequential: an assertion that any agreement limiting Israeli military discretion is, by definition, unacceptable.
The distinction is not semantic. Israel can demand that a final agreement address missile threats, weapons transfers, Hezbollah’s arsenal, and enforceable nuclear restrictions. It can seek rapid intelligence-sharing, inspection standards, and clear American commitments if Iran violates a deal. What it should not demand is a regional order built around the premise that Washington must keep military escalation available whenever Israeli leaders decide diplomacy has become too constraining. A security strategy can seek tougher terms without requiring permanent crisis as its operating condition.
Netanyahu’s record makes this concern difficult to dismiss. In 2015, he addressed the U.S. Congress to oppose the emerging nuclear agreement with Iran and argued that “no deal is better than a bad deal.” His intervention went beyond a technical dispute over centrifuges and inspections. It was an effort to shape American politics against an agreement that would have reduced Iran’s isolation and narrowed the space for a constantly escalating confrontation. The current moment is different in detail, but not in structure. Again, an American administration is trying to convert military exhaustion into a diplomatic opening. Again, Netanyahu’s government is treating the opening less as an opportunity to improve terms than as a danger to its freedom of action.
The strongest case for Netanyahu’s position deserves to be stated plainly. Iran has violated or reduced past nuclear commitments; it has built missile capabilities that threaten Israel and regional states; and its relationship with Hezbollah gives Israel reason to fear that an incomplete deal could postpone a confrontation rather than prevent one. No responsible American policymaker should dismiss those fears as manufactured. Nor should Washington assume that a signature alone will produce peace.
But accepting those facts does not require accepting Netanyahu’s conclusion. The lesson of past failures is not that diplomacy is futile. It is that agreements need verification, enforcement, and political staying power. The alternative — a posture in which every imperfect agreement is treated as worse than open-ended confrontation — has repeatedly produced the opposite of security. It has left Iran’s nuclear program unresolved, deepened regional militarization, exposed Israeli civilians to repeated rounds of retaliation, and kept American forces tied to crises with no durable political end state.
Lebanon shows the human stakes. Families displaced by fighting do not experience a ceasefire as a strategic abstraction. They experience it as the difference between returning home and preparing to flee again. Israeli communities near the border do not need more speeches about deterrence; they need confidence that another round of rockets and mobilization is not inevitable. Iranian civilians, meanwhile, have lived under sanctions, strikes, and the anxiety that a new escalation may arrive before diplomacy has a chance to work. Political leaders may retain leverage by keeping crisis alive, but ordinary people pay the price of that leverage.
This is also an American question. The United States cannot define its interests solely through the threat assessments of even its closest partners. Washington must consider Israel’s security, but it must also weigh maritime stability, energy markets, the safety of U.S. service members, relations with Gulf states, domestic economic pressure, and the strategic cost of endless regional deployment. A functioning U.S.-Iran agreement would not make Iran an ally or solve every conflict in the Middle East. It could, however, reduce the chance that every dispute in Lebanon, the Gulf, or the nuclear file automatically becomes a reason for another American military commitment.
The real test of the memorandum is therefore not whether Netanyahu endorses every clause. It is whether Washington can address legitimate Israeli concerns while retaining an independent definition of American interests. A final deal should be harder, not softer: it should include credible verification, clear penalties for violations, protection for commercial shipping, and mechanisms that prevent Lebanon from becoming the trigger for a wider war. But it should not grant Israel an informal veto over whether the United States may pursue diplomacy at all.
The choice is not between naïve accommodation and Israeli security. It is between a regional policy that treats insecurity as permanent and politically useful, and one that tries to reduce it through enforceable limits and reciprocal obligations. Netanyahu cannot have a veto over America’s Iran diplomacy because no durable peace can be built on the assumption that diplomacy is always provisional and escalation is always available. The next 60 days will show whether Washington is prepared to act on that principle.
Greg Pence is an international studies graduate of University of San Francisco and my articles have been published on websites like Middle East Monitor.
