The issue of North Korea’s nuclear program has long been the principal stumbling block to the normalization of U.S. relations with that country. True, Washington has endeavored to make the communist regime a pariah in the international system for a variety of reasons since the Korean War. Beginning with George H.W. Bush’s administration in the early 1990s, however, U.S. leaders have become obsessed with shutting down Pyongyang’s nuclear program. Washington has insisted that the so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) abandon any ambitions to be in the exclusive global nuclear weapons club.
Washington should desist. The stakes – avoiding nuclear war – are much too high.
Washington’s continuing refusal to contemplate accepting a nuclear North Korea torpedoed promising signs of an improvement in bilateral relations during Donald Trump’s first term. Trump conducted two cordial summits with DPRK leader Kim Jong-un, one in June 2018 and the other in June 2019. The latter (brief, mostly ceremonial) meeting included Trump’s stroll across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea. Promising signs of a thaw in relations between Washington and Pyongyang faded, though, during the more substantive summit in Hanoi in late February 2019, when hawks in both Congress and Trump’s own administration (most notably ultra-hawkish national security advisor John Bolton) convinced the president not to compromise on the nuclear issue or Pyongyang’s insistence on the immediate lifting of sanctions.
In addition to sabotaging potentially constructive diplomatic initiatives, reckless hawks periodically even have flirted with suggestions that the United States eliminate DPRK nuclear sites with bombing and missile strikes. In 1994, Bill Clinton’s administration adopted substantive plans to execute such a mission. Former President Jimmy Carter fortunately helped defuse the impending crisis and prevailed on Clinton to accept his proposal for multilateral negotiations to steer Pyongyang toward the goal of a purely peaceful nuclear program under rigorous international restrictions. Carter’s efforts likely prevented a horrific war, but they also produced years of fruitless negotiations, since it became obvious that the DPRK had no intention of accepting such restraints.
The U.S. demand that Pyongyang return to nuclear virginity has become increasingly detached from reality as the DPRK has made steady progress on building a small arsenal of nuclear weapons. Experts at the U.S. Arms Control Association estimate that North Korea has assembled approximately 50 such weapons. The DPRK also is building an increasingly capable ballistic missile system to deliver such weapons. Over the past several years, there is growing evidence that Pyongyang already has tested missiles that have sufficient range to reach the continental United States.
It is long past time for Washington to abandon its utopian agenda and accept the reality, however unpleasant, that North Korea is a nuclear weapons power. Such a shift in policy also would mean moving to normalize the full range of diplomatic and economic relations with Pyongyang and initiating an ongoing security dialogue to minimize the risk of dangerous incidents between the two countries. It is irresponsibly dangerous to maintain Washington’s current approach of trying to isolate Pyongyang and force the regime to comply with demands that North Korea be a non-nuclear member of the international system.
DPRK leaders no longer even bother pretending that they are willing to negotiate about rescinding or limiting their country’s nuclear program. In April, Kim Yo-jong, North Korea dictator Kim Jong-un’s sister and powerful adviser, warned: “If the U.S. and its vassal forces {Washington’s East Asian allies] continue to insist on anachronistic ‘denuclearization,’ it will only give unlimited justness and justification to the advance of the DPRK aspiring after the building of the strongest nuclear force for self-defense.”
In late July, she softened her comments a little, contending that her brother’s personal relationship with President Trump was “not bad,” but she also stated: “Any effort to leverage personal relations to deny North Korea status as a nuclear power ‘will be thoroughly rejected.’” She added: “It is worth taking into account the fact that the year 2025 is neither 2018 nor 2019.” Specifically, the North’s “capabilities and geopolitical environment have radically changed.” She was especially referring to Pyongyang’s growing military ties to Russia and the prospect of Moscow’s greater support for the DPRK’s nuclear aspirations in exchange for the military aid that Pyongyang already is giving to Russia in its war against Ukraine.
Trump apparently tried to improve the atmosphere slightly on July 31 when he stated that he remained open to meeting with Kim Jong-un again. Such a statement at least should ease fears that the president might try to apply his “Iran model” to North Korea and bomb the DPRK’s nuclear installations. Such a move would be extraordinarily perilous since, unlike Iran, North Korea already has an operational nuclear arsenal. However, Trump vitiated most of the beneficial potential of his conciliatory diplomatic gesture when he emphasized that the purpose of a new summit meeting would be to continue “the dialogue on denuclearization.”
U.S. officials must adjust their policies on nuclear proliferation to make them correspond to current and looming global realities. Israel is and has been for many years an undeclared nuclear-weapons state. That status is hardly a secret. North Korea has now also barged into the ranks of such powers. It does no good to deny such obvious realities. Indeed, it is worse than useless to ignore the larger implications of Pyongyang’s new capabilities in the nuclear arena.
Policymakers in Washington have some urgent issues that must be addressed, and reducing the danger of a disastrous military collision with the DPRK should be at the top of the list. A more sustainable policy will require some big changes on the part of the United States. The first step should be to sign a peace treaty with Pyongyang to replace the 1953 armistice that halted the fighting during the Korean War. After 62 years of a twilight “frozen conflict,” it is time for both sides to move on.
A full peace treaty will require the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the United States and the DPRK. If Kim’s regime is wise, it will also use that occasion to face reality and officially establish relations with the government in Seoul. Even if Pyongyang foolishly declines to do so, Washington still must move to develop a steady, more constructive relationship with its longtime adversary. Lifting economic sanctions as soon as possible would be another essential step. Establishing a communications hotline between the military commands in the two countries also is imperative to prevent a tragic accident or miscalculation that could lead to a nuclear clash.
Even under the best of circumstances, establishing decent relations between the United States and North Korea’s bizarre, horridly repressive government will not be easy. However, the alternative of stubbornly persisting in Washington’s current, utterly impractical policy is a blueprint for catastrophe.
