Before the U.S. struck Iran’s civilian nuclear facilities in an unprovoked and illegal bombing, a diplomatic settlement to the nuclear standoff was on the table. Retired ambassador and former Iranian nuclear negotiator Seyed Hossein Mousavian says that he has been told by an informed Iranian source that “the key elements of the deal between [Trump’s special envoy] Witkoff and [Iran’s foreign minister] Araghchi were agreed upon.”
“Iran would accept maximum nuclear inspections and transparency,” including implementing the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol. They would either convert or export their stockpile of 60% enriched uranium, cease high-level enrichment and cap their enrichment at the 3.67% needed for a civilian energy program. Finally, Iran would fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in resolving any outstanding technical ambiguities. In return, Iran would be permitted to have its civilian nuclear program, and the U.S. would lift all nuclear-related sanctions.
Such a deal would satisfy Iran’s demand to exercise its “inalienable right to a civilian [nuclear] program” and America’s demand to ensure that Iran’s program never become weaponized. But before it could be signed, U.S. President Donald Trump succumbed to pressure and undermined the talks by demanding the Libya model. That demand killed any hope for a diplomatic resolution.
The Libya model is code for zero enrichment and the complete abandonment of Iran’s civilian nuclear program: a demand that Iran will never agree to.
On December 19, 2003, Libya announced that it would completely dismantle its nuclear program. In return, Libya was promised sanctions relief and normalization of relations with the U.S. and the international community. But the promised relief never came. Relations never normalized, and Libya’s requests for international assistance in developing nuclear power for peaceful civilian purposes were blocked.
In 2011, the U.S. bombed Libya, overthrew the Gaddafi regime and murdered Moammar Gaddafi. The U.S. deception was observed by the world, including Iran.
North Korea was watching the lesson too: “[t]he Gaddafi regime in Libya could not escape the fate of destruction after being deprived of their foundations for nuclear development and giving up nuclear programmes of their own accord,” North Korea said.
The North Korea model proposes that the only deterrence against an untrustworthy and threatening America is developing nuclear weapons. Libya was bombed. Iran was bombed. North Korea was not bombed. In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in 2006, two days after testing its first nuclear device, that its “nuclear test was entirely attributable to the US nuclear threat, sanctions and pressure” and that it “compelled to substantially prove its possession of nukes to protect its sovereignty.”
North Korea had always articulated its stance as a conditional. If the U.S. eliminates the need for deterrence by eliminating its threats, then North Korea will negotiate the elimination of its nuclear deterrent. In 2017, North Korea’s Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un, explained, “Unless the US hostile policy toward the DPRK and the nuclear threat are fundamentally resolved, we will not put nuclear and ballistic rockets on the negotiating table under any circumstances.”
In a speech made after passing a law that, for the first time, declared North Korea a nuclear weapons state that will “never give up” its nuclear weapons, Kim Jong Un again said, “As long as nuclear weapons exist on Earth, and imperialism and the anti-North Korean maneuvers of the US and its followers remain, our road to strengthening our nuclear force will never end.”
The U.S. has consistently threatened North Korea. In 2022, the U.S. said that its commitment to defending Japan and South Korea was “ironclad” and made clear that it would “use the full range of U.S. defense capabilities to defend our allies, including nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities.”
In his first term in office, Trump threatened that if North Korea made “any more threats to the United States… they will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen” and that if “forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea.”
The threats are not new but continuous. During the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur said that he “see[s] here a unique use for the atomic bomb.” He would later say that he “would have dropped 30 or so atomic bombs.” On December 9, MacArthur requested commander’s discretion to use atomic bombs, and he submitted a list of potential targets. On July 9, 1950, at the start of the Korean War, the Joint Chiefs of Staff debated “whether or not A-bombs should be made available to MacArthur.”
President Truman made the threat public in a November 1950 press conference, when he warned that the U.S. might use any weapon in its arsenal. While Truman was speaking, Air Force General George Stratemeyer put the Strategic Air Command on warning to be prepared to dispatch bombers with nuclear capabilities.
According to Daniel Ellsberg, “when Eisenhower arrived in the White House, the Korean War was stalemated. Eisenhower ended the impasse in a hurry. He secretly got word to the Chinese that he would drop nuclear bombs on North Korea unless a truce was signed immediately.”
Ellsberg also reports that, in 1995, the Clinton administration secretly threatened North Korea that it could use nuclear weapons against North Korea’s nuclear reactor program.
The danger present today, and the lesson learned from history, is that, if the U.S. continues to insist on the Libya model for Iran, Iran may feel compelled to follow the North Korea model, a model they never planned to follow.
Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear program was protected by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But, when the U.S. bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities without UN Security Council approval, the IAEA neither came to Iran’s legal defence nor criticized the United States.
On June 20, Iran filed a formal complaint against IAEA director general Rafael Grossi in the Security Council, accusing him of failing to be impartial and failing to criticize the U.S. breach of the NPT. Iran insisted that Grossi’s “passivity… amounts to de facto complicity.”
On July 2, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian gave final approval to a law suspending cooperation with the IAEA. According to the law, “IAEA inspectors will not be permitted to enter Iran unless the security of the country’s nuclear facilities and that of peaceful nuclear activities is guaranteed.”
As of now, “Iran remains committed to the NPT and its Safeguards Agreement.” However, their commitments under the NPT will now be coordinated through Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. Some, or all, IAEA inspectors have now left Iran.
Iran’s Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, has also made clear that Iran will not “back down from enrichment.” On June 25, Trump said that the U.S. would recommence negotiations with Iran within the next week. On July 3, the U.S. was still intending to meet with Araghchi in Oslo within the week.
But anger in Iran over the 12 days of bombing is intense. A foreign ministry spokesperson says that “Public opinion is currently so angry that no one even dares to talk about negotiations and diplomacy.” While saying that “[t]he doors of diplomacy will never slam shut,” Araghchi responded to reports of imminent talks with the United States by saying, “I don’t think negotiations will restart as quickly as that…. We will have to first ensure that America will not revert to targeting us in a military attack during the negotiations.”
The worst outcome for the U.S. and the world would be Iran following the North Korea model and continuing its nuclear program – or taking it in a direction it never intended to before being bombed by the United States – hidden from the gaze of the international community: a decision Iran has not so far made.
After the bombings, they have already reiterated that their “policy has not changed on enrichment. Iran has every right to do enrichment within its territory. The only thing that we have to observe is not to go for militarization.”
History is full of lessons if we did not so readily rewrite or ignore history. Iran will never concede to the Libya model. The U.S. will never permit the North Korea model. The answer lies in a compromise that satisfies the demands of each: civilian enrichment for Iran with no possibility of weaponization. That compromise might be accomplished by a return to the deal that was on the table prior to the bombing or by a return to the idea of a nuclear consortium within which Iran can enrich uranium for civilian purposes but only in cooperation with partner countries who can also keep an eye on Iran’s nuclear program.
Ted Snider is a regular columnist on U.S. foreign policy and history at Antiwar.com and The Libertarian Institute. He is also a frequent contributor to Responsible Statecraft and The American Conservative as well as other outlets. To support his work or for media or virtual presentation requests, contact him at tedsnider@bell.net.