On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine with a small force of around 142,000 troops. Not enough to conquer Ukraine, the invading force was sufficient to persuade Ukraine to the negotiating table. Russian President Vladimir Putin has claimed that was the original goal of the military operation: “[t]he troops were there to push the Ukrainian side to negotiations.”
And it nearly worked. Within weeks, in Istanbul, a negotiated peace was within reach. It was only after the United States, the UK, Poland and their NATO allies pushed Ukraine off the path of diplomacy and onto the continued path of war that Putin mobilized more troops and more resources.
As Alexander Hill explains in the newly published book, The Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies, in the initial phase of the war, Russia struggled without the advantage of overwhelming numerical superiority and without committing their latest, most advanced equipment. With the U.S. and its NATO partners providing the Ukrainian armed forces not only with their most advanced weapons systems, but with the intelligence to effectively use them, Ukraine actually had “an overall technological edge during the initial phases of the war.” But the Russian armed forces proved to be very adaptable. They adopted new tactics and a much more methodical approach to the war, introduced advanced weapons systems, and demonstrated a capability to adapt to and destroy the most advanced Western weapons and equipment.
By the time the Ukrainian counteroffensive had failed to meet any of its goals, the tide had turned, and Russia was irreversibly winning the war.
At the beginning of the war in Istanbul, before the inconceivable loss of life, a negotiated end to the war could have been signed. Three years later, after the loss of more land and hundreds of thousands more lives and limbs, a similar negotiated peace will be signed, only adjusted to the current realities on the ground. Ukraine could have had a similar deal but maintained all their territory but Crimea. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers have died or been injured in vain in pursuit of America’s fantasy of a NATO without limits and a weakened Russia.
Russia went to the negotiating table in Istanbul in a weaker position than it goes to the table today. It has survived the war of sanctions and isolation and won the war against Ukrainian soldiers and NATO weapons on the battlefield. Russia will be willing to enter a ceasefire, but only if they can accomplish without fighting everything they can accomplish with fighting.
Tragically, three years later, the ceasefire talks will pick up where the Istanbul talks left off. Everything in between was in vain. Witkoff has said that “[t]here were very, very what I’ll call cogent and substantive negotiations framed in something that’s called the Istanbul Protocol Agreement. We came very, very close to signing something.” He then added that “I think we’ll be using that framework as a guidepost to get a peace deal done between Ukraine and Russia.”
And if you don’t believe that the remaining differences could have been bridged and a peace signed in Istanbul, then get ready for a very long war. Because those are the very same points that will need to be negotiated if the current ceasefire proposal is to succeed.
After all the loss of land and loss of life, Ukraine will still surrender territory and NATO membership. They will not receive a security guarantee that involves a U.S. military commitment. Kursk has collapsed in a costly strategic failure and the Ukrainian armed forces are barely hanging on across the full length of the 1,000-mile front in eastern Ukraine. Russia is not going to stop the war without receiving a signed agreement from the U.S. and NATO that there will be no Ukraine in NATO nor NATO in Ukraine. And they are not going to stop the war without Crimea and at least some of the four oblasts they have annexed and a guarantee in the Ukrainian constitution of the protection of the rights of ethnic Russians in the territory that remains in Ukraine.
Putin has made clear that the idea of a ceasefire and a negotiated peace is “the right one” and that Russia “support[s] it” but that “there are questions we need to discuss” and that any ceasefire negotiations would need to address the “original causes” of the war.”
It seems clear that, before the U.S. pressured Ukraine into expressing a “readiness to accept the U.S. proposal to enact an immediate, interim 30-day ceasefire,” they had already laid the groundwork by discussing with Russia, who can go on fighting to achieve their nonnegotiable goals, what those nonnegotiable goals are.
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has confirmed, for example, that the Saudi Arabia talks with Ukraine included discussions about “territorial concessions.” On Sunday, U.S. President Donald Trump said that when he next talks to Putin, “we will be talking about land, we will be talking about power plants.” He said “they were already discussing ‘dividing up certain assets’.” U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has already said that any thoughts of recovering Ukraine’s lost territory is “an unrealistic objective” and an “illusionary goal.”
And, most importantly, Hegseth has also stipulated that Trump “does not support Ukraine’s membership in NATO as part of a realistic peace plan.” And Trump has shared that verdict with his NATO allies. On March 14, when NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte was asked if Trump had taken NATO membership for Ukraine off the table in negotiations, he simply replied, “Yes.”
From the time Ukraine was nudged away from the negotiating table in Istanbul to the time it will return to the negotiating table, all the loss of life and land was in vain. It is preestablished that Ukraine will not recover all of its territory, and it is preestablished that they will not become a member of NATO. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers have died for nothing but the pursuit of American hubris. And that should make Americans very angry.
Ted Snider is a regular columnist on U.S. foreign policy and history at Antiwar.com and The Libertarian Institute. He is also a frequent contributor to Responsible Statecraft and The American Conservative as well as other outlets. To support his work or for media or virtual presentation requests, contact him at tedsnider@bell.net.
