Two Cents About COIN
The war in Afghanistan, according to Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s recent assessment, is "a situation that defies simple solutions or quick fixes. Success demands a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign." McChrystal and other American leaders calling for a "surge" of additional U.S. troops into Afghanistan to mirror the alleged success of the "surge" in Iraq are voicing their belief that the doctrinal framework for the original surge – COIN, or manpower-intensive counterinsurgency warfare – is a widely-applicable tool in asymmetric warfare that the U.S. ought to employ in Afghanistan.
Top decisionmakers in the U.S. military, including Gen. McChrystal and Gen. David Petraeus, continue to express their faith in the doctrine, which they played major roles in creating. Prominent Republicans in Congress, who almost unanimously support sending more troops to Afghanistan, have endorsed a nation-building strategy that relies heavily on COIN over a counterterrorism strategy that focuses on targeting al-Qaeda and other militants from a distance. Several key figures in the Obama administration also appear to favor that approach.
It may be true that, as military expert Stephen Biddle said in recent Congressional testimony, "the U.S. is an unusually experienced counterinsurgent force today," and "the new Army/Marine counterinsurgency doctrine…is the product of a nearly unprecedented degree of internal debate, external vetting, historical analysis, and direct recent combat experience."
But these very factors that have encouraged so many highly capable U.S. leaders to sign on to "COIN" should cause observers to be wary of the doctrine and the currency it increasingly enjoys in the American political debate. After all, the more enthusiastic we are about the potential of COIN warfare, the more blind we will be to its costs, which are enormous.
We can and must think about contemporary problems – such as what strategy the U.S. should pursue in Afghanistan – through the lenses of relevant theories and historical analogies. But it is foolish to think within the box of a single analogy, such as the Iraq "surge," or a single theory, such as the idea that we can succeed at counterinsurgency and nation-building by deploying generous numbers of ground troops and focusing on winning the "hearts and minds" of local communities.
Our need to make quick decisions and cope with a complex world creates a powerful incentive for us to create "rules of thumb," default beliefs, habits, choices, or courses of action that we adopt almost without thinking. And yet when those in the halls of power make major decisions on the basis of such "rules of thumb," the results can sometimes be disastrous. It behooves political observers to be aware of new decision-making habits, and the spread of some new piece of "conventional wisdom," in their leaders.
It is important to remember that military leaders have a major incentive to endorse a COIN approach in Afghanistan. According to General Petraeus and other experts, most successful COIN operations require very high numbers of U.S. troops on the ground – numbers that may be politically and logistically impossible for the Obama administration to accept.
Because the number of troops that can be reasonably demanded for a COIN operation is essentially limitless, mission failure can be blamed on the executive branch for not sending enough troops rather than on military leaders, the combat environment, or the COIN playbook itself. As Gen. McChrystal wrote in his assessment: "Success is not ensured by additional forces alone, but continued underresourcing will likely cause failure."
Organizational psychology and the logic of bureaucracies provide more clues into the wave of COIN-fever that appears to have struck so many of our political and military leaders. Simply put, it was neither easy nor cheap for the military to develop COIN doctrine as we attempted to salvage the war in Iraq in recent years, and now COIN feels like hard-won wisdom that we should put to the test in another theater of war. It’s a classic case of sunk costs: it is felt that we paid too much for COIN to abandon it now.
Policymakers’ belief in the power of COIN may encourage them to see military solutions where none exist. If the U.S. opts to send tens of thousands of additional ground troops to Afghanistan in order to pursue a comprehensive COIN strategy, it will be taking on a great deal of risk and incurring substantial additional costs in pursuit of a highly uncertain outcome.
Read more by Ryan McCarl
- Resist the Urge to Confront Kim Jong-Il – June 30th, 2009
- War: The More We Spend on It,
the More We Get – June 14th, 2009 - Torture Proponents’ Desire for Distance Is Telling – June 1st, 2009
- Out of Range – May 14th, 2009
- The Next Forgotten War – April 19th, 2009





Don Bacon
November 7th, 2009 at 6:33 am
"The doctrinal framework for the original surge – COIN, or manpower-intensive counterinsurgency warfare – is a widely-applicable tool in asymmetric warfare that the U.S. ought to employ in Afghanistan."
Yes, but that is the tool, but the foundation for successful COIN, according to Field Manual 3-24 (by Petraeus) is a viable Host Nation (HN), and we know what that's like. The concept (or charade, if you will) is that the US is in country to help the HN government.
from FM 3-24:
There are five overarching requirements for successful COIN operations:
fedupandsick
November 7th, 2009 at 1:39 pm
What's really scary is that the "surge' in Iraq was somehow considered a success when in fact it didn't come close to meeting it's objective. Time heals all stupidity.
paulBass
November 7th, 2009 at 2:50 pm
im just so glad that DOD decided to postpone all deployment until all soldiers are given at least 6 months of pashto and dari language training.
i mean it sure will be a big help when a soldier can tell the difference between a couple of Afghans having a domestic dispute or talking about an ambush down the road.
i mean you know the military is going all out in this effort when they are recruiting from the most elites language training experts……. such as……. Craigs list
http://charlotte.craigslist.org/edu/1431476674.ht...
me2
November 7th, 2009 at 11:13 pm
What's really scary is that we've been in Afghanistan for eight years, and the best that the people who've been there can come up with is "Hey, this might have worked in Iraq. Lets try it here."
Is that really the best they can come up with.
Of course, what really happened in Iraq was that a society that had previously had three religious/social groups largely integrated with each other fractured apart in a wave of violence. Then, as the groups settled back down in new segregated arrangements, the violence dropped off. It just happens that at the peak of the violence, these desperate idiots decided upon bureaucracy procedure 101, which was "'announce a new strategy … any new strategy .. just announce something new."
So,now they are claiming it worked, when in reality the drop in violence had little to do with it. Actually, they may have been rather lucky in that the violence was dropping as they implemented this. The strategy of scattering little penny-packets of troops is very risky. And if Iraq had exploded up into a full scale civil war with the US in the middle of it, then these scattered small packets of troops in their little bases may have suffered heavy losses.
Scatter lots of small outposts of troops across Afghanistan, and its very likely that the veteran guerrilla warriors over there will know exactly what to do with them. If you aren't sure of what that is, go watch Lawerence of Arabia again.
me2
November 7th, 2009 at 11:16 pm
Don Bacon …..
I love military double speak
"HN forces and other counterinsurgents must establish control of one or more areas from which to operate."
Yeah, that's a good idea … in fact, if you can't do that, you better start flying out your puppet government on helicopters, because if you can't control even one area, you've lost.
"Operations should be initiated from the HN government’s areas of strength against areas under insurgent control."
It probably took them years to figure out that attacking the enemy held areas was much better than attacking the friendly held areas. They probably had to bring in the RAND people in order to make that giant leap forward.
人人可建粉丝组组长
November 8th, 2009 at 4:15 pm
美国人不会因为华盛顿是奴隶主而不拥戴他为美国国父。这就是包容心。
——摘自《何健语录》,欢迎转载,谢谢支持!
Steve Naidamast
November 8th, 2009 at 6:40 pm
As a military historian myself, I don't believe there is any evidence to substantiate COIN theory. Though an insurgency cannot defeat a state a state has never defeated a determined insurgency. Some of the factors that may have become part of current COIN theory may have arisen from the many unsuccessful US interventions in South America and earlier from Viet Nam. Beyond these two situations, there has never been a successful nation building strategy in history, including that of Israel if one were to include its development as part of the process.
COIN theory, in my view, has basically been developed to provide the US government with a cover for extending and expending monies on useless military interventions whereby the goals are always something other than what is fed to the media. For example, in Afgahnistan it has always been the oil pipeline routs and has been from the day the Bush Administration invaded that country in response to 9-11 in 2001. It has nothing to do with democracy or idealism or liberty and the rights of the citizens.
If you don't believe this then ask yourself, when was the last time the US intervened in another country's affairs and succeeded with an outcome that benefited the entire population where their lives were substantially better than that before the intervention?
KSB29
November 8th, 2009 at 8:41 pm
"Though an insurgency cannot defeat a state a state has never defeated a determined insurgency. "
I can only think of a few, and they are quite a stretch. The USSR's actions after WWII in suppressing nationalist feelings in Ukraine, Hungary and Czech republic and Russia's last go around with Chechnya.
In the former's case you have population that are already starved, beat down, war weary, and is without friends. In Chechnya's case, while they did have outside support the nation is so small that Russia simply rounded up every single male of fighting age.
None of those conditions exist in Afghanistan or Iraq. Not to mention that in Russia's case at least the targets of her foreign misadventures shared a land border with their nation. They didn't have to worry about an uprising in a 3rd party nation cutting their supply lines.
"COIN theory, in my view, has basically been developed to provide the US government with a cover for extending and expending monies on useless military interventions whereby the goals are always something other than what is fed to the media."
Agreed. Today's COIN can't even define what defeat looks like, let alone victory. At least when those last helicopter lifted off from the Saigon embassy you knew that war was over.
There is still one way to tell. When the invading power drowns in debt and goes utterly broke.
Steve Naidamast
November 8th, 2009 at 9:03 pm
I tend to agree with KSB29's assessment of the nationalist reactions to Soviet Russia after WWII.
However, a little clarification here. To my knowledge there was no real insurgency in The Ukraine or the Czech Republic. Though, there may have been violent actions I don't remember such as being defined with any coordination among a defined insurgent formation. Hungary is somewhat different where the majority of such action I believe took place only in Budapest, which successfully defended against the current Soviet garrison stationed there. When the Soviet Union moved in reinforcements the Hungarian Revolution was over. Chechnya of the four countries mentioned was the only one to promote an insurgency and somewhat successfully for many years. However, the way I understood it, the majority of the populace did not provide support for the insurgents thus eventually allowing Russian forces to finally overwhelm them.
Iraq and Afghanistan. as KSB29 states have completely different condition but in both cases the majority of both populations want the US forces out and thus either passively or directly support the insurgents.
Though it is often promoted that the Sunnis and Shia in Iraq have historically been at each other's throats, according to at least one document I read, this has been more propaganda than reality since neither the Shia or the Sunni invested in attacks against each other to the level of ferocity that Kurdish forces presented Hussein with. If the document I read can be corroborated than it would make sense that the propaganda aspect was promoted by US military PR in order for the governmentmilitary to make decisions as to which side they would be supporting. And according to other documents the US has in fact created "mischief" between the two religious sects…